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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment analyzes the problematical legal status of children. It
incorporates knowledge derived from other disciplines and from other areas of
the law to assess the child's present place in the legal system. The common
thread running through the discussion is the analogy drawn to the broad
equitable principles of trust law as a model for defining the rights and duties
existing among the child, his parents, and the state. The trust model con-
structed upon these principles assumes that the child has the full rights of an
adult, but that his rights are held in trust by the parent or the state until the
child develops the full rational powers of an adult. This approach requires
that the child's parents and the state be not merely responsible for the child
but, in some respects, responsible to him for decisions made regarding his
welfare during his minority.
The institution of childhood itself has been described as a relatively recent
development. 1 In medieval times, the young child, once freed from strict
physical dependence upon his mother or nurse, was introduced into the world
of adults.2 Between the ages of five and seven, he began participating in adult
work and recreation. 3 This undifferentiated role was changed when the
moralist philosophers of the seventeenth century put a new emphasis on the
responsibility of the parent in ensuring the physical, and above all the
spiritual, training of the child.4 The resulting withdrawal from adult life into
a protective sphere of family privacy and control gave the child a more
important place in the family.5 But it also effectively "quarantined" him from
early participation in adult activities that had earlier been available to him. 6
Parents began to exercise strong measures of physical domination early in the
child's life to inculcate a tradition of passive obedience. 7 This was a preven-
tive measure to avoid later rebellion against critical decisions about marriage
and occupation which the parent could make even if the child had become an
adult by the time such decisions were made. 8 Even upon reaching maturity,
one was expected to show signs of obedience verging on servility to one's
parents. 9 Therefore, it can be seen that the same historical roots gave rise
both to the concept of childhood as a distinct period of life and to the concept
of the family as an institution bearing a special protective responsibility for
that period.10
Because of the child's presumed incompetence arising from his physical and
intellectual immaturity, the law governing families initially vested power over
1. P. Aries, Centuries of Childhood 128-33 (1962).
2. Id. at 128.
3. Id. at 329.
4. Id. at 412.
5. See id. at 398.
6. Id. at 412.
7. Stone, The Rise of the Nuclear Family in Early Modern England: The Patriarchal Stage,
in The Family in History 42 (C. Rosenberg ed. 1975).
8. Id. at 45.
9. Id. at 41.
10. See Ariks, supra note 1, at 403.
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the child in the father as an adult and legally responsible person." Even
constitutional decisions recognized the parents' fundamental "right" to make
child rearing decisions free from governmental interference, in the absence of
physical abuse or gross neglect of the children in that parent's care. 12 Since it
was thought inappropriate to extend adult rights to the child, the child had
few rights of his own. 13 This lack of rights, the unilateral nature of decisions
regarding a child's welfare, and the exclusivity of parental custody and
control gave the child a legal position comparable to that of a chattel. '4 The
major problem with the present legal status of children is that it allows
parents and, increasingly, the state to assert their own legally recognized
interests over a child without any system of checks and balances to ensure
that these interests are in fact exercised to protect and promote the child's
development into a mature, productive citizen. Accordingly, any re-
evaluation of the child as a legal person must do at least two things, and these
are the objectives of this Comment. First, a re-evaluation must define those
interests that are unique to a child as a child and require legal protection of
them as recognized rights. Second, it must formulate a workable concept that
will allow adults to exercise rights on behalf of the child until such time as he
is capable of exercising his own rights. It is in this second area that the trust
model may help to define guidelines.
At the outset, the appropriateness of the trust model requires discussion. A
basic premise in this Comment is that children do have rights. The Supreme
Court has given express recognition to this proposition in recent years, noting
that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitiutional rights."'15 Yet it is clear that the child himself, in his early
years, has not yet developed sufficient intellectual powers to exercise such
rights or, in some cases, even to recognize their existence and the alternatives
available in their exercise. 16 What is missing under present law is some
11. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 171, 186
(1916).
12. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents may send children to
private rather than public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents may require
that a child have the opportunity to study particular subjects). But see Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parents may not require a child's participation in religious activities that
might be harmful to the child).
13. See Ladd, Civil Liberties for Students-At What Age?, 3 J.L. & Educ. 251. 251 (1974)
("Adults have many rights, including the kind that go along with merely being citizens .... The
very young, on the other hand, have few rights, and almost no civil liberties.").
14. See pt. IV(B)(1) infra.
15. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (upholding the right of a minor
under the age of eighteen years to have an abortion without the consent of her parents). See also
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (recognizing a
minor's substantive first amendment right to freedom of speech absent a showing by the school
authorities that the prohibited conduct would materially and substantially interfere with appro-
priate school discipline); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (a juvenile charged with a crime is entitled
to the same due process protection as an adult).
16. It has been found that only in adolescence does a child begin to use mental processes
similar to those of an adult and to understand the patterns and motivations of human behavior on
an adult level. See J. Ffavell, Cognitive Development 114-43 (1977); note 38 infra and accom-
panying text.
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conceptual mechanism which explains why rights may be exercised in the
child's interest until such time as his own capacity has developed. Tradition-
ally, parents have exercised control over a child as part of their own adult
prerogatives within the family, thus isolating the child from the recognition or
exercise of his own rights. 1 7 In addition, the state, by undertaking compulsory
education 18 and by administering a system of juvenile justice,' 9 plays an
increasingly important role in determining the status of the child. With the
advent of discretionary and in some cases mandatory child advocates in legal
proceedings, 20 there is yet another significant adult to exercise a child's rights
on his behalf. 21 Consideration of the trust model in defining the parent-child,
state-child, or advocate-child relationship provides several advantages.
The corpus of the trust, 22 which the trustee must protect and develop in the
beneficiary's behalf,23 consists of the body of rights which are, or should be,
ascribed to children. It should be clear that the Irust law is used here only as a
conceptual analogy, since no conventional trust could be formed with such an
unconventional res as a person's rights. 24 One strength of such a conceptual
model is that it reinforces the fact that the rights in question belong to the
child as beneficiary and not to either the parent or the state as trustee. To take
one example, a parent, as a practical matter, must decide whether to send his
child to a public or parochial school because children of grammar school age
would be unable to make a reasoned choice between the two schools. Because
the parent makes the decision, it might be concluded that it is the right of the
parent to determine what kind of education the child should receive. 25 Under
the trust model, however, the parent would be allowed to decide for the child
not by virtue of his own right but only by virtue of his position as trustee. 26
The right to choose between two schools, as a corollary of the right to receive
an education, 27 would be treated under the trust model as part of the corpus
17. See Hafen, Reservations About Children's Rights, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 605, 611-19.
18. See pt. MI infra.
19. See pt. II infra.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
21. See generally Keith-Lucas, "Speaking for the Child": A Role-Analysis and Some Cautions,
in The Rights of Children 218-31 (A. Wilkerson ed. 1973), which distinguishes five roles which
the child advocate might be called upon to fill in a child's behalf, namely: "1. Direct representa-
tion of a child or of his established rights; 2. Parental intervention in cases of alleged neglect or
dependency; 3. Representation of the child's stake in the proceedings; 4. Expert witness to a
child's believed needs; 5. Permanent representative, or guardian." Id. at 230.
22. See G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts § 25, at 69-70 (5th ed. 1973).
23. See id. § 95, at 343-50; notes 28-30 infra.
24. But see Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, § 25, at 69 ("[Any transferable interest, vested
or contingent, legal or equitable, real or personal, tangible or intangible, may be held in trust.").
25. The Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on the question of whether the right to direct a
child's education belongs to the parent or to the child. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). But the Court has stated in dicta that the right belongs to the parent. See id. at 230-32;
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (referring to "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control').
26. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, §§ 88-89, at 319-25.
27. See pt. III infra for a discussion of a child's rights within the compulsory education
system.
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of the trust-the rights which belong to the child. The fact that the rights
which a parent exercises belong not to him but to the beneficial owners
imposes two important limitations upon the exercise of such rights. At the
same time it offers two additional conceptual advantages to the use of the
trust model to define children's rights.
The first limitation upon the exercise of power by parents or the state under
the trust model would be the standard of care and loyalty imposed upon those
in fiduciary relationships. 28 Property law imposes a particularly stringent
standard of care upon a trustee. Since the law imposes such a high standard
upon the caretaker of mere property, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a
somewhat higher standard of conduct might also be required of a person in
charge of a living child. The analogy is especially appropriate because in
many respects the family resembles a fiduciary relationship. This relationship
is an intimate one, in which the beneficiary must "place great confidence in
the [party who exercises] a high degree of control over the affairs of the
beneficiary."29 A court asked to redefine the duties of parents or the state
might well look to the duty of loyalty imposed by the law of trusts for a
conceptual analogue. A trustee is required to exercise the powers given him
solely in the interests of the beneficiary, allowing neither his own self-interest
nor even the interests of other beneficiaries to color his decisions. 30 Similarly,
where the child's needs are distinct from the adules, a court might require
that the parents give full consideration to the child's best interests by
exercising the child's rights in a manner that will protect and preserve the
child's future options. 31 A vegetarian parent, for example, who cannot
adequately nourish a growing child, must be willing to modify his own strict
compliance with what may be an adequate regimen for adult growth to meet
the nutritional needs of the child. As in any fiduciary relationship, the courts
should be empowered to oversee the proper execution of the trust, to enforce,
where necessary, the trustee's fiduciary duties, and to intervene actively in the
relationship when it determines that there has been an abuse of the trustee's
discretion in handling the trust powers. 32 Thus the use of a trust model would
28. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, § 95, at 343-50.
29. Id. § 1, at 2.
30. Id. § 95, at 343-50.
31. Justice White, for example, argued that, although the Constitution prohibits state
interference with a parent's discretion to direct the education of his child, the parent is not free to
reduce the child's future options to choose among available occupations and life styles by
subjecting him to the parent's "idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a
productive and happy member of society." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972)
(concurring opinion). "A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent
talents of its children but also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that they may later
choose . I... d. at 240. A court might, therefore, in a decision compatible with Justice White's
view, recognize that a parent has a duty to choose the type of education for his child that will
maximize the child's options for future participation in society, regardless of the parent's
preferences in life style. See also Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a
Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 32, 41-49 (1973).
32. See Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, § 89, at 321-25.
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allow a court to draw upon an existing body of law as a conceptual analogy in
re-defining the child's legal relationship with adults or with the state. By
introducing the concept of loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary, the trust
model would direct the attention of the trustee and the enforcing court to the
child whose rights are being exercised.
The second limitation on the power of a parent or the state to exercise a
child's rights which can be derived from the trust model concerns the duration
of the trustee's powers. The law presently defines childhood in a monolithic
way, 33 choosing an arbitrary date for majority at which time the child is
recognized as having achieved adulthood with an abruptness comparable to
an armed Athena leaping fully grown from the head of Zeus. Yet it is clear
from child development studies and from ordinary observation34 that a child's
capacity to understand, to define his own interests, and to exercise indepen-
dent judgment develops gradually, and, in certain matters, matures well
before the designated date of majority.35 Under the trust model, a trust
terminates when its purposes have been accomplished. 36 Taking each right of
the child individually, it is possible to emancipate a child in stages rather than
in an abrupt and arbitrary fashion. As the child demonstrates the capacity to
exercise a right himself, the underlying rationale for entrusting the exercise of
that right to an-adult-to protect the child from the consequences of his own
imprudent decisions-is eliminated. 37 Upon the demonstration of capacity,
33. The monolithic treatment of the concept of majority by legislatures has been criticized as
encouraging a similar "off-on" arrangement for the recognition of rights and liberties under which
the adolescent is given no legally recognized opportunity to determine his own actions up to and
including the day before his majority. See Ladd, Civil Liberties for Students-At What Age?, 3
J.L. & Educ. 251, 252 (1974).
34. See generally M. Beadle, A Child's Mind (1971) (a description of early learning processes).
35. The first major shift in psychological functioning from primitive impulsive thought
toward more nearly adult logical controlled thought occurs around the age of seven. See Skolnick,
The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 38, 68 (Summer 1975).
36. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, § 150, at 539-40.
37. Some courts have recognized that, in many instances, the family is no longer able to
protect children from "the diverse influences of the street." See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). Assault and robbery are now commonplace inside many schools. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1978, at 9, col. 2. As one judge stated: "The picture . . . of high school
freshmen and sophomores (to say nothing of juniors and seniors) as fragile, budding egos flushed
with the delicate rose of sexual naivety, is ... unreal and out of touch with contemporary facts of
life . . . ." Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 526 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J., dissenting). See
also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977) (judicial notice taken of the high
incidence of sexual activity among minors); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72
(1976) (recognition that females ten and eleven years of age are seeking abortions); Konner,
Adolescent Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1977, at 21, col. 4.
Since children today may be exposed to influences which even adults were sheltered from at the
beginning of the century, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has recognized that a
"competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant" should be allowed to decide for
herself whether or not to have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976) (striking down a statute requiring parental consent for abortions). In Danforth the Court
1978] RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
the relevant right should be withdrawn from the corpus of the trust and
vested in the child whose reason has developed sufficiently for him to exercise
the right prudently on his own behalf. 38
In order that the child may eventually be able to exercise his rights
prudently, the trust must be structured to ensure him broad opportunities to
develop the full capabilities of an adult. 39 In making decisions as trustees, the
parent or state agency should therefore avoid any action that might obstruct
the development of a child's ability to reason abstractly, his capacity to form
emotional relationships, his motivation to achieve goals, or other such skills
necessary for adult life. When presented with alternative courses of action on
the child's behalf, the trustee should make the choice that forecloses the
fewest future opportunities for the child. 40
The analogy from trust law may be carried further to provide a theory
behind the establishment of a trust involving a child's rights. Although the
state has played an increasing role as trustee, in its legislative functions it
recognized that a child has a fundamental right of privacy protected by the Constitution. Id. at
74. In terms of the trust model, it could be said that as long as a young child lacks the ability to
exercise her right of privacy prudently, the right is held in trust and exercised on her behalf by
her parents. By comparison, a girl who is old enough to bear children, and who has undertaken
the risk of becoming pregnant, should no longer be given any greater legal protection than an
adult is given from the consequences of her own possibly imprudent decisions. The purpose of the
trust-to protect the child-has terminated, and the child must be allowed to exercise her right of
privacy on her own behalf.
38. There is empirical evidence indicating that at least by adolescence children possess an
abstract reasoning ability comparable to that of an adult. Child psychologist Jean Piaget has
demonstrated that children over the age of twelve are capable of abstract reasoning in varying
degrees. See J. Piaget, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child (1959); J. Piaget, The Moral
Judgment of the Child (1948). Even child psychologists who believe that Piaget attributes reason
to children at too young an age agree that by middle adolescence the development of rational
powers in an individual is all but complete. See J. Horrocks, The Psychology of Adolescence 87
(4th ed. 1976); D. Rogers, The Psychology of Adolescence 154 (3d ed. 1977). But see Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring); Hafen, Reserations About
Children's Rights, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 605, 611-13 (1976).
39. One essential element in a child's development is the achievement of a sense of self-
esteem. See E. Hurlock, Adolescent Development 340-41 (4th ed. 1973); S. Samuels, Enhancing
Self-Concept in Early Childhood 33-35 (1977). Without a sense of.self-esteem a child will be
unable to form rewarding personal relationships or to participate effectively in society. See J.
Conger, Adolescence and Youth, Psychological Development in a Changing World 227 (2d ed.
1977). See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 566 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); J. Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 440 (1971). A child develops a sense of self-esteem, especially during adolescence, by
making important decisions for himself, thereby building a sense of personal competence and
initiative. J. Horrocks, The Psychology of Adolescence 343-44, 349 (4th ed. 1976). To ensure that
a child has the maximum opportunity to develop his self-esteem, the law, under the trust model,
should allow the child to exercise his rights in his own behalf as soon as the child is able to make
a prudent decision with respect to the right involved. When a child is competent to exercise the
right in his own behalf, the purpose of protecting the child by keeping the right in trust is no
longer relevant, and the trust should terminate.
40. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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operates also as settlor of the trust.4 1 By enacting statutes regulating such
matters as custody, 42 the age of majority,4 3 and the parental duties of
financial support of dependent children, 44 the state has acted much like the
settlor of a trust in determining the dimensions of the fiduciary relationship
between adult and child. Such laws, in effect, define who shall be given the
powers and responsibilities of child care.
Thus, the trust model provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the
conditions upon which the parent or the state may exercise the child's rights
and the proper duration of such exercise. The sections below investigate in
greater detail the nature of children's rights. The area contains conceptual
difficulties not encountered in dealing with other historically oppressed
groups. The situation of children is complicated by the fact that adults often
romanticize their own childhoods, and tend to forget the serious and troubling
problems a child faces as he grows and attempts to absorb and understand the
adult world.4 5 While it is proper to be concerned with the development of
adult capabilities, such concern should not be grounds for withholding from
children the respect and dignity we accord adults. "Childhood is a stage of life
itself, not just an apprenticeship.1 46
The individual sections below will define in detail some of the basic rights
that should be accorded to children. For introductory purposes, it will suffice
to state that this Comment is largely devoted to those rights relating to
childhood and development, namely, education, 47 custody,48 nurturing, 49 and
freedom from abuse. 50 However, extensive treatment will also be given to
legal procedural rights, 5 1 which were once assumed to belong only to adults.
II. A CHILD'S RIGHTS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Separate court systems for adults and juveniles' have existed in the United
States since 1899.2 The present separation is based on the belief that children
41. Cf. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 22, § 1, at 1 ("The settlor of a trust is the person who
intentionally causes the trust to come into existence.').
42. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240 (McKinney 1977).
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 2 (McKinney Supp. 1977) ("A 'minor' or 'infant'... is a
person under the age of eighteen years.").
44. See, e.g., N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act §§ 413-414 (McKinney 1975).
45. See J. Holt, Escape from Childhood 73-86 (1974).
46. Berger, The Child, the Law and the State, in Children's Rights 179 (1971).
47. See pt. ITI infra.
48. See pt. IV(B) infra.
49. See pt. IV(A) infra.
50. See pt. IV(C) infra.
51. See pt. H infra.
1. A juvenile court system developed because reformers were appalled by the application of
adult procedures and penalties to children. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). However, the
belief that, under adult law, children were severely punished for trivial offenses is more an
unjustified impression than a reality. Sanders, Some Early Beginnings of the Children's Court
[Vol. 46
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must be protected. 3 A protective philosophy has validity, but experience has
shown that a protective system fosters as many abuses as the traditional
system which subjected children to adult procedures and penalties. 4
Movement in England, in Juvenile Justice Philosophy:. Readings, Cases, Comments 42 (F. Faust
& P. Brantingham eds. 1974); see A. Platt, The Child Savers 193-212 (2d ed. 1977). There is
considerable evidence that for centuries child offenders have been treated with leniency. Sanders,
supra at 43. In fact, if the juvenile justice system had been such a radical concept, it is unlikely
that it would have been so readily accepted. Platt, supra at 194.
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles 1 (1974 & Supp. 1977);
Platt, supra note 1, at 9. Although elements of the concept of juvenile justice-a separate system
where children are protected from the adult criminal courts-had existed for a considerable time,
Faust & Brantingham, The Origin of The Juvenile Court-Nineteenth Century Philosophies, in
Juvenile Justice Philosophy- Readings, Cases, Comments 1 (F. Faust & P. Brantingham eds.
1974), the concept formally emerged with the establishment of the first juvenile court in Illinois in
1899, Davis, supra at 1; Platt, supra note 1, at 9. Today, every state, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico have juvenile court systems. 387 U.S. at 14.
3. The status of youth differs from the status of adulthood. Youth is a status of dependence
which "carries with it certain privileges and special protections not accorded adults." W. Stapleton
& L. Teitelbaum, In Defense of Youth 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stapleton). A child is a
"developing person" who starts life completely helpless and must slowly learn to live in society.
Id. Adult perception of the dependent status of children has not changed significantly in
centuries. John Locke, in the seventeenth century, wrote that children must be under their
parents' control until they learn to take care of themselves. When they achieve the ability to
understand "the principles by which they are governed," they may become independent.
Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights, 44 Ha-v. Educ. Rev. 142, 144
(1974); see pt. IV(A) infra.
Reformers sought to protect children from adult courts by the establishment of a separate court
system for children. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 547-48
(1957). Thus, the juvenile court proceeding was developed as an informal, civil, nonadversarial
hearing directed to the child's best interests. See Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the
Juvenile Court, 7 Crime & Delinquency 97, 98-99 (1961); Paulsen, supra at 549. The informalities
of a nonadversarial proceeding were intended to spare the child from "psychological trauma and
to facilitate a new focus on the child's condition rather than on his guilt." D. Katkin, D. Hyman
& J. Kramer, Juvenile Delinquency and the Juvenile Justice System 282 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Katlkin]; Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720 (1962).
The child is to "feel that he is the object of [the State's] care and solicitude," Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 120 (1909), not a party in a criminal proceeding.
Children were also to be protected from adult penal measures. Early reformers were appalled
that children could be given long prison sentences in jails with hardened criminals, or executed.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); Katkin, supra at 249. Thus, crime and punishment was
deemphasized in the juvenile system in favor of a policy of rehabilitation. T. Johnson, Introduc-
tion to the Juvenile Justice System 12-13 (1975); Platt, supra note 1, at 47; National District
Attorneys Ass'n, Juvenile Law and Procedure 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NDAA]; Flicker,
Standards for Juvenile Justice, 8 N.Y.U. Educ. Q. 15 (1977); Note, The New York Juvenile
Justice Reform Act of 1976: Restrictive Placement-An Answer to the Problem of Seriously
Violent Youth?, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 408, 409 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fordham Note].
4. Modern abuses are not as flagrant as the hanging of an eight-year-old for stealing candy,
but nevertheless exist. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), for instance, because Gerald Gault was
15 when he was taken into custody for making lewd phone calls, and therefore subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six years. Id. at
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Juvenile court procedure substitutes flexibility and informality for the
formality of the adult system.5 It had been presumed 6 that the juvenile court
afforded juveniles special protection which made constitutional protections
unnecessary. 7 In recent years, however, juvenile delinquents8 have been
guaranteed most due process rights, 9 because courts realized that the flexibil-
ity of the juvenile court proceeding had resulted in the arbitrary handling of
juveniles.10 Status offenders," on the other hand, have not been guaranteed
due process.' 2 The Court has been reluctant to grant full constitutional
protections to all juveniles13 and risk destroying the juvenile justice system 14
7. If Gerald has been over 18, his maximum punishment for the same offense would have been a
fine of no more than $50 or imprisonment for two months. Id. at 29.
5. See note 3 supra. For example, intake, a procedure in the juvenile system which does not
occur in adult proceedings, is an informal screening by court officials and probation officers of the
complaints filed against children. These officials then decide whether the case should be referred
to the juvenile court for a formal hearing. Experts estimate that one-half of the complaints are
disposed of at intake and not sent to the juvenile court. A Sussman, The Rights of Young People
90-91 (1977).
6. See notes 10, 15-20 infra and accompanying text.
7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). "It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the
special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the
substance of normal due process." Id. Thus, juveniles became, constitutionally, non-persons.
Stapleton, supra note 3, at 11; Kravitz, Due Process in Ohio for the Delinquent and Unruly
Child, 2 Cath. U.L. Rev. 53, 55 (1973).
8. A child is considered to be a juvenile delinquent if he violates state laws, federal laws, or
local ordinances. Johnson, supra note 3, at 32.
9. See note 115 infra.
10. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 533-56
(1966). "There is evidence, in fact, . . . that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." 383 U.S. at 556.
11. Juvenile status offenses are acts which are not prohibited for adults, "they are just for
kids." W. Sanders, Juvenile Delinquency 64 (1976); Sussman, supra note 5, at 53. Status offenses
include violations of ordinances such as curfew, truancy, tobacco and alcohol laws, Sanders,
supra at 64, and acts demonstrating incorrigibility, idleness, and immorality. Sussman, supra at
53; see, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2151.022 (Page 1976).
12. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1971); McNulty & White, The
Juvenile's Right to Treatment: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 16 Santa Clara L. Rev. 745, 753
(1976) [hereinafter cited as McNulty. Contra, Note, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a
Constitutional Right to Treatment?, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 624, 629 (1973) (hereinafter cited as
PINS] (The author of the note has read Gault beyond its limited holding. The Court specifically
stated that it was not considering "the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state." 387 U.S. at 13. The Court went on to say that It
was only considering the problems of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id.)
13. McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533, 545 (1971).
14. Id. at 551; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Juveniles fully protected by the Constitution would need no other substitute protection from
fatherly judges, informal hearings, and parens patriae. Perhaps the ultimate dissolution of the
1978] RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 679
and its special protective nature.' 5
Courts in the nineteenth century rationalized the absence of constitutional
safeguards in juvenile cases by distinguishing civil from personal liberty, 16
but the distinction was never fully developed. This section will develop the
distinction between civil and personal liberty and a child's right to each.
Further, this section will propose that the distinction can serve as a means to
approach the conflict between the special protections afforded juveniles and
the need for due process protection for status offenders.
A. Personal Liberty and Civil Liberty
Most Americans believe that they know what liberty is' 7-but, then, they
have never tried to define it. Those who attempt to define it resort too
frequently to a mere listing of its elements.18 One author came close to
defining liberty when he wrote:
[Liberty's] unique quality is that it seeks to accomplish no fixed end, but only seeks to
provide a process of living by which each man can work out for himself his own life
and his own conception of his own destiny, provided he stays within an area which
will allow others to have such right equally with him. 19
This "definition" suggests two aspects of liberty: an individual's freedom to
make decisions about his own life, and possible limitations on that freedom to
assure the freedom of others. The individual's right to make decisions about
his owh life will be referred to in this section as his right to personal liberty.
The individual's right to fair treatment when his personal liberty is limited by
the rights of others will be referred to as his civil liberty.
The Bill of Rights guarantees such personal liberties as freedom of speech,
association, religion, 20 and a right of privacy, 21 but personal liberty is broader
juvenile justice system will come, but for now the Court is disinclined to give impetus to it. See
403 U.S. at 551.
15. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21,
24 (1967). Constitutional guarantees were traded for rehabilitation, education, and salvation. M. °
Paulsen, The Problems of Juvenile Courts and the Rights of Children 5 (1975).
16. See, e.g., In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 373 (1882); People v. Turner, 55 I1. 280, 284 (1870);
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
17. See Brown, What Liberty Is, 47 A.B.A.J. 290 (1961).
18. See, e.g., J. Raws, A Theory of Justice 201-05 (1971); Brown, Defining Liberty: An
Analysis of Its Three Elements, 51 A.B.A.J. 359 (1965); Foley, Individual Liberty and the Rule of
Law, 7 Willamette L.J. 396 (1971).
19. Brown, supra note 17, at 291.
20. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
21. The Supreme Court has said that even though the word "privacy" is not mentioned in the
Bill of Rights or the Constitution, other specifically named guarantees have "penumbras" that
include the protection of individual privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965); see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452-57 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973).
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than this. Personal liberty includes the right to order one's life as one wishes
as long as one does not violate the rights of others. "[A]n individual may do
what he wants to do, be who he wants to be, and think and act for himself."
22
An individual is free to acquire knowledge, marry, have children, worship a
god, live and work where he chooses, engage in a lawful occupation, enter
contracts, and generally pursue happiness.2 3 Personal liberty exists when an
individual has a substantial freedom of choice24 and a meaningful range of
alternatives, 25 but an element of restraint is also a part of liberty.
26
Internal restraint-whether it be called self-discipline, self-control, moral-
ity, or conscience 2 7 -allows an individual to be free. 28 If a person cannot
control himself, he is not free to order his own life through personal choice.
29
External restraint is also necessary to personal liberty. An individual cannot
expect to be free from the constraints of mores30 and the duties imposed by
positive law.3 1 Without external restraint, human action would be chaotic,
with the powerful enslaving the less fortunate, 32 and no one exercising
personal liberty.
33
An individual can only exercise his personal liberty to an extent consistent
22. Commentary, On Liberty-1970, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 67, 70 (1970).
23. Id. at 70-71; accord, Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 428-29 (1902). These enumerated
rights are not a finite listing, but are suggestive of the body of rights that make up an individual's
personal liberty.
24. Foley, supra note 18, at 397: Simonton, A Definition of Liberty, 50 A.B.A.J. 337, 339
(1964).
25. Foley, supra note 18, at 397.
26. Id. at 398. Foley suggests four essential elements of liberty: "a living, purposive, choosing
human being," alternatives from which to choose, a relationship to another human being, and
restraint. Id. at 397-98.
27. Id. at 398.
28. Id.
29. If a person is, for example, subject to fits of uncontrollable Anger or compulsive acts,
which he cannot restrain, he is not free to exercise personal choice. Id.
30. Society's mores are its "numerous customs, morals, taboos and traditions." Simonton,
supra note 24, at 337-38. When an individual violates these he subjects himself to disgrace or loss
of reputation. Id. at 338.
31. Id. at 337. Positive law is defined as "[l]aw actually and specifically enacted or adopted by
proper authority for the government of an organized jural society." Black's Law Dictionary 1324
(4th ed. 1968). A violation of positive law results in a direct personal penalty, usually a fine or
imprisonment. Simonton, supra note 24, at 337.
32. Foley, supra note 18, at 399.
33. The less fortunate would be subject to the will of the powerful and the powerful would
not be free because of their constant effort to coerce others. Id. Thomas Hobbes espoused such a
dominant-subservient relationship between a child and his parents in the seventeenth century. He
argued that the relationship must be founded on fear and that children must be completely
dependent. Hobbes wrote that "like the imbecile, the crazed and the beasts, over . . . children
... there is no law." 3 T. Hobbes, Leviathan 257 (Molesworth ed. 1839-45), quoted in Worsfold,
supra note 3, at 144. The father, in Hobbes' view, had the power of life and death over his
children, and thus the children must obey. Id.
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with the exercise of personal liberty by others. 34 When an individual goes
beyond this limitation, his exercise of personal liberty may be constrained. 35
This interference must be conducted, however, in a fair way. In our society,
this right to fair treatment is the right to procedural due process, which rests
upon the mandate of the fifth and fourteenth amendments that no person be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law. 36 The right to procedural
due process 37 is the civil liberty of which this section speaks. Thus, a person's
civil liberty exists to protect the fair exercise of his personal liberty.
B. The Child's Right to Personal Liberty
An adult can exercise personal liberty to an extent not inconsistent with the
rights of others, but a child's right to exercise personal liberty is more
limited. 38 Because of the child's condition of dependence and helplessness, 39
parents are generally entrusted with the care, custody, 40 and education of
their children. 4 1 In order for the parent42 to perform his duty of rearing his
children he may exercise a reasonable degree of force and restraint over
them.43 A parent may interfere with a child's right to exercise personal
liberty" because it is presumed that children are not mature enough to make
34. See notes 19, 22 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Foley, supra note 18, at 401, 417-418.
36. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
37. It is almost impossible to give a comprehensive definition of due process. Its meaning can
best be ascertained by a case-by-case analysis: See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-100
(1908). For a discussion of its general principles, see id. at 100-06.
38. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, - , 569 P.2d 1286, 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298,
302 (1977).
39. See note 3 supra. See also pt. IV(A) infra.
40. It has been asserted that a child has a right to custody-the right to have someone take
care of him. Shears, supra note 3, at 720; see pt. IV(B) infra.
41. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); In 7e Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 372 (1882); People v.
Turner, 55 IM. 280, 284 (1870); Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). Parents are ordinarily
given the responsibility "because it can seldom be put into better hands," 4 Whart. at 11, and it is
done "upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken care of, and %ill be
brought up with a due education." 103 Ill. at 372; see pt. Ill infra.
42. This discipline may be exercised by a parent or one who stands in the place of a parent.
See, e.g., Caway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 579, 36 A.2d 377, 378 (1944) (for certain
purposes a teacher stands in loco parentis); Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221, 222 (1875) (a stepfather
can exercise a parent's discipline and control). One acting in loco parentis is someone other than
the parent who has assumed parental duties and responsibilities. Howard v. United States, 2
F.2d 170, 174 (E.D. Ky. 1924); Meisner v. United States, 295 F. 866, 868 (W.D. Mo. 1924).
43. See, e.g., People v. Green, 115 Mich. 524, 533, 119 N.W. 1087, 1090 (1909); W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 27 (4th ed. 1971). A parent may use "moderate correction
and temporary confinement." People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 285 (1870).
44. A parent can select the school to which his child will go, decide whether to put a child up
for adoption, regulate when a child goes out and stays in, and much more. See Wald, Making
Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 Human Rights 13, 16-17 (1974).
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rational judgments about what is in their best interests.4" Under the trust
model, however, parent trustees have a duty to make their judgments in the
best interests of the child beneficiary.
46
If the traditional patterns of family control fail or children are not being
properly cared for and educated by their parents, the State assumes these
functions. 47 This interference with the parents' right to rear children 48 is
justified by the State's role as parens patriae .49 The parent's right is subject to
limitation by the State-the ultimate parent of all children within its
borders-5 -when in a court's opinion the best interests of the child demand
it.-5 The State also has its interest in the development of its citizens5 2 as
justification for its assuming the care and custody of a child. 53
It was previously stated that the State may only interfere with the parent's
right to rear his children when the best interests of the child demand it. This
limitation guards against arbitrary State interference. Juvenile status offense
45. Id. at 17. Much of what is done for children is said to be done in the child's best interests,
but, in reality, often what is done is in the best interests of society or parents. J. Goldstein, A.
Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). See generally pt. IV(B) infra.
Juvenile courts acknowledge the importance of a child's best interests, but they continue to
balance those interests against those of parents and the public. Johnson, supra note 3, at 13.
46. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts § 95 (5th ed. 1973).
47. Stapleton, supra note 3, at 12.
48. Parents have a constitutional right to "bring up children," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923), and to "direct the upbringing and education of children," Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). This right is subject to State intrusion only "if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
49. The doctrine of parens patriae was borrowed from the English chancery court. Ketcham,
supra note 3, at 97; Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, in
Juvenile Justice Philosophy: Readings, Cases, Comments 72, 74 (F. Faust & P. Brantingham eds.
1974). As parens patriae, the king, through his chancellors, assumed the protection of all the
infants in the realm. Ketcham, supra at 97. When the doctrine was incorporated into American
law, the state and federal governments took the place of the crown. Id. at 98. As one aspect of
parens patriae, the chancery court dealt with neglected or dependent children, not with children
accused of criminal violations. Nevertheless, "it is as inheritor of the chancery court's protective
powers that the juvenile court in this country has been most commonly justified." President's
Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Crime 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Pres. Comm'n].
50. Johnson, supra note 3, at 11-12.
51. If the State must intervene in the case of any child, it exercises its power of guardianship
over the child and provides him with the protection, care, and guidance that he needs, Id. See
also Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1193 (1970).
52. "[T]he public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its members." Ex
parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); see Stapleton, supra note 3, at 13. It is the child's
interest, and the community's, that children be protected from abuse and guided to develop into
worthwhile citizens. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
53. See In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 371-72 (1882); Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of
Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876).
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statutes, however, allow the State broad discretion in its involvement in
family problems.5 4
C. Status Offenses and the Right to Personal Liberty
1. Adult Status Offenses
Status offenses are crimes that are defined in such a way that the essential
element is not a proscribed action or omission, s s but a personal condition or
character.5 6 "Status" is an ambiguous word used to indicate "a certain
personal condition, as evidenced by certain facts."57 For example, one might
be found to occupy the status of a common drunkard because he is idle and
habitually found intoxicated.58 The principal justification for taking action
against status offenders is that it prevents crime because these offenders are
potential criminals. 59 The principle presupposes criminal status, not on the
grounds of a specific offense, but on the grounds of an intent, "sufficiently
manifested by overt acts," to commit a crime in the future. 60
Status offense statutes have been invalidated on grounds of being uncon-
stitutionally vague61 and restrictive of personal liberty. 62 Although the vague-
ness argument has been the more successful, 63 the early cases were concerned
with the particular language of the statutes rather than the concept of crimes
54. See note 137 infra.
55. "A crime may be generally defined as the commiision or omission of an act which the law
forbids or commands . . . ." J. Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law 16 (1934).
56. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463, 463 (1967); Lacey.
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203, 1203-04 (1953); see
note II supra.
57. Lacey, supra note 56, at 1204.
58. See Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminal-
ity, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 102, 110 (1962). Other examples include: vagrancy, begging, loitering,
prostitution, gambling, brawling, and engaging in an unlawful calling. Id. at 109-111.
59. Cuomo, supra note 56, at 464; Lacey, supra note 56, at 1217. Other purposes are to isolate
undesirable people from society, to prevent people from becoming public charges, and to
encourage industry. Cuomo, supra at 464.
60. State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 587, 197 A. 360, 363 (1938); see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 683 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Although none of these acts are harmful to
society in themselves, the State constitutionally may attempt to deter and prevent them through
punishment because of the grave threat of future harmful conduct which they pose.")
61. Cuomo, supra note 56, at 480; Lacey, supra note 56, at 1221-22; see, e.g., Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (vagueness as to what conduct forbidden);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (vagueness as to punishment which may be imposed);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (vagueness as to what persons within scope of
statute).
62. Lacey, supra note 56, at 1220-21. The infringement of liberty charge often relates to those
clauses of statutes pertaining to loitering, idleness, and association with known criminals. See Ex
parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920) (statute outlawing vagrancy held to be
unconstitutional restraint on liberty).
63. Cuomo, supra note 56, at 480.
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of personal condition. 64 The statutes were held void for not clearly defining
the conduct forbidden. 65 The Supreme Court has stressed that everyone is
entitled to be informed of what the law commands or forbids.
6 6
A third ground for voiding the statutes is that they inflict cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court, in Robinson v. California,67 held that a statute
making the status of narcotic addict a crime, without any showing that the
defendant had ever used narcotics within the state, inflicted cruel and unusual
punishment.6 8 The Court's discussion of the constitutionality of a statute
defining a crime in terms of status, rather than an act, 69 can be read to cast
doubt on the constitutionality of all status offense statutes.7 0
The California statute in question in Robinson7' did not punish the
purchase, sale, or possession of narcotics, nor the "antisocial or disorderly
behavior resulting from their administration," but punished the status of
narcotic addiction. 72 Under the statute a person could be continuously subject
to prosecution "at anytime before he reforms" even if he had never used or
possessed narcotics or been guilty of antisocial behavior within the state.7 3
Although the Court noted that narcotic addiction is an illness,7 4 a fact that
raises additional considerations, 75 the plight of other status offenders is not so
different from that of the addicted to make comparison unreasonable. For
example, if a person is arrested for vagrancy because he momentarily paces
back and forth on a public street, but commits no criminal act, 7 6 it appears
that he is no better off than an addict, in the eyes of the law. He is
64. Lacey, supra note 56, at 1221; see, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)
(attacking the word "gang"); Phillips v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 75 P.2d 548 (1938)
(attacking the word "loiter"); State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933) (attacking the
words "lewd," "disorderly," and "dissolute"); cf. State v. Starr, 57 Ariz. 270, 275, 113 P.2d 356,
358 (1941) (attacking the word "loiter": The court stated that "[i]f it be suggested that a person
could not know when he [is] violating the law, the answer is that anyone should know if he had
any business on the school grounds or thereabouts.').
65. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) ("fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his ... conduct is forbidden") (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948)
("Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be
sustained."); In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 793, 350 P.2d 116, 123, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 371 (1960)
(citizens not sufficiently warned by vague language as to what course of conduct is denounced).
66. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
67. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
68. Id. at 667.
69. Id. at 665-66.
70. The Court specifically held that a person afflicted with narcotic addiction may not be
imprisoned if he or she has not used drugs or committed some other unlawful act. Id. at 667.
71. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721, repealed by ch. 1407, § 2, 1972 Cal. Stats.
72. 370 U.S. at 666.
73. Id. (quoting statute).
74. Id. at 667.
75. These considerations include questions of the state's role in health and welfare and
compulsory treatment. Id. at 664-66.
76. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 159 (1972).
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continuously subject to prosecution until he reforms, even if he never commits
a criminal act within the state.
In Powell v. Texas" the appellant sought to overturn his conviction for
public drunkenness by application of the cruel and unusual punishment ruling
announced in Robinson.7 8 The Court found that the case did not fall within
the holding because the state had not attempted to punish a status, but had
imposed a sanction on undesirable public behavior.7 9 Justice Black, however,
in his concurring opinion, discussed the Robinson holding and its application
to pure status crimes.80 He indicated that the holding was not limited only to
status offense statutes punishing those afflicted with the disease, and said:
"Punishment for a status is particularly obnoxious . . . because it involves
punishment for a mere propensity .... This is a situation universally sought
to be avoided in our criminal law; the fundamental requirement that some
action be proved is solidly established . . .,,s
2. Juvenile Status Offenses
Similarly, juvenile status offense statutes punish a condition82 rather than a
specific act.83 For example, a child may be charged as a status offender
because he endangers his morals. 84 He is subject to this charge at any time
before his reformation even though he is not found in a disreputable place or
associating with immoral persons. It is his habitual behaviors which subjects
him to this, not a present, specific, criminal act.8 6 Although a child, in the
past, may have been disobedient or associated with persons whom his parents
felt were immoral, he is not subjected to the jurisdiction of the status offense
statutes on the basis of any one past or present act.8 7 The child becomes a
status offender as a result of his cumulative record of noncriminal, but
"wayward" and "immoral" acts.88
As with adult statutes, statutes which label a child "incorrigible" or
"wayward" are vague because they do not give a child adequate notice of the
conduct prohibited.8 9 Juveniles neither know the limits on their conduct nor
77. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
78. Id. at 532.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 541-44 (Black, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 543 (Black, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
82. See Sussman, supra note 5, at 53.
83. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.022 (Page 1976).
85. Juveniles are guilty of a status offense as a result of habitual conduct which paints an
overall picture of waywardness. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y.
Family CL Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.022 (Page
1976).
86. PINS, supra note 12, at 629.
87. Sussman, supra note 5, at 53.
88. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.022 (Page 1976).
89. Sussman, "Children in Need of Supervision" Laws Discriminate Against Females, I
Children's Rights Rep. 5, 7 (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Children's Rights Rep.).
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the circumstances in which they will be charged with wrongdoing. 90 Yet,
statutes which allow the above have been repeatedly held to be constitu-
tional. 91 One explanation for the different treatment of adults and children
arises from the difference in their right to personal liberty. While adult status
offense statutes are held invalid because they create an unreasonable restraint
on personal liberty, 92 status offense statutes applied to juveniles are held valid
because such a restraint on a child's personal liberty is reasonable.
It is not unreasonable to restrain a child's freedom to be on public streets
and in public places, to choose his place of abode, or to move about at will. A
juvenile is seen as an immature, dependent being 93 whose character must be
shaped by parents and society. 94 This necessitates restrictions that may
90. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) (a person in need
of supervision is one who is incorrigible, ungovernable, habitually disobedient, and beyond the lawful
control of his parents); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.022 (Page 1976) (an unruly child does not subject
himself to reasonable control of parents by being wayward or habitually disobedient). Inconsistency
is increased because conduct frequently is not labeled a status offense until a parent objects to It, and
parents have differing views about children's behavior. Children's Rights Rep., supra note 89, at 7,
Ironically, many of the offenses are actually parent offenses and a child has a reasonable justification
for his actions. A girl may run away to avoid sexual advances by male relatives, K. Wooden, Weeping
in the Playtime of Others 81 (1976); Meyers, Bad Girls Before the Law, 6 Student Law. 34-36
(1977), or a child may be considered incorrigible because he is seventeen and does not want to be
home early every night, see Wald, supra note 44, at 21.
91. See, e.g., Inre Napier, 532 P.2d 423(Okla. 1975); Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874,529
P.2d 1096 (1975); District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58(D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1016 (1975); In re Patricia, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33(1972). But see Gesicki
v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 4C6 U.S. 913 (1972).
92. Although adult status offense statutes have been found invalid on the separate grounds of
vagueness and restraint on the exercise of personal liberty, see notes 61-62 supra and accompanying
text, the two grounds appear closely related. Courts that have invalidated such statutes because they
create an unreasonable restraint on personal liberty speak of an individual's right to be on public
streets and in public places, see City of Huntington v. Salyer, 135 W. Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (195 1),
the individual's right to choose his place of abode, see Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St.
484, 40 N.E.2d 925 (1942) (Hart, J., dissenting), and the individual's "power of locomotion, of
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct," id. at
490, 40 N.E.2d at 930; accord, Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920). Courts
that have found such statutes void for vagueness speak of citizens not being fairly warned by
ambiguous language as to what conduct is forbidden, see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972); In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960), and
of vague language making an innocent act criminal, see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520
(1948). If a citizen is not fairly warned of what he cannot do, an innocent act may be criminal,
and he will suffer a restraint on his personal liberty. For example, a person who risks arrest for
vagrancy and loitering simply by being on a public street may decide not to travel on the public
streets. This decision is not a free one, but is motivated by fear of arrest. Personal liberty is being
restrained by the vague language of the statute. In sum, one can broadly view adult status offense
statutes as creators of unreasonable restraints on an adult's exercise of his personal liberty.
Statutes that have been invalidated on cruel and unusual punishment grounds, such as the one In
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), would restrain the personal liberty of an addict in that
he would continuously be subject to arrest at anytime before his reformation.
93. See notes 3, 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 41-49, 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
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impinge upon his personal liberty. 9s The doctrine of paens patriae allows the
State to act according to what it believes is best for the child, in order to
produce responsible citizens. 96 Status offense statutes are one means to that
end. Such statutes are often justified as a method of identifying potential
delinquents and preventing their future criminal acts, 97 thus operating as a
means of achieving the goal of rehabilitation fundamental to the juvenile
justice system. 98 Rehabilitation, as a fundamental goal of juvenile justice,
seeks to save children from the consequences of persisting on the path of
waywardness. 99 No matter how reasonable the restraint, however, it must be
fairly imposed. A child has a right to expect to be treated fairly,100 but there is
currently no requirement of fair treatment imposed on the court when it deals
with juvenile status offenders.' 0 '
D. The Child's Right to Civil Liberty
A parent may restrain his child's exercise of personal liberty according to
his personal standards of behavior, 02 but the parent must act reasonably.
t0 3
95. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
97. McNulty, supra note 12, at 752; Sussman, supra note 5, at 53. According to a recent series of
studies, however, it is unlikely that juvenile courts can predict with any accuracy which status
offenders are potential delinquents or demonstrate that court intervention was a significant factor in
restraining such mipors. McNulty, supra at 752-53.
In fact, many authorities, such as the President's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime, the White House Conference on Children, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
and the Joint Comm'n of the A.B.A. Inst. of Judicial Admin. Juvenile Justice Standards Project,
recommend that status offenders be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and would
rely on the use of community agencies. Id.; Sussman, supra note 5, at 54-55; Flicker, supra note 3, at
17; Katkin, supra note 3, at 17; Kaufman, OfJuvenile Justice and Injustice, 62 A.B.A.J. 730, 733
(1976); see notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text. The 1974 federal Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act provides funds to states for developing facilities to deal with status offenders
outside the court system. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(aXl2), 5711 (Supp. V 1975).
Others disagree. For example, the argument has been made that the force of the court is needed to
keep youngsters in line, and that "informal handling by non court agencies leads to infringements on
basic rights." Katkin, supra note 3, at 313. This argument was made by Judge Maurice Cohill, a
juvenile court judge active in the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. Id. This position
generally assumes that dealing with status offenders in juvenile court is best for all concerned. But
while it may be best for society, it is not necessarily so for the children. See PINS, supra note U?.
98. Johnson, supra note 3, at 12-13; Platt, supra note 1, at 47; Flicker, supra note 3. at 15;
Fordham Note, supra note 3, at 409; NDAA, supra note 3, at 2.
99. Pres. Comm'n, supra note 49, at 29.
100. See note 166 infra and accompanying text.
101. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
102. See Stapleton, supra note 3, at 13.
103. People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 285 (1870); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 27
(4th ed. 1974); see note 43 supra and accompanying text.
While it may be absurd to allow children to run to court for an injunction whenever they feel their
parents' rules are unreasonable, an argument can be made that society should not lend its
authority-through the juvenile courts--to enforcement of "arbitrary parental commands." Wald,
supra note 44, at 21. No court should threaten a teenager with incarceration if he does not go to
church or go to bed early every night. Id.
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Under the trust model, the parent as trustee has a duty to properly execute the
trust and not abuse his discretion in the exercise of his trust powers. 104 The
parents' unreasonableness could be considered an abuse of trustee discretion.
Such an abuse would justify the State's decision to intervene, removing the
parent as trustee and assuming the duties of the trust.
The State, as well, should act reasonably when it interferes with a child's
right to exercise his personal liberty. But the question arises whether the State
is held to a more specific standard than that of reasonableness, that is, the
constitutional standard of due process.
Since the parent is not bound by constitutional due process standards when
he temporarily deprives his child of personal liberty, it is argued that neither
is the State required to proceed according to these standards when it performs
the parents' function.10 5 There are, however, arguments for the State being
held to a stricter standard than parents when it interferes with the child's
right to personal liberty and consequently for status offenders having the right
to civil liberty. One argument is that parents have a greater power than the
State to limit a child's exercise of personal liberty'0 6 because of their own
constitutionally recognized right to rear children, 10 7 while the State's jus-
tification for infringing on the child's personal liberties rests on its responsibil-
ity as parens patriae. 108 Secondly, when the State assumes the parental duty,
it denies the child the right to remain with his family and limits the parent's
right to rear his child. 109 Thirdly, the greater intensity and immediacy of the
parent-child relationship requires more flexibility in that relationship than in
the State-child relationship.' "0
104. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 46, § 89, at 321-25.
105. Pres. Comm'n, supra note 49, at 28.
106. Inre Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,-., 569 P.2d 1286, 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 (1977).
107. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
108. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944), said that it is cardinal "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."
Since under the police power a state may regulate "to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people," Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), it may be
urged that the State's power as parens patriae rests on the same constitutional basis as the police
power. However, this argument cannot stand because the State must exercise its police power
with due process, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27, 31-32 (1885), and the State acting as parens patriae to restrict a child's personal liberty does
not act with due process. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 48 supra.
110. The right of parents to raise their children is compatible with a "child's biological and
psychological need for unthreatened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents." Goldstein,
Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645,
649 (1977). The State does not have the ability to replace the parent in the "complex interpersonal
bonds between parent and child." Id. at 650. The parent deals with the child on a day-to-day basis.
The State, on the other hand, cannot deal with the consequences of its decisions or with the speed
required to deal effectively with children. Id.
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1. Civil Liberty When the Child Is Declared a Status Offender
A standard justification for State intervention into family rights is the
rehabilitation of children."' just as a parent is justified in restricting his
child's exercise of personal liberty because he has the responsibility of develop-
ing the child into a productive citizen, 112 when the State intervenes as
substitute parent,"1 3 the parental responsibility to develop is shifted to the
State. Under the trust model, this would occur when the parent-trustee is
removed for failure to carry out the trust purpose.' 1 4 The child should be
guaranteed that not only the initial State decision to intervene, but also all
subsequent decisions on placement, treatment or supervision be fairly made.
The Supreme Court has granted juvenile delinquents most due process
safeguards'" because it found that the absence of such safeguards had not
protected children, but had subjected them to arbitrariness. 1 6 In weighing
the protections afforded juveniles by "benevolent unbridled discretion"
against the protection afforded by due process, 71 the In re Gault Court found
discretion to be a "poor substitute" for procedural due process.11 The Court
noted that the juvenile court without due process had not reduced crime nor
rehabilitated delinquents,' 9 but had been unfair to children. 120
The Court, however, has been reluctant to extend civil liberty to status
offenders. Because juvenile status offenses focus on family problems rather
than criminal behavior by the child, 12' and because in these cases the State
assumes the role of parent 122 to protect, care for, and educate the child,'2 no
need for due process has been recognized in status offense proceedings. 124
111. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
114. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 46, § 160, at 573-75.
115. The Supreme Court has specifically held that: 1) a child and his parents are entitled to
written notice of charges, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967), 2) the child and his parents must be
notified of the right to be represented by counsel, id. at 41, 3) the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable in juvenile delinquency cases, id. at 55, 4) the child must have the
opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, id. at 56-57, and 5) proof beyond a reasonable
doubtis "essential" when ajuvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed
by an adult, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). On the other hand, in McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held, 5-4, that the right to an impartial jury in all criminal
prosecutions guaranteed by the sixth amendment is not applicable to juveniles because the juvenile
court proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. Id. at 540-41.
116. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In
Kent, the Supreme Court, for the first time suggested that constitutional principles were applicable to
juvenile court proceedings, holding that "the [juvenile court] hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment." 383 U.S. at 562; see Katkin, supra note 3, at 272.
117. 387 U.S. at 17-29.
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 22.
120. See id. at 19-21.
121. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
122. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); In re Ferrier, 103 IIl. 367, 372 (1882).
123. Id.
124. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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The treatment of juvenile delinquents and juvenile status offenders has
been distinguished. While there may be a punishment element involved in the
handling of juvenile delinquents212 5-especially the ones who commit felony-
type crimes126-the handling of status offenders presumably remains a pro-
tective rehabilitative endeavor. If status offenders are given civil liberty, the
courts fear that any special protective quality left in the juvenile system would
be destroyed.' 27 In fact, however, affording juveniles the protection of civil
liberty need not interfere with the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system,
nor compel the abandonment of special safeguards for juveniles. 128 The aim
of guaranteeing civil liberty to juveniles is to ensure their fair treatment, not
to destroy the juvenile system.
Since in practice there is little difference in the State treatment of status
offenders and juvenile delinquents,129 it is reasonable that status offenders be
guaranteed at least the same civil liberty. The Supreme Court has struggled
with the protective philosophy and guaranteed juvenile delinquents civil
liberty. All of the arguments for due process for delinquents also apply to
status offenders. Status offenders are subjected to flexible hearings and are
institutionalized without rehabilitation.130 Status offenders are also generally
subject to the same dispositional alternatives as delinquents: 13' probation,
placement with another family or an agency, and commitment to a farm,
camp, or training school. 132 As with delinquents, the goal, however in-
adequately realized, is rehabilitation and assisting the child in becoming a
125. See S. Rubin, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency 81, 82-85, 89-103 (3d ed. 1970); H. Sandhu,
Juvenile Delinquency: Causes, Control, and Prevention 160 (1977); United Nations, The Young
Adult Offender: A Review of Current Practices and Programmes in Prevention and Treatment 68,
87-88 (1965).
126. "If they are big enough to commit vicious crimes against society, they are big enough to be
punished by society .... Detention may not help the juvenile, but it will certainly help his potential
victims." Shubow & Stalin, Juveniles in Court: A Look at a System in Flux, 61 Mass. L.Q. 193, 193
(1977) (quoting the former President of the United States); see The Trib, Jan. 17, 1978, at 10, cols.
1-4.
127. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 2 1,
24 (1967). Carrying the argument one step further leads to the fear that, if there is no protective
quality left in the juvenile system, there is no need for a separate juvenile system. 403 U.S. at
551; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Juveniles fully protected
by the Constitution would need no other substitute protection from fatherly judges, informal
hearings, and parens patriae. Cf. Nejelski, Juvenile Justice in the United States 6 (27th Int'l Conf.
in Criminology, Sept. 15, 1977).
128. 397 U.S. at 363; 387 U.S. at 21, 24. "The observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered will not compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." 387 U.S. at 21. The states can continue to
label a child a delinquent or status offender to avoid the label "criminal" and its stigma, id. at 23,
and continue to keep a child's record confidential, id. at 25, for example, and not conflict with the
protection due process affords.
129. See notes 130-33 infra'and accompanying text.
130. Nejelski, supra note 127, at 9-10; see Meyers, supra note 90, at 39.
131. Johnson, supra note 3, at 38; Sussman, supra note 5, at 58.
132. Sussman, supra note 5, at 58.
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responsible adult. 133 Since status offenders have not even committed a
crime,1 34 but are institutionalized more often than delinquents, 13S it would
seem that they are in even greater need of due process protection than
delinquents.
Another reason for guaranteeing procedural due process to status offenders
is the ease with which status offense statutes allow the concept of rehabilita-
tion to be used as a smokescreen for placing undesirable children out of the
community. 136 Status offense statutes allow authorities broad discretion
which often results in misuse.137 For example, New York City is planning to
have teenage prostitutes processed in Family Court as status offenders instead
of juvenile delinquents in an attempt to remove them from the streets. 13s A
juvenile now processed as a delinquent for prostitution faces a maximum of
eighteen months in a detention facility. 39 A girl declared in need of supervi-
sion could be placed in a facility for up to two and a half years, 140 without
procedural due process. Status offense jurisdiction thus is used in place of a
charge of delinquency where the alleged criminal act cannot be proved, 14'
and provides a device to strip the child of the constitutional rights he would
have had as a delinquent. 42
Another alarming misuse of status offense jurisdiction is by parents who use
it to divest themselves of undesirable or unwanted children. 14 3 At their
discretion, parents "can march their kids to court any time, armed with
evidence to ensure they stay there," and the court will respond to the parents'
plea. 144 But, the State's desire to cleanse society and families should not be
133. Johnson, supra note 3, at 13; NDAA, supra note 3, at 2-3; Platt, supra note 1, at 47. But see
Morgan, They Think, "I Can Kill Because I'm 14," in Katkin, supra note 3. at 139, 141.
134. Sussman, supra note 5, at 53; Johnson, supra note 3, at 38-39.
135. Sanders, supra note 5, at 65 (citing Lerman, Delinquents Without Crimes, in In Law and
Order- The Scales of Justice 241-69 (A. Blumberg ed. 1973)). Often this incarceration is with serious
offenders. McNulty, supra note 12, at 754.
136. PINS, supra note 12, at 625. "Experience has demonstrated that, in practice, there is a
strong tendency for the rehabilitative ideal to serve purposes that are essentially incapacitative rather
than therapeutic in character." Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50
J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Science 226, 229 (1959).
137. See Meyers, supra note 90, at 37-38; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn
and Rebellious Son, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1097, 1110-21 (1976).
138. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1977, at B-3, cols. 1-2.
139. Id. at col. 2.
140. Id.
141. Rosenberg & Rosenberg,.supra note 137, at 1115-16. "In cases where there is insufficient
proof of drug-related crimes, receipt of stolen goods, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, assault,
burglary, criminal mischief, or sex offenses, trial courts have instead made PINS findings." Id. at
1116 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., In re Gladys L, 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1970); In re Simon, 295 So. 2d473 (La. Ct. App. 1974); In re Raymond 0., 31 N.Y.2d 730,
290 N.E.2d 145, 338 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1972); In re Mark V., 34 App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d
983 (1970); In re Williams, 241 Or. 207, 405 P.2d 371 (1965).
142. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 137, at 1118.
143. See Meyers, supra note 90, at 36-37; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 137, at 1119.
144. Meyers, supra note 90, at 37. Parents accuse their children of arguing, sleeping all day,
slamming doors during an argument. Id.
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enough to allow the deprivation of a child's personal liberty, in the name of
rehabilitation, without the protection of civil liberty.145 In fact, this behavior
under the trust model would be a violation of the trustee's duties within the
fiduciary relationship. 146 The parent, and the State as substitute parent, as
trustee has the duty of care and loyalty to the child, 147 and the duty to act
solely in the best interest of the child beneficiary. 148 A child should be
guaranteed fair treatment, both at the time the State decides to intervene in
the child's life, and during the time the State is acting as substitute parent,
developing and rehabilitating the child.
2. Civil Liberty While the State Rehabilitates the Status Offender
Rehabilitation is an important aspect of the special protection philosophy
for juveniles. 149 The belief is that troublesome children can "be trained to
become useful, productive citizens,"' 50 not by punishment,' s but by restric-
tion of their personal liberty as any parent would do.' s2 Reformation is to be
achieved by teaching the principles of morality and religion, by teaching a
skill with which to earn a living, and by separating the child from corrupting
influences. 153 But, rehabilitation has not occurred 15 4 and the young offenders
frequently receive treatment that is a "repudiation of rehabilitation. '55
If the State institutionalizes a status offender to rehabilitate him, the State
is merely depriving the child of his personal liberty as any parent would. '
5 6
But if the State fails to rehabilitate, it has lost its justification for intervention.
However, although juveniles are frequently committed to reformatories and
training schools for the purpose of rehabilitation, little rehabilitation actually
occurs.15 7 Most juvenile institutions have not demonstrated a capacity to
145. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), said
that permitting an individual to be confined simply because the state is willing to treat him raises
grave constitutional problems. Id. at 585 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The majority found that the
deprivation of a person's liberty could not be constitutionally justified by "[m]ere public intolerance or
animosity." Id. at 575.
146. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 46, § 95, at 343-50.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
150. Paulsen, supra note 15, at 4; Platt supra note 1, at 47.
151. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 12-13; Platt, supra note 1, at 47; NDAA, supra note 3, at 2-3;
Flicker, supra note 3, at 15; Fordham Note, supra note 3, at 409.
152. See note 156 infra.
153. See Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); Flicker, supra note 3, at 16.
154. M. Midonick, Children, Parents and the Courts: Juvenile Delinquency, Ungovernability,
and Neglect 163-69 (1972).
155. Rubin, supra note 125, at 81.
156. "[Iln exercising a wholesome parental restraint over the child, (the State] can be properly
said to imprison the child, no more that the tenderest parent exercising like power of restraint over
children." Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328,338 (1876);
see In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 368-69 (1882); Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 334 (1869);
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
157. Nejelski,supra note 127, at5; Ohlin, Coates& Miller, RadicalCorrectionalReform:A Case
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rehabilitate,15 8 and, in fact, have punished and abused children.159 Educa-
tional programs and recreational facilities in the institutions are often in-
sufficient or nonexistent.1 60 In addition, the national recidivism rate-a
failure rate161-is extremely high for juveniles. 62 Thus, the institutionaliza-
tion amounts to nothing more than custody. As parents have the right to
restrain, but not to imprison, 163 so too the State as parens patriae is not
justified in imprisoning children.'6 When a child's personal liberty is re-
strained by the State in order to rehabilitate that child, a child needs the
protection of procedural due process, i.e., civil liberty, to ensure that his
personal liberty is not being unfairly denied. 
6S
Thus, even if a child is rehabilitated by the State, he has a right to expect
fairness as well. A child has a right to both benevolent concern and justice
from the State.1 66 Due process can assist in the achievement of rehabilitation.
"The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly . . . will be a better
prospect for rehabilitation."'167
The protective philosophy that created the juvenile court system had a
valid and honorable basis, but its goals are not always achieved. The State
can be concerned with the quality of its citizenry and thus protect children
StudyoftheMass. Youth Correctional System, 44Harv. Educ. Rev. 74,75(1974); Pileggi, Inside the
Juvenile Justice System: How Fifteen-Year-Olds Get Away With Murder, New York Magazine 36.
39 (1977).
158. Katkin, supra note 3, at 349; Nejelski, supra note 127, at 5.
159. Katkin, supra note 3, at 350;, Wooden, supra note 90, at 106-17.
160. Wooden, supra note 90, at 97, 109.
161. Id. at 25, 97.
162. In 1974, the national recidivism rate was 80%: the juveniles returning with more serious
charges. Id.; Nejelski, supra note 127, at 4-5.
Not only is it true that juvenile institutions have not rehabilitated, but a recent Stanford Prison
Study demonstrated that "a prison-like environment could elicit pathological reactions in carefully
selected, normal, healthy, average young men." Wooden, supra note 90, at 112.
163. Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 338 (1876).
164. See generally Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S.
913 (1972). Compare People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870), with In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367 (1882).
165. A right to treatment for adults civilly committed has developed over the last twenty years.
See PINS, supra note 12, at 645-51; Rangel, Juvenile Justice: A Need To Reexamine Goals and
Methods, 5 Cath. U.L. Rev. 149, 153-56 (1976). The courts have held that when individuals are
committed for treatment they have a constitutional right to receive treatment. See, e.g., Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (IN,.D. Ala.), hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). This right is also being extended to children.
Martarellav. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), for example, held that when the State acts
asparens patriae to detain a child, it must furnish adequate treatment. Id. at 585; see pt. IV(B).
166. Allen, supra note 136, at 231.
167. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 566 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Many of
the children who come before the court come from broken homes, from the ghettos; they often suffer
from low self-esteem; and their behavior is frequently a symptom of their own feelings of inadequacy.
Traumatic experiences of denial of basic rights only accentuate the past deprivation and contribute to
the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the
same protection as an adult may be the true beginning of the rehabilitative process." Id.
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from a wayward life by restricting their personal liberty. At the same-time,
however, the child needs civil liberty-protection from the State's acting
arbitrarily in its restraint of his liberty. Children have the right to expect fair
treatment. After all, the Constitution is not for adults alone.
168
Iii. A CHILD'S RIGHTS IN THE COMPULSORY EDUCATION SYSTEM
In recent years in the United States, public primary and secondary schools
have come under attack for their apparent inability to provide adequately for
the education of school children.' As student performance in many schools
continues to deteriorate, 2 critics of the present system have noted that
receiving a high school diploma may be evidence of time served rather than
successful completion of a program of study.3 In light of such criticism, a
reexamination of the states' continued reliance upon compulsory education
4
168. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1976).
1. See, e.g., Armbruster, The More We Spend, the Less Children Learn, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28,
1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 9, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1977, at 82, col. 2. Scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, the
exam used by many colleges as a criterion in selecting those applicants to be admitted, have been
steadily declining since 1963. Id.
3. See, e.g., Sugarman & Kirp, Rethinking Collective Responsibilityfor Education, 39 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 144, 199 (No. 3 1975) [hereinafter cited as Sugarman].
4. Fifty of the fifty-one jurisdictions have compulsory education statutes. Ala. Code tit. 16, § 28-3
(1975); Alaska Stat. § 14.30.010 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-321(1975); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 80-1502 (1960); 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. 88 (West) (to be codified at Cal. Educ. Code § 48200);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-33-104 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-184 (West 1977); Del, Code
tit. 14, § 2702 (Cum. Supp. 1977); D.C. Code Encycl. § 31-201 (West 1968); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.01
(West 1977); Ga. Code Ann. § 32-2104 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 298-9 (1976); Idaho Code § 33-202
(1963); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-8.1-3-17
(Burns Cum. Supp. 1976); Iowa Code Ann. § 299.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Kan. Stat. §
72-1111 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 159.010 (1971); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-221 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20, § 911 (Supp. 1977); Md. Ann. Code art. 77, § 92 (1975);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 76, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
380.1561 (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 120.10 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 167.031 (Vernon Supp., 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-6304 (1971); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 79-201 (1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.040 (1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:1 (1964); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 18A:38-25 (West 1968); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 77-10-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3205
(McKinney 1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115-166 (Supp. 1975); N.D. Cent, Code § 15-34.1-01 (1971);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3321.03 (Page Supp. -1976); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 10-105 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.010 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-19-1 (1969); S.C. Code § 59-65-10 (1976); S.D.
Compiled Laws Ann. § 13-27-1 (1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-1708 (1977); Tex. Educ. Code Ann.
tit. 2, § 21.032 (Vernon 1972); Utah Code Ann. § 53-24-1 (1970); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1121
(1974); Va. Code § 22-275.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.27.101 (1970); W.
Va. Code § 18-8-1 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.15 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. Stat. §
21.1-48 (Cum. Supp. 1975). These statutes are strikingly similar in their overall pattern. They
uniformly set minimum and maximum ages for attendance, allow for optional attendance beyond
the required age, define the length of the school year, set penalties for noncompliance, and
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and a large highly structuralized school complex is necessary if the states are
to provide for the intellectual needs of the nation's students.
Over the past decade, the central controversy in education has been
whether there exists a fundamental right to an education. While the Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezs held that
education is not a fundamental constitutional right, 6 this section will suggest
that despite the Court's holding, there exists authority to allow a court to find
that under the present compulsory educational system a student has certain
rights, and the school the duty to protect, preserve, and promote those
rights.7 In order to protect these rights, courts should recognize that students
forced to attend assigned public schools8 have the right to an education which
will allow them to develop intellectually and achieve a sense of dignity and
self-respect. It will be argued that in the extreme situation where it can be
established that a particular school is not providing students with an educa-
tion, a court may intervene, and impose upon the school the duties which will
secure these rights.9 In determining the appropriate duties, a court could refer
to the trust model to conceptualize the relationship between the student and
exempt those who are physically or mentally incapable of regular atiendance. See K. Alexander &
K. Jordan, Legal Aspects of Educational Choice: Compulsory Attendance and Student Assign-
ment 11-12 (1973).
5. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
6. Id. at 18. In Rodriguez, however, the Court indicated that certain minimal standards of
education might be constitutionally mandated. The majority stated that "Itihe argument here is not
that the children ... are receiving no public education." Id. at 23. Rodriguez has been the target of
much criticism, see, e.g., Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral
Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 32, 60-64 (1973), and rather than
foreclosing the controversy, it has served merely to focus upon the failure of our present educational
system to provide a relatively equal education to those subject to compulsory education laws.
7. The Supreme Court has recognized that students are "persons" within the meaning of the
Constitution. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511(1969). The
Court also has held thatschools must respect a student's first amendment rights to freedom of speech
and freedom of religious beliefs, as well as his fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and
liberty. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (liberty); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (speech); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954) (equal protection); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(religious beliefs).
8. As of 1975, nine out of ten students were attending public schools. Sugarman, supra note 3, at
199. The authors also point out that most private schools are quite expensive. Id. at 200. In light of
the high percentage of students attending public schools and the high cost of private schools, it is
submitted that for many children there exists no practical alternative other than attending tuition-
free public schools.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 13, 1977, at 33, col. 1. This article discusses the conditions at
Samuel Gompers Vocational-Technical High School in the South Bronx section of New York City,
The author states that students and teachers told her that required courses were not being offered,
and that in the first term there were between forty and fifty classes a day without teachers. They also
told the author that programming errors had resulted in scheduling some students for subjects in
which they lacked basic prerequisites, and one teacher stated in a memorandum that in the spring of
1975 five hundred misprogrammed students attended no classes for several weeks and had to spend
the school day sitting in the auditorium.
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the school. 10 Because of the assumed inability of children to make decisions
for themselves, I they traditionally have been reduced to a dependent status,
and are treated as the "domain" of their parents, the schools, or the state. 12
The trust model provides an alternate framework, familiar to the courts, in
which the student's rights could be protected-that is, held in trust, until he is
able to exercise them intelligently. In such a framework, the school, as
trustee, would be obligated to act in the best interest of the student, the
beneficiary of the trust.13
This section will draw an analogy to recent decisions dealing with the rights
of individuals who have been involuntarily committed to state institutions.14
If it can be shown that a school system subjects students to abuses as grave as
the ones in those cases,' 5 the courts should grant a remedy rather than
continuing to defer to the expertise of educators in school administration. 1
6 It
10. Courts have used the concept of a trust, or fiduciary relationship, when dealing with
education in the past. In New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347
N.E.2d 568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976), the court stated that both the local school boards and the
board of education each perform fiduciary responsibilities, and that, in any controversy between
them, the primary concern should be the welfare of the students. Id. at 122, 347 N.E. 2d at 575, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 215. Similarly, in Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189A. 131 (Juv. & Doam. Rel.
Ct. 1937), the court stated that a parent's right to custody of his child and to direct his education could
not be treated as a property right, but is similar to a trust reposed in the parent by the State for the
welfare of the child. Id. at 84-85, 189 A. at 133.
The duties traditionally imposed upon a trustee include the duty to act solely in the interest of the
beneficiary, to preserve, protect, and promote that which is held in trust, to account to the
beneficiary, and to terminate the trust when its purpose has been accomplished. G. Bogert & G.
Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts, §§ 95, 99, 101, 142, 150 (5th ed. 1973).
11. See Office of Education, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Pub. No. (OE)
76-00004, The Education of Adolescents 30 (1976) (hereinafter cited as The Education of Adoles-
cents]. This report was written by the National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education. The
panel was appointed in 1972 to determine the current status of secondary education in the United
States. Its task was to pinpoint the inadequacies in adolescent education, and make recommenda-
tions as to what changes would be necessary to correct any shortcomings. Id. at vii. The panel draws
upon both scholarly and field research in reaching its conclusions and making its recommendations,
and its report is a valuable source of current information concerning the effectiveness of adolescent
education in America.
12. McNeil, Student Rights and the Social Context ofSchooling, in Schooling and the Rights of
Children 40, 57 (V. Haubrich & M. Apple eds. 1975).
13. Under a trust model, the State, as settlor of the trust, would repose in the school, as trustee,
the duty to provide for the student's education until he was sufficiently prepared to enter society, The
student, as beneficiary of the trust, could require the school to justify its management of his
education, and could petition for court supervision of the trust if the school's actions were damaging
to his intellectual development or infringed upon any of the personal rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The student's rights would be held in trust until he is able to control his own
development. See pt. I supra, notes 15-44 and accompanying text.
14. See note 70infra and accompanying text. These decisions will be referred to as the treatment
cases.
15. See notes 74-80 infra and accompanying text.
16. In the past, courts have been reluctant to become involved in the daly operation of schools
since they are controlled by a hierarchy of state and local administrative authorities. Epperson v.
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will be argued that the decisions dealing with institutions have formulated a
constitutional basis upon which students forced to attend school may demand
and enforce certain rights.' 7
A. A Student's Rights Within the System
1. The Right to Intellectual Development
Providing the type of instruction which will encourage intellectual devel-
opment should be at the very heart of our compulsory educational system.' 8
Education prepares a child to enter society as a self-sufficient and self-reliant
individual.1 9 It is, therefore, incumbent upon the school to provide students
with the instruction and environment necessary to enable them to realize their
intellectual potential. Education's influence upon an individual's ability to
exercise his constitutional rights also requires that the instruction provided
broaden the student's intellectual capacity. 20 The information and ideas to
which a student is exposed in school may enhance his ability to enjoy the
rights of free speech and association, and may provide him with the tools
necessary for the exercise of his right to vote. 2' Moreover, since a student's
adult life most surely will be affected by the quality of his schooling,2 2 a
system of compulsory education which does not focus upon intellectual
development takes its toll not only upon the student, but also upon the society
he soon will enter. The deleterious effects of such a system are even more
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Judicial intervention also has been impeded by the belief that the
administrative officials are more qualified than the courts to carry out the task of educating students,
and that courts lack the expertise to question the wisdom of theirdecisions. See Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975). The treatment cases set forth in note 70 infra illustrate how the courts can
improve education without taking over the operation of schools, and how the judiciary may obtain
the expertise necessary to examine the advisability of school policy. The methods which were
successful in the treatment cases that are adaptable to schools are discussed in pL HIT(C) infra.
17. See pt. EII(B)(1) infra.
18. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where Justice White states that "the State is not
concerned with the maintenance of an educational system as an end in itself, it is rather attempting to
nurture and develop the human potential of its children .... : to expand their knowledge, broaden
their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and increase their human
understanding and tolerance." Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 221. The best known expression, by the Court, concerning the importance of an
education to an individual's entry into society can befoundin Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), where Chief Justice Warren stated. "Today [education] is a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to suceed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." Id. at
493.
20. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112-13 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
21. See id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. C. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom 325 (1970) (quoting Jerome Brunees statement that
"[the conduct of life is not independent of what it is that one knows" nor "of how it is that one has
learned what one knows").
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pronounced when one considers that adolescence is the period during which
an individual is capable of the most intense intellectual stimulation and
development. 23 It is suggested that if a student is to receive any long-term
benefit from forced attendance, and if society is to continue to look upon
schools as the principal transmitter of American heritage, 24 the development
of children should be the guiding force of compulsory education.
Circumstances present in some of the existing public school systems,
however, may actually stifle intellectual development. For example, as a
result of the huge expansion in the number of students enrolled in public
schools, 25 the priorities of management in crowded schools have overridden
the needs of the student.2 6 "Institutional imperatives of orderly movement,"
27
standardization, 28 administrative convenience,29 and economic efficiency
30
have been the most important determinants of organizational policy. 3 1 Em-
phasis on these factors has resulted in a structure which is often unresponsive
to the needs of a vastly expanded and increasingly complex student popula-
tion. 32
Emphasis should be turned away from a highly structured school system
and focused upon providing comprehensive intellectual development. The
present system's almost exclusive reliance upon large schools 33 and classroom
instruction 34 isolates the student, and forces the school to serve custodial as
23. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 21. Data on physical, sexual, and neurolog-
ical development as well as intelligence, problem solving, and cognitive and moral development,
reveal an apparent peaking and leveling off in adolescence. See also Silberman, supra note 22, at 325.
24. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 2.
25. As of 1973, American secondary schools served upwards of 18,000,000 students. Id. at 1.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 8.
28. McNeil, Student Rights and the Social Context of Schooling, in Schooling and the Rights of
Children 40, 51 (V. Haubrich & M. Apple eds. 1975).
29. Sugarman, supra note 3, at 205.
30. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 25.
31. See Hechinger, An Exploded Myth, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1976, at 31, col. 2, where the
author states that until recently the New York City School Board viewed expenditures for mainte-
nance, lunches, pensions, and transportation as uncontrollable items in the school budget. As a result
of this policy, spending cuts had to be made in areas which had a direct effect upon the quality of the
instruction provided the student. Actions such as this demonstrate the low priority often given to the
intellectual development of the student, and run contrary to Justice White's admonition that the State
should not maintain an educational system "as an end in itself." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
239 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
32. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 1.
33. Report of the Twelfth Annual Conference on Civil and Human Rights in Education,
Humanizing Education in the Seventies: Imperatives and Strategies 18 (1974). The speaker, noting
that zero population growth could lower school size, expressed the fear that instead of allowing
schools to shrink naturally to a decent size, administrators would prefer to combine the smaller ones.
Id.
34. While the majority of the state statutes require formal instruction in a public or qualified
private school, several states allow education to be provided outside the classroom as long as It is
substantially equivalent to the statutory guidelines. See, e.g, N.J. Stat. Ann, § 18A:38-25 (West
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well as educational functions. 35 Intellectual development requires a more
personal and diverse environment than can be offered in one building
housing hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of students. 36 It is submitted
that less structured schools would be more likely to prepare a student for
entry into society, and would deemphasize the institutional imperatives which
often narrow educational goals and detract from the student's intellectual
development. 37
2. The Right to Dignity and Self-Respect
Intellectual development will be difficult to achieve in an environment
which does not afford the individual a right to dignity and self-respect. The
school atmosphere plays a crucial role in the intellectual development of a
student. 38 In addition, adolescents are maturing more quickly today than ever
before.39 In light of this, the courts should recognize that students are entitled
to a "sphere of personal liberty"'40 as to those aspects of their behavior which
do not substantially detract from the school's ability to provide the student
body with an education. 4 1 The fourteenth amendment's guaranty of libert 2
1968); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3204 (McKinney Supp. 1977). The courts' interpretation of "equivalent,"
however, has left the student with no practical alternative to formal school instruction. See, e.g., In
re Thomas H., 78 Mllisc. 2d 412, 357 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Fain. Ct. 1974); Stephens v. Bongart, IS N.J.
Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937). But see State v. M Iassa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231
A.2d 252 (Law Div. 1967). See also Comment, Compusory Education in the United States: Big
Brother Goes to School, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 349, 364 (1972).
35. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 2 2. The Final Report and Recommendations
of the National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education points out that during colonial times
and the nineteenth century, schools were but one of the institutions responsible for the education of
children. The family and the community also took partin theshapingofthe nation's youth. Id. at 7. It
is suggested that by allowing the family and community to get involved again today, society would
not place the entire educational burden upon the schools, and that their role as a custodian would
therefore diminish.
36. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 28. The National Panel's Report states that
recent evidence suggests that the crucial educational determinants of a student's development are the
climate of the school, the student's sense of involvement, and his identification with the purposes of
the faculty. The Report goes on to say that the impersonal atmosphere which exists in many large
schools causes students to become alienated from their peers and their environment. Id. On the basis
of this information, one may question the possibility of intellectual development in many of our
nation's urban schools, which often have a large enrollment.
37. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 10, 12-13.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 20.
40. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970) (suspendinga student from school
for refusing to cut his hair violated his personal liberty).
41. A school may infringe upon the personal liberties of a student if it can show that the student's
action substantially interferes with the educational process. Jackson v. Dorier, 424 F.2d 213, 216
(6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (students suspended for violation of hair
regulation). See also Brown, Hair, the Constitution, and the Public Schools, 1 J.L. & Educ. 371,377
(1972); Smith, The Constitutional Parameter of Student Protest, 1 J.L. & Educ. 39, 55 (1972)
42. "[jN]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property . "U.S Const.
amend. XIV § 1.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
should be extended to afford students the right to be free from school
regulations which do not serve educational goals and which therefore unnec-
essarily restrict a student's ability to develop as an individual.
43
Critics of the present system have noted that its reliance upon large
comprehensive institutions has rendered many American schools incapable of
providing for the needs of the individual. 44 The school's need for orderly
movement of thousands of students has often led to a preoccupation with
order and control, 45 and has resulted in a situation in which conformity is
rewarded, 4 6 and creativity frequently is looked upon as an expensive and
potentially disruptive luxury. 47 In answer to this criticism, school officials cite
the need for an ordered atmosphere in which educational goals can be
achieved. 48 To create this atmosphere, administrators say they must promul-
gate reasonable rules regarding student discipline. 49 While in principle such
rules are desirable and necessary, in practice they often can be demeaning and
create an atmosphere of fear and apprehension among the student body. 50
43. In Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), the fourteenth amendment's
guaranty of liberty was extended to give students the right to govern the length of their hair. The
court stated that" 'liberty' seems ... an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to do
momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those personal aspects ... which have no
direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty." Id. at 1284-85. Following such
reasoning, school regulations which are no more than expressions of personal taste and custom,
that is, which do not serve educational goals, would be violative of the student's constitutional
right to liberty. For example, in Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970), a school
official testified that he thought a hair code was reasonable because "anything out of the ordinary
attracts attention and therefore could be disruptive of the educational process." Id. at 735
(quoting school superintendent). It is submitted that this type of reasoning carried to its logical
end would allow a school to suspend a student who was so tall or short that he attracted
attention. Moreover, extension of the liberty guaranty would open unnecessarily restrictive school
rules to constitutional attack. For example, in Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970),
the school justified its hair regulation on the grounds that long hair contributed to unsanitary
conditions and created a safety problem. The court, however, found these to be insufficient
reasons for forcing male students to cut their hair since caps could be worn to prevent any
danger. Id. at 1266.
44. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 28.
45. Silberman, supra note 22, at 122. See also J. Holt, The Under-Achieving School 142 (1969).
46. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 68-69.
47. Silberman, supra note 22, at 137.
48. See, e.g., Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185, 186-87 (D.N.H. 1970) (school board
chairman testified that the relaxed atmosphere induced by wearing work clothing to school did not fit
the atmosphere of discipline and learning).
49. See Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The court conceded that school
authorities have the right and power to promulgate rules and regulations reasonably related to
educational processes and objectives. Id. at 729. For a recent survey of school disciplinary rules, see
E. Bolmeier, Legality of Student Disciplinary Practices (1976).
50. See Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 264 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Dr. Scott Kester, an assistant professor at the University of Miami,
stated that corporal punishment could damage a child's development by engendering anxiety,
frustration, and hostility. See also Reitman, Follman & Ladd, Corporal Punishment in the Public
Schools 15 (ACLU Report 1972) [hereinafter cited as Reitman].
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The wide latitude granted educators in drafting and implementing such
regulations5 1 is easily abused, 52 and has contributed to the retention of
scheduling practices and disciplinary procedures which have not kept pace
with the earlier maturation of the child.5 3 As a result, the school atmosphere
often suppresses the individuality of the student,5 4 and makes it difficult for
him to develop a sense of dignity and self-respect."5
Although it must be recognized that going to school is a "collective
experience"5 6 in which the rights of the individual must necessarily be
balanced against the needs of the institution, enrollment in school need not
result in a total loss of one's sense of identity and self-worth.57 It is submitted
that order can be maintained without fostering an atmosphere which alienates
the student. If students were given a greater ability to influence their
environment and to assume adult responsibilities, they would develop the
sense of self-worth necessary for intellectual development58 and would face
less personal frustration, which has been found to be a frequent cause of
disruptive student behavior. 59
B. The Educator's Duty To Preserve the Student's Rights
Some commentators on the educational system have concluded that there are
schools in our country where students simply are not learning. 60 A sampling of
school systems that contain more than half of the nation's primary and secondary
student population showed that the average achievement scores of students
above the third or fourth grade level have declined, and that each year the same
children continued to drop below the norm as they progressed through the
grades. 6 1 While this decline could be the product of factors unrelated to the
51. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. National Educ. Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on Corpoial Punishment 7 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Task Force].
53. The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 23.
54. See generally Haney & Zimbardo, It's Tough To Tell a High Schoolfrom a Prison, Psychology
Today, June 1975, 26, 106 [hereinafter cited as Haney] (authors state that students take refuge in the
anonymity of the crowd).
55. See The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 5. The National Panel's Report states
that schools contain controls and supervisory practices inconsistent with developing the potentials
and increasing maturity for self-direction of young adults. Id.
56. Silberman, supra note 22, at 123.
57. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School DisL, 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969), where the Court states: "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism... students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate."
58. The National Panel states that an individual's ability to influence his environment seems to
contribute to the identity necessary in establishing a sense of self-worth. The Education of Adoles-
cents,supra note 11, at 65.See also Ladd, CivilLibertiesforStudents-At What Age?, 3J.L. & Educ.
251, 255 (1974) (suggesting that schools use a system whereby students acquire more freedom and
responsibility as they get older).
59. See The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 66.
60. See generally Armbruster, supra note 1.
61. Id. at 9, col. 2.
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school, such as changes in American home life, the proliferation of one-parent
families, or a less motivated student, 62 the quality of the instruction provided
plays an important role in a student's performance. 63 This evidence, coupled
with the indications that some schools fail to teach adequately even such basic
skills as writing and reading, 64 would justify a court in intervening in the affairs
of a school with an extremely poor record of performance in order to define
minimum academic duties. 65
62. Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1977, at 82, col. 3.
63. Not only does the quality of instruction influence performance, it may also influence a child's
decision to "enter or remain in school." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
114-15 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296
(1969)).
64. In the report of an independent study headed by former Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz, it was observed that "[1]ess thoughtful and critical reading is now being demanded and
done and ... careful writing has apparently about gone out of style." Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1977,
at 82, col. 2 (quoting College Examination Board Study). These observations are parallel to those
made by the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Based upon two samplings of high
school essays, the Assessment found that only 50% of the 17-year-olds tested could organize their
ideas on paper, and that, in general, the students were using a primer-like vocabulary. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 23, 1977, § B, at 6, col. 1.
The Wirtz study's criticism of reading instruction is also substantiated by results of standard-
ized reading exams. The following table shows the results for New York students. The exam was
given nationally, and it was expected that 50% of the students in an average school district would
be above grade level.
1976 1975
42.6% at or above the nat'l aver. 45.2%
15.9 less than 1 year below 17.3
17.0 one to two years below 16.4
20.6 two or more years below 17.5
3.9 not tested 3.6
100.0 100.0
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 1.
Results of the 1977 test show that only 40.1% of the students are reading at or above grade
level. Precise comparison, however, with the 1975 and 1976 statistics is difficult since in 1977 the
California Test of Basic Skills was used while in the earlier two years, the Stanford Achievement
Test was used. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1, & § B, at 6, col. 1.
65. It is quite possible that the state legislature would be a more appropriate forum than the
courts for definition of the school's duties. As the representative branch, it is "best qualified to
apportion scarce resources among various state needs." Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1282, 1300
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Adequate Treatment]. Judicial intervention is proper, however, where
legislative inaction has led to constitutionally repugnant conditions. Id. A recent article discussing
the role of the judiciary in reforming state institutions points out that often state administrators
rely upon courts to pressure legislatures and to impose needed reform. Note, Implementation
Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 428, 430 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Implementation Problems]. In light of this, and the lack of legislative guidance concerning the
duties of schools, judicial involvement in the present situation is necessary to protect the
educational rights of the student.
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
1. The Source of the Duty
The school's duty to provide the instruction and environment necessary for
intellectual development is arguably contained in the fourteenth amendment's
due process guaranty. 66 If the state requires students to attend a school in which
the educational program has deteriorated to the point where it provides no
effective education, 67 it is arguable that the due process prohibition of
arbitrary confinement has been violated. 68 This argument has been accepted
in another context by at least one court, which stated that forced attendance
during a teacher strike, or at any time when the teaching staff was drastically
reduced, might result in "confinement" without due process. 69 An insight as to
whether noneducational forced attendance is a denial of due process may be
gained from an analysis of the arguments raised in a series of decisions (the
"treatment cases') dealing with the due process rights of those involuntarily
committed to state institutions. °
Initially, it must be recognized that restrictions placed upon the student's
liberty are not as pervasive as those imposed upon patients in a mental hospi-
tal.71 The student, unlike the patient, is not deprived of the freedom "to be with
family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life."7 2
It is submitted, however, that this distinction does not preclude an application of
the arguments discussed in the treatment cases, at least where a student can
establish that his attendance at school is "in the nature of a 'confinement.' ,73
Moreover, the fact that students are not totally segregated from society should
not lead to the conclusion that there are no similarities between the way state
hospitals treat patients and the way schools treat students.74 Both students and
66. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. See, e.g., note 9 supra. See also The Education of Adolescents, supra note 11, at 22.
68. See Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 796.
807-09 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Education]. See also notes 69. 82. 95 infra
(discussing compulsory education as a denial of due process).
69. In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313, 316-17, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Faro. CL 1976)-
70. These cases have become known as the treatment cases. The following are those most
often cited: Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.) (juveniles in a state school), cer. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (criminally in-ane in state
hospital); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (incarcerated juveniles), re,'d on
other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977); .Martarella v. Kelley, 349
F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("PINS" juveniles), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Inmates of the Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (incarcerated
juveniles); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.) (mentally ill in state hospital).
hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373,
344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub non. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
71. See The Right to Education, supra note 68, at 808 (noting that students only spend a part
of their day in school).
72. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)).
73. In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313, 317, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Fan. Ct. 1976).
74. See Silberman, supra note 22, at 146, and Haney, supra note 54, where some of the
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patients are granted only limited personal liberties, 75 and since it is rare that
either the student or the patient will be fully cognizant of his rights, or how best to
assert them, 76 both must rely upon others to insure that they are adequately
protected-the student because of his years and the incompetent because of his
mental condition. Also, vindication of the rights of either a student or a mental
incompetent may force a court to inject itself into the internal operations of state
institutions rather than deferring, as courts have traditionally done, to the
expertise of administrators. 77 Finally, the most important similarity stems from
the fact that restrictions imposed upon students and mental patients have a
similar justification and, consequently, an analogous purpose. The State com-
mits the mentally ill in order to protect society from potentially dangerous
individuals, and for the purpose of rehabilitating or treating them so that they
may reenter society. 78 The State likewise forces the child to attend school in order
to protect society from the dangers likely to result from an uneducated citizen-
ry,79 and for the purpose of preparing the child to take his place in an adult
society.8 0 Consequently, if commitment without treatment is a denial of due
process,8 ' then forced attendance without education is also at least arguably a
denial of due process. 82
The courts have used two theories of due process in finding that mental
patients are constitutionally guaranteed a right to treatment. These are the quid
pro quo theory83 and the parens patriae theory.8 4 While each has been inter-
preted differently,8 5 it is possible to state generally that the first sees treatment as
similarities between schools and closed institutions like state hospitals are discussed. Also, It
appears that the New York legislature has found that a teacher's need to control students is
somewhat similar to the needs of a prison warden, since both are given the same privilege to
discipline those under their control. See N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10 (McKinney 1975).
75. Silberman, supra note 22, at 146.
76. Apple & Brady, Toward Increasing the Potency of Student Rights Claims: Advocacy-
Oriented Policy Recommendations, in Schooling and the Rights of Children 198, 199 (V.
Haubrich & M. Apple eds. 1975). See also Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial
Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 Yale L.J. 1338, 1342-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The
Wyatt Case] (discussing the problems facing the mentally ill in ascertaining and asserting their
rights).
77. These problems will be discussed in pt. HI(C) infra.
78. Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]. When a state acts to protect society, it is
exercising its police power, and when it acts in the best interests of the individual, it is exercising
its parens patriae power. Id. at 1326.
79. See, e.g., State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 39, 146 A. 170, 171 (1929).
80. See.note 19 supra.
81. See notes 88-93 infra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 94-97 infra and accompanying text. An argument similar to this was raised over
ten years ago by John Holt, a well-known school reformer. He stated that compulsory education
should be challenged whenever its effects upon a student are negative. See J. Holt, The
Under-Achieving School 75 (1969).
83. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 524 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
84. Id. at 521.
85. Almost all of the treatment cases cite Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
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a justification for confinement with less than full due process safeguards,8 6 and
the second sees treatment as the only permissible purpose for involuntary com-
mitment.8 7
The quid pro quo theory stems from the fact that civilly committed adults
as well as children within the juvenile justice system, are not given the full
panoply of procedural safeguards.8 8 To justify this abridgment of constitu-
and Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on standards orderd, 334 F.
Supp. 1341) (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (Sth Cir. 1974), as authority for the right to
treatment. In neither of these decisions is the right to treatment discussed at length, and several
different theories are set forth by the court.
In Rouse, the right to treatment was established through an interpretation of the 1964
Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act. 373 F.2d at 453. The court, however, also mentioned that
there were possible constitutional grounds for a right to treatment. It stated that the summary
nature of civil commitment proceedings and the provision of treatment as a justification for
confining the appellant longer than would have been possible had he been found criminally
responsible raised due process questions when treatment was not being provided. The court went
on to state that indefinite confinement without treatment may be so inhumane as to be cruel and
unusual punishment. Id.
The Wyatt court, however, specifically found a constitutional right to treatment. 32S F. Supp.
at 784. In doing so, the court appears to have -followed the Rouse court by applying both a due
process and eighth amendment rationale. While the court noted the summary nature of civil
commitment, and held that a person so committed "unquestionably" had a right to treatment, it
also mentioned the possibility that commitment without treatment was cruel and unusual
punishment, and that since treatment was the sole purpose for involuntary hospitalization, it
necessarily could be the only constitutional justification for civil commitment. Id.
The more recent decisions appear to construct two arguments from the three in Wyatt and
Rouse. These arguments are fully developed in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-25
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). One requires treatment when the State exercises
either its police or parens patriae power in order that the confinement relate to its purpose, and
the other requires treatment as the quid pro quo for the patient's commitment without full due
process safeguards and for an indefinite time. Id. at 521-22. Few of the other treatment cases
discuss the right as clearly as did the Fifth Circuit, and it is difficult to categorize them as
accepting or rejecting one or the other of the Donaldson arguments. See, e.g., New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
enforced sub nom. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), supplemented, 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). All of the decisions,
however, do employ some variation of one or both of the rationales expressed in finding that a
right to treatment is guaranteed. See, e.g., Mfartarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmates of the Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367, 1371-72 (D.R.I. 1972).
Finally, it should be noted that although Donaldson was vacated by the Supreme Court in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the majority did not deal with the arguments
discussed by the Fifth Circuit and decided the case narrowly upon its particular facts. Id. at 575.
But see id. at 578-89 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. See, e.g., Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
87. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
88. In re D.F., 138 N.J. Super. 383, 391, 351 A.2d 43, 48 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. CL 1975),
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tional rights, the State must provide a quid pro quo, and that quid pro quo is
rehabilitative treatment.8 9 Thus, where it can be shown that treatment is not
provided, the abridgment of rights is no longer justified, and continued
confinement violates due process. 90
Under the parens patriae theory treatment is the only permissible purpose
for the confinement resulting from civil commitment. 9' The underlying ratio-
nale is that when the State exercises its parens patriae power by confining an
individual who is not guilty of any offense solely because of his mental
condition, treatment is the only constitutionally permissible purpose for his
confinement. 92 Thus, where either a mentally ill adult who has been commit-
ted because of a need for treatment or a juvenile who has been confined
because of a need for supervision can establish a lack of rehabilitative
treatment, his confinement does not bear a reasonable relationship to its
purpose, and his due process rights are thereby violated. 93
Of the two theories, the second is more adaptable to the instant discussion
of compulsory education, 94 and could be employed by a court to find that
noneducational compulsory attendance is a denial of due process.9 s Just as the
State, as parens patriae, commits the mentally ill because treatment is in their
best interests, it also compels students to attend school because receiving an
education is in their best interests. 96 Thus, if a student can establish that he is
vacated in part, 145 N.J. Super. 381, 367 A.2d 1198 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 74 N.J, 260
(1977); Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1288.
89. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
90. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1287.
91. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Welch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974), qf'd in part and
vacated in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
93. The requirement that the confinement bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose for
which the individual is committed stems from the Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The Court, ruling on the constitutionality of an Indiana
pretrial commitment statute for incompetent criminal defendants, held that indefinite pretrial
commitment of a defendant who had little hope of attaining mental capacity violated due process.
Id. at 717, 738. See pt. II(C) supra for a discussion of the constitutionality of juvenile status
offenses.
94. This argument is better suited to education because the State exercises its parens patriae
power when it compels a student to attend school for his best interests. See note 96 itqra. It
should be noted that the quid pro quo argument has been criticized as unsound. See O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-89 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Civil Commitment, supra note
78, at 1325 n.39.
95. See In re John R., 79 Misc. 2d 339, 341, 357 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (Faro. Ct. 1974),
where the court, discussing the constitutionality of New York's compulsory education statute,
stated that if the statute were of no benefit to those it purported to aid, forced attendance would
violate due process. The court held that te statute was a valid exercise of the State's parens
pattiae power since it was intended to aid truants, and evidence showed that some benefited from
mandatory attendance. Id. at 342, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. It is suggested, however, that the
statute is intended to aid all students, and if a student could show that he received no benefit
from forced attendance, the court might find compulsory education a denial of due process.
96. See Alexander & Jordan, supra note 4, at 19-20 (discussing State's exercise of its parens
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not receiving an education, his compelled attendance, that is, his limited
confinement, does not bear a reasonable relationship to its purpose, and his
due process rights are thereby violated. 97 The result of such a finding would
be the imposition of a duty upon educators to provide students with the type
of education that bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of their forced
attendance. That purpose traditionally has been to prepare students to
become self-sufficient and self-reliant participants in society, 98 and provide
them with the tools necessary to exercise their rights and to assume their
duties as citizens. 99 It is submitted that the type of education which bears a
reasonable relationship to this purpose would guarantee the student a right to
intellectual development'0 and a "sphere of personal liberty"'1' in which he
would be able to develop a sense of dignity and self-respect.
2. Defining the Scope of the Duty
A court called upon to define the scope of the school's duty might gain
guidance from an examination of the relationship between a trustee and a
beneficiary.10 2 The school, as trustee, would have a duty to protect, preserve,
and promote the intellectual development and dignity and self-respect of the
patriae power in education). It should be noted that the State also compels students to attend
school under the police power rationale of protection of society. Here, providing an education
would justify the State's infringement of the student's right to liberty. Where, however, a student
could establish a failure to educate, his confinement would not bear a reasonable relation to its
purpose since, in his case, forced attendance would not be insuring society an educated citizenry.
See discussion note 93 supra. The State also exercises its police power when it commits those
dangerous to society. See Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1327 & n.46.
97. See note 95 supra. Following the reasoning employed by the New York family court,
continued mandatory attendance would not benefit the student and would violate his due process
rights.
It should be noted that a student attempting such an attack of our compulsory educational
system will have to establish that his liberty has been violated to an extent that merits
constitutional protection. See The Right to Education, supra note 68, at 808. The author also
points out that a student must demonstrate that a court is capable of defining standards for a
minimal education. Id. The competency of a court to set specific standards wvill be discussed in
pt. mI(C) infra.
98. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165 (1944) ('It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
... given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.").
99. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113 (1973) (iarshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Education may instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for political
discourse and debate."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("[Slome degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system . . . .'; School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government.').
100. See pL II(A)(1) supra.
101. See note 40 supra.
102. The courts have used the concept of a trust relationship in the past when dealing with
the education of children. See note 10 supra.
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student.10 3 The school would have wide discretion in carrying out its respon-
sibilities. 10 4 Its actions, however, could be challenged upon a showing of an
abuse of discretion, 05 and a court could either direct the school to reconsider
its decision, or instruct the school as to what action it should take. 10 6 The
student, as beneficiary, could require the school to justify any action which
had a significant effect upon his intellectual development. 10 7
3. Judicial Recognition of Rights and Duties
The duty to preserve the student's right to dignity and self-respect would
necessitate at least a reexamination of the school's continued use of corporal
punishment as a means of disciplining misbehavior. 08 Although it has been
held constitutional, 0 9 corporal punishment is considered by many an ineffec-
tive"10 and psychologically damaging means of discipline,"' which tends to
discourage the development of a more humane disciplinary policy. 112 Critics
of corporal punishment have noted that restrictions placed upon its use often
are ignored," 3 and teachers tend to resort to it impulsively rather than
employing less physical forms of discipline.' 14 On the practical level, the
National Education Association Task Force on Corporal Punishment has
103. Id.
104. See G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts § 89 (5th ed. 1973).
105. See id. at 323.
106. See id.
107. See id. § 141. Of course, not every action taken by the school would be subject to attack
by the student. For example, a student would probably not be allowed to question such school
decisions as whether to offer algebra to the tenth grade and geometry to the ninth. He probably
could, however, ask a school to justify its doing away with mathematics instruction after the
eighth grade, or its shortening the school day by 50% without providing some complementary
instruction elsewhere. Possible ways by which a court may determine what actions have a
significant effect upon a student's educational development will be discussed in pt. I1(C) htfra.
108. As of 1974, corporal punishment was employed in about 80% of the nation's school
districts. See R. Farson, Birthrights 118 (1974). New Jersey and Maryland have outlawed
corporal punishment, and it has been discontinued in many large urban areas like New York and
Chicago. See Reitman, supra note 50, at 32. There are, however, twenty-one states which
specifically authorize its use in schools. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 10854-10855 (West Supp.
1977); Del. Code tit. 14, § 701 (Cune. Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.27 (West Supp. 1977);
Ga. Code Ann. § 32-836 (Supp. 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 75-6109 (1971); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 392.465 (1975); S.C. Code § 59-63-260 (1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 1161 (1974). It should be
noted that the arguments put forth in the text deal only with the use of corporal punishment as a
means of discipline, and are not intended to apply to physical restraint used in defense of a
teacher or school property.
109. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
110. See generally Farson, supra note 108, at 120; The Task Force, supra note 52, at 9;
Reitman, supra note 50, at 13.
111. The Task Force, supra note 52, at 12; Reitman, supra note 50, at 15.
112. Reitman, supra note 50, at 13-14.
113. The Task Force, supra note 52, at 7.
114. Farson, supra note 108, at 120-21.
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found that rather than controlling the student body, it may, in fact, increase
disruptive behavior. 115 Moreover, schools which have discontinued its use
have attained delinquency records superior to those still relying upon it. 1 16
The Task Force also noted that corporal punishment hindered learning
ability, 117 and discouraged the development of individual self-control. ' s In
addition, evidence exists which shows that corporal punishment has a de-
humanizing effect upon older students' 1 9 and teaches students in general that
physical violence is an appropriate way to resolve conflicts and enforce
demands. 120 Finally, its harmful effects upon a student's sense of dignity, 12 1
and the existence of less damaging forms of discipline, 2 2 might allow a court
to find that a school has violated the due process requirement that depriva-
tions of personal liberties be the least restrictive necessary to accomplish their
objective, 123 thereby forcing the school to adopt a more effective and less
restrictive disciplinary procedure. For example, instead of using physical
punishment to deter tardiness, violations of dress codes or failure to observe
rules in classes, a school might deter such behavior through such less
restrictive alternatives as revocation of student privileges or detention of
students after school.12 4
115. The Task Force, supra note 52, at 10.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Reitman, supra note 50, at 15-16.
119. Id. at 16.
120. The Task Force, supra note 52, at 17.
121. Reitman, supra note 50, at 16.
122. The Task Force, supra note 52, at 27.
123. This requirement is discussed in Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1328 n.49.
124. The fact that less restrictive procedures could accomplish the school's objective of
maintaining discipline and order would allow a court to find the use of corporal punishment a
violation of due process. For example, in Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), students were punished severely
for behavior such as tardiness in leaving a school stage, failing to wear white socks in gym
classes, accidentally breaking glasses in sheet metal classes, and wiping dust off a seat in the
school auditorium. Id. at 256-58. One student was severely beaten with a wooden paddle while
being held down by two men, and other students were thrown into walls by school officials. Id.
While the Supreme Court failed to find these instances cruel and unusual punishment, 430 U.S.
at 671, it did not address the question of whether such action was the least restrictive form of
discipline possible. This principle, which arises under the due process clause, requires that
deprivations of a student's liberty be no greater than is necessary to keep order in schools. Thus,
in Ingraham, if less restrictive conduct would have achieved the objective of disciplining these
students, due process was violated. See Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1328 n.49. It is
submitted that less restrictive types of discipline could have been employed to correct these minor
infractions of school, rules. Revocation of student privileges or detention after regular school
hours would have accomplished the school's objective without the damaging effects of a severe
beating.
Finally, it is suggested that as long as Ingraham remains the definitive holding, the least
restrictive alternative analysis could be employed as a criterion for ascertaining the constitution-
ality of corporal punishment. A court, taking into consideration the gravity of the student's
misbehavior and the severity of the discipline handed out, would have to decide if a less
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Imposition of a duty to preserve the student's right to intellectual develop-
ment may subject administrators or school boards to civil liability for the
school's failure to educate. Recently, students have brought actions against
their former high schools for allowing them to graduate functionally illiter-
ate. 12s These actions have been dismissed on the ground that schools owe
students no common law or statutory duty of reasonable care in providing
them with an education.1 26 The courts' failure to find a legal duty resulted
largely from the public policy considerations raised by these actions, the most
important of which is the potentially crushing financial burden that could
result from recognition of a duty owed by the school.
127
As an alternative, however, students might bring actions against school
administrative officials under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 19 7 0 ,128
or against school boards directly under the fourteenth amendment, 129 where it
would be alleged that the school's failure to educate resulted in a confinement
restrictive alternative could have served the school's purposes. If one existed, the student's due
process rights were violated, and the school would be forced to explore other forms of discipline.
125. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., No. 77-1128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed
Aug. 31, 1977).
126. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 861 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., No. 77-1128, slip op. at 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 31, 1977).
127. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 822, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854, 859, 861 (1976).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
The success of a § 1983 action will depend upon the outcome of the ongoing controversy
concerning the scope of § 1983 liability. The Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 action was
inappropriate where an adequate state remedy existed, or where the state official's action was
merely a mistake in judgment. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). The Court also has extended to certain state officials absolute immunity
from § 1983 liability. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1133, 1199 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Moreover, lower federal courts have held
that individual acts of negligence by state officials do not give rise to § 1983 liability, id. at 1205,
and the Supreme Court has recognized a good faith defense or immunity for state executive
officials, id. at 1209.
129. This action would be based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a discussion
of an action brought directly under the fourteenth amendment, see Comment, Implying a Damage
Remedy Against Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional A ction
as an Obstacle to Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 Md. L. Rev. 123 (1976); Note, Damage
Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 922 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note]; Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counselling
Hesitation," 9 Ind. L. Rev. 441 (1976).
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without due process of law. 130 The Supreme Court has held that school
officials are subject to section 1983 liability if they know, or should know,
that their actions violate a student's constitutional rights, or if the school
official acts with a malicious intention to injure a student.1 3' In addition,
recent developments in the law may allow actions to be brought against a
school board or school district. In the past, the vast majority of such actions
have been dismissed. 132 These dismissals, however, were based upon the
courts' finding that school boards are either municipal corporations or political
subdivisions, both of which are presently outside the scope of section 1983.133
Actions brought directly under the fourteenth amendment would avoid this
obstacle, and may be successful in light of the large number of lower court
decisions which have held municipal governments subject to liability. 134 The
federal actions also may be more successful since the monetary considerations
justifying dismissal of the state claims would not as easily allow a court to
dismiss violations of a student's constitutional rights. 13s The federal actions,
however, would require the student to show a confinement without education
in order to establish a violation of his due process rights, whereas the
malpractice claim would require only that there be a deviation from the
professional community's standard of care.
The ultimate success of either action is not as important as is judicial
recognition that schools which provide no effective education violate a legally
enforceable duty owed to the students. The refusal of some courts to impose
that duty, however, has resulted in a situation where schools are held
blameless when they graduate students who are unable to perform even the
most rudimentary intellectual functions.' 3 6 It is suggested that the courts
should no longer condone this situation, and that acceptance of either the
state or a federal cause of action would encourage school officials to take
appropriate steps to insure at least basic intellectual development. 37
130. See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
131. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). It should be noted that the Court made its
ruling within the specific context of school discipline. Id. It is submitted, however, that since the
students in Wood were asserting a violation of their due process rights, id. at 310, the case
provides authority for a violation of due process in the present situation.
132. Developments, supra note 128, at 1195.
133. Id. See also Note, Suing the School Board Under Section 1983, 21 S.D.L. Rev. 452,
458-61 (1976).
134. See cases cited in Note, supra note 129, at 928-29 nn.40-46.
135. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (failure to provide mental patients with
treatment not justified by a lack of funds).
136. For example, the youth involved in one of the suits complained of being unable to fill out
a job application, or to read a restaurant menu. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1977, at 33, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at 1, 56, col. 2.
137. -Many states have, adopted, or are in the process of adopting, minimum competency
requirements for high school graduation. See, e.g., 8 N.Y.C.R.RL § 3.45 (1976). There is some
question, however, as to whether these requirements will have any substantial effect upon the
quality of school instruction. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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C. Enforcement Through the Courts
Before a court may take affirmative action which will possibly interfere
with the operation of a local school, the claimant must demonstrate that the
controversy is justiciable.138 This will require him to persuade the court that
there exist standards by which it can determine the rights and duties of the
parties, that judicial resolution of the controversy will not violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, and that the court is capable of effectuating an
adequate form of relief.' 39 A discussion of how these elements were satisfied
in the treatment cases will illustrate how the judiciary may protect a student's
right to intellectual development and personal dignity without disregarding
the requirement of justiciability.
In education, as in mental health, it is difficult to determine which method
of teaching is the most effective.' 40 As a result of this, courts have been
reluctant to challenge the educational expertise of school officials, 14 1 and
rarely question more than their good faith and the reasonableness of their
decisions. 14 2 The treatment cases, however, have demonstrated the courts'
ability to scrutinize the wisdom of a state institution's therapeutic actions, 143
and have shown that courts can establish constitutional standards in areas
that require scientific knowledge. 44
In the treatment cases, the courts, rather than choosing one form of care
over another, have set down certain guidelines under which effective treat-
ment could be provided to all patients. 45 They reviewed the structure,
atmosphere, and personnel of the institutions, 146 and initially decided whether
rehabilitative treatment was possible under existing conditions.147 The exper-
tise needed to make this decision was provided by stipulation of the parties, 48
138. Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1333.
139. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1296.
140. See, e.g., Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (N.D. Ga.
1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975) (mental health);
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854,
860-61 (1976) (education).
141. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).
142. See generally R. Loeb, Your Legal Rights as a Minor 54 (1974).
143. See generally The Wyatt Case, supra note 76, at 1379 (Wyatt has shown that the
judiciary is capable of achieving fairly broad reforms in institutions). But see Implementation
Problems, supra note 65, at 431 (suggesting that a more expanded concept of implementation
should be employed by a court attempting institutional change).
144. See notes 145-50 infra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Martarella v.
Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
146. Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1337; Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the
Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 513, 523 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Treatment].
147. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1298.
148. Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1339.
[Vol. 46
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
comparison with published standards and accepted practice, 149 and through
suggestions of amid such as the American Psychiatric Association.' 5"
A similar approach might be used to determine whether conditions in a
particular school rendered intellectual development impossible. Examination
of the administrative structure, classroom environment, and the quantity and
quality of teaching staff's' would expose at least the poorest schools where
little more than custodial care is provided. Also, educational expertise could
be gathered through the same means used in the treatment cases. This
approach would enable a court to protect the student's right to intellectual
development and, at the same time, respect the the school administrator's
expertise.
Justiciability also requires that judicial resolution of the controversy should
not distort the proper pattern of relationships between the federal government
and the states. s 2 This limitation has led to a reluctance on the part of the
courts to enter mandatory decrees which may, in effect, assume the adminis-
trative functions of state agencies.' S3 In the treatment cases, however, this
reluctance has been overcome by a system of periodic review of recommenda-
tions made by court-appointed observers such as ombudsmen or human rights
committees.15 4 These individuals advise the court of conditions existing in the
institution, and report on the administration's progress in attempting to
comply with the court's decree.15s With such information, courts have been
able to monitor the effectiveness of their decrees without assuming daily
operation of the state institution. S6
A similar mechanism could be employed where a court found noneduca-
tional confinement in a particular school. Indeed, court orders requiring
school officials to comply with desegregation decrees have been enforced
through the use of masters without violating the sovereignty of the state.' 57 In
light of this precedent and the experience of the treatment cases, judicial
enforcement of a student's right to intellectual development need not usurp
the responsibilities vested in state institutions. S8
149. Right to Treatment, supra note 146, at 517.
150. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1298.
151. See, e.g., In re Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 339-42, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852, 866-70 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1958) (because of a high percentage of substitute teachers, educational opportunities
provided by a school found inferior).
152. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1299.
153. Id.
154. Civil Commitment, supra note 78, at 1337, 1340.
155. See The Wyatt Case, supra note 76, at 1351, 1353.
156. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1301.
157. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 764-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Developments, supra note 128, at 1236-39.
158. The State's right to regulate education was recently reiterated in Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977). The issue raised in Chance was whether the procedure
employed in the selection of school supervisory personnel discriminated against blacks and Puerto
Ricans. Id. at 1081-82. The Second Circuit directed the district court to relinquish jurisdiction
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It might be argued that no court could entertain a claim that a public school
confined students without due process because the State has not given its
consent to be sued in such actions.'5 9 The rationale of this contention is that
the court's decree would impose obligations upon the defendant which could
not be carried out without appropriations of state funds. 160 This argument,
however, has been criticized as unsound' 6' and the best known decision
accepting its validity has been reversed by the Fifth Circuit. 162
In conclusion, much of the past controversy over the nation's reliance upon
a compulsory educational system has been an attempt to balance the right of
the parents with the right of the State to govern the instruction of children.1 63
Under a compulsory system of education, however, the interests of the
student should be superior to the interests of the institution. 164 Administrative
concerns should be served in addition to, rather than to the exclusion of, the
needs of the student. Judicial recognition of a right to intellectual develop-
ment and dignity and self-respect would raise the priority given to student
needs, and judicial enforcement, at least in extreme situations, would encour-
age inadequate schools to provide the instruction and atmosphere which best
suits those needs.
IV. A CHILD'S RIGHTS WITHIN THE FAMILY
Dean Pound noted two generations ago that the law has not adequately
recognized the interests of children as family members.' He attributed this
failure of recognition to the law's preoccupation with two competing interests.
First, society itself values the family as the institution best equipped to
assume the burdens of child rearing. 2 Second, parents, whose own rights as
individuals and family members have been legally recognized, display what
over the matter since racial discrimination had not been established. Id. at 1091-92. The court
also recognized that the state has a vital interest in running its own schools. Id. at 1091. It limited
that interest, however, by requiring that the state do so "in a constitutional manner," Id. It is
submitted that this limitation would allow a court, confronted with a case of noneducational
confinement, to find compulsory education a denial of due process without violating the state's
interest recognized in Chance.
159. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1301-02; see, e.g., Burnham v. Department of
Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
160. Adequate Treatment, supra note 65, at 1301-02.
161. Id.; The Wyatt Case, supra note 76, at 1341-42 n.15.
162. See Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Ga.
1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cerl. denicd, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
163. Project, Education and the Law: State Interest; and Individual Rights, 74 Mich. L.
Rev. 1373, 1386-87 (1976).
164. See generally New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 122,
347 N.E.2d 568, 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 215 (1976) (the student should be the primary concern).
1. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 185 (1916).
2. Id. at 186.
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Pound characterized as a certain "tenderness" 3 about any readjustments in the
balance of legal interests within the family. In short, parents resist any
proposed change in the recognized rights of other family members which
might impinge on their own interests. In the presence of the established
interests of parents and society in the status quo, the law, noted Pound, has
"proceed[ed] with great caution in securing the interests of children against
their parents." 4
This portion of the Comment will discuss three rights which the child has,
or should have, against his parents, namely: (A) nurturing-the right to
affirmative acts of personal care to promote a child's normal physical and
emotional development;s (B) custody-the right to be cared for by adults
chosen for their capacity to meet the child's needs and protect his interests;6
and (C) freedom from abuse-the right to family interaction which is not
damaging, harmful, or threatening to a child's physical integrity.7
A. The Right to Nurturing
Insofar as our society recognizes early child care as a duty almost exclu-
sively of parents,8 the law should begin to recognize affirmative parental
duties to provide personal care. The characteristics of, and rationale for, this
duty will be developed below. The duty will be called parental nurturing. It
may be defined as the duty to ensure that a child have every reasonable
opportunity for normal physical and emotional development.
The law presently focuses on the quality of physical care which the parent
is required to deliver. 9 Through neglect statutes and other child-protective
legislation, the law protects children against physically abusive or grossly
neglectful parents.' 0 The question will be raised whether this minimum
standard of care is in fact compatible with the provision of reasonable
opportunities for development. The courts and legislatures have also taken a
3. Id. at 187.
4. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
5. See pt. IV(A) infra.
6. See pt. IV(B) infra.
7. See pt. IV(C) infra.
8. The isolated, and theoretically independent, American nuclear family presents a strong
contrast to systems in which the state actively intervenes and even preempts family provision of
child care. One example of this latter system is the child care system developed in the late 1940's
and early 1950's in Israeli kibbutzim. During these early years after the establishment of the
Israeli state, socialization of children was not viewed as a parental duty. The infant was removed
from his parents' care at the age of four or five days and raised with a group of his peers until
maturity. The metapelet, or child caretaker, played a central role in providing physical care and
discipline, and the child was found to form a strong emotional tie to her, as well as to his
biological parents. The ideological basis of kibbutz life required that all children be raised as
potential community members, with equal educational and environmental opportunities, in order
to learn respect for community values from an early age. See X. Spiro, Children of the Kibbutz
9-20 (terms defined at 2) (1st Schocken ed. 1965).
9. See notes 32-89 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 48-89 infra and accompanying text.
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restricted approach to the issue of emotional care of children,' 1 especially in
cases where failure of such care does not produce observable physical effects.
This restriction in the scope of legally enforced parental duties contrasts
sharply with the emphasis in other disciplines on a child's emotions during his
early years and the close relationship between the child's physical and
emotional development.1 2 It will be suggested below that the availablility of
remedies' 3 less drastic and more flexible than the termination of custody may
eliminate one of the courts' principal reasons for hesitancy in recognizing a
child's right to nurturing. As was noted in the Introduction to this Com-
ment, 14 the trust model is used at several points as a conceptual framework
for defining the duty of nurturing and for redefining the parent-child relation-
ship through recognition of that duty.
1. Physical and Emotional Nurturing
Research into early child development has demonstrated that a child
internalizes his environment to a degree nearly incomprehensible to the adult
mind. An infant reaches the age of three months before he begins to
differentiate between himself and the outside world.'" Until the age of seven
years, he is the ultimate egocentric-all experience is perceived as an expres-
sion of his own needs, wishes, and fantasies. 16
It is not surprising then that the development of a child who is otherwise
well cared for will be severely retarded if he is deprived of emotional care,
even for short periods, during his crucial early years. This was dramatically
revealed to researchers who discovered that infants in impersonal institutions
suffered severe emotional and psychological damage, even though they re-
ceived high quality physical care. 17 It was found that children who had been
institutionalized for more than a brief period between the ages of six months
and seven years grew up to be emotional ciphers.' 8 As they grew, such
children were unable to form emotional attachments to adults or to other
children 19 and, in some cases, even exhibited active antisocial behavior in later
11. See notes 90-135 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 15-31 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 136-59 infra and accompanying text.
14. See pt. I supra, notes 15-44 and accompanying text.
15. Piaget considers the infant's differentiation of self from other objects one of the principal
achievements in the intellectual development of the infant. See J. Piaget, The Construction of
Reality in the Child 350-57 (M. Cook trans. 1954).
16. Id. at 357-64; see M. Beadle, A Child's Mind 122-40 (1971).
17. The debilitation of institutionalized infants is called "marasmus." Its incidence has
declined as institutions have attempted to adopt a more personalized approach to infant care. M.
Ribble, The Rights of Infants 11-12 (2d ed. 1965). See also J. Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental
Health (1st Schocken paperback ed. 1966).
18. Bowlby, supra note 17, at 16, 23. Although there is some debate about the three-month
figure, Bowlby notes the research of Spitz and Wolf in which depressive symptoms were observed
among babies between the ages of three and six months upon separation from a mothering figure.
Id. at 23.
19. Id. at 32-33. Bowlby calls the personality disorder arising from such early institutional
experiences "affectionless character." See id. at 33.
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life. 20 By its very nature, an institution fails to provide a child with a
caretaker who can, on a regular basis and through frequent contact, develop a
sensitivity to that particular child's needs and his preferences in gratification.
Such sensitivity is the product of continuing contact and some degree of
emotional commitment by the adult.2 1 Researchers defined the cause of
malaise among institutionalized children who lacked such continuous emo-
tional contact as complete maternal deprivation, 22 upon the presumption that
mothers provide this emotionally satisfying care.
In fact, a similar syndrome has been found among children in intact homes
under the care of their biological mothers. 23 "Masked deprivation" 24 in intact
families most often results from the mother's inability to interact appropriately
with her child. Either the child has no meaning at all to the mother, or he has
an inappropriate meaning, in which, for example, the mother sees the child as
a mere extension of her own needs. 2S In either case, such a parent is incapable
of perceiving and fulfilling the child's actual needs. Physical care may be
adequate in a custodial sense, but the relationship is emotionally barren, with
little if any affection between mother and child. 26
The adverse affects of inadequate emotional care include growth retarda-
tion, delay in intellectual achievement, and near-autistic social responses. 27
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11; cf. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 3
(1973) (Children are "dependent and in need of direct, intimate, and continuous care by the adults
who are personally committed to assume such responsibility.") [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
22. Bowlby, supra note 17, at 11, 16-17.
23. See R. Patton & L. Gardner, Growth Failure in Maternal Deprivation 16 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Patton & Gardner].
24. Prugh & Haulow, "Masked Deprivation" in Infants and Young Children, in Deprivation of
Maternal Care, A Reassessment of Its Effects 206-07 (1st Schocken paperback ed. 1966).
25. Id. at 207-08. Prugh and Harlow term the lack of meaning to the parent "insufficient
relatedness," and the inappropriateness of meaning "distorted relatedness." Id. at 208. Although
the text refers only to the mother for the sake of clarity in a discussion of maternal deprivation,
inadequate parent-child relationships may involve either parent.
26. There are usually complex personal reasons operating to prevent parent-child bonding. In
the six families studied by Patton and Gardner, at least one parent in each family demonstrated
severe emotional problems of his own. In addition, one of the six mothers was mentally deficient,
and two were themselves the products of poor parental relationships. Patton & Gardner, supra
note 23, at 25-26, 36-37.
27. Patton and Gardner describe six case histories of growth failure caused by maternal
deprivation. One fairly typical case was that of a three-year-old boy who weighed only fifteen
pounds, had the bone development of a fifteen-month-old, and could not yet walk independently
or talk intelligibly. As with most children who fail to thrive, the boy was apathetic and inactive.
Patton & Gardner, supra note 23, at 55-60.
Researchers are aware that similar physical symptoms can arise from emotional deprivation,
sensory deprivation, and simple caloric malnutrition. For this reason, investigation of failure to
thrive caused by emotional deprivation must include documentation that food supply in the home
and caloric intake by the child are sufficient. See Patton & Gardner, supra note 23, at 21. It is
also believed that lack of sensory stimulation tends to impair cognitive, rather than emotional,
development. See, e.g., M. Rutter, The Qualities of Mothering- Maternal Deprivation Reassessed
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Such data provide two persuasive reasons for early identification of, and
intervention in, inadequate parent-child relationships. First, the effects of
early deprivation on a child's physical and emotional development are not
totally reversible. Even after the deprivation is cured and some degree of
catch-up growth is achieved, deprived children remain behind their
chronological peers in physical size, intellectual acumen, and emotional
maturity. 28 On the positive side, though, there appears to be a correlation
between the promptness in treatment and success in minimizing the residual
effects. 29 Second, as a parent himself, the emotionally and psychologically
impoverished child will be unable to provide his children with the care and
affection necessary for their own development.30 The cycle of inadequate
emotional parenting, self-perpetuating from one generation to the next, is
similar to the cycle of child abuse inflicted by parents who were themselves
battered children. 3' The development of a preventive law approach is clearly
called for in both areas.
a. The Right to Physical Nurturing
The idea that a parent has a duty to render physical nurturing to children
in his care is not a concept foreign to the law. In Blackstone's words, parents
have "by their own proper act, in bringing [children] into the world . . .
entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that
the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved." 32
Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder. '33
Perhaps the most unequivocal legal recognition of the parental duty to
provide for a child's maintenance is the financial obligation of child support
which legislatures and courts seek to enforce vigorously. 34 In some jurisdic-
85-92 (1974). The fact that such similar results arise from physical and emotional deprivation
reinforces the idea that physical and emotional health in a child are closely associated.
28. Patton & Gardner, supra note 23, at 83-84. Children studied remained below the fiftieth
percentile in physical height and weight in relation to their peers during the limited follow-up
studies done by these researchers. Id. at 83.
29. Id. at 46-47; M. Rutter, The Qualities of Mothering: Maternal Deprivation Reassessed
75-78 (1974).
30. Bowlby, supra note 17, at 68-69; Patton & Gardner, supra note 23, at 25.
31. See Bowlby, supra note 17, at 27 ("The impairment of the capacity for successful
parenthood is perhaps the most damaging of all the effects of deprivation . .. ); V. Fontana,
Somewhere a Child is Crying 68 (1976).
32. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *447.
33. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act, which has been adopted in many
jurisdictions, including New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:100-1 to -8 (West 1969), and Virginia,
Va. Code §§ 20-61 to -88 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In New York, the duty of the mother to support a
child is also provided for where the father is dead, incapable of supporting the child, or cannot be
found within the state. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 414 (McKinney 1975). See also Dram Shop Acts
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tions, the child himself has an action against the nonsupporting parent.3 s
Support laws reflect legislators' reluctance to have the government assume the
financial burden for a child when a parent can, but fails to do so. 36 The
emphasis on the duty of financial support is so strong that it is considered
preferable, for example, to have a mother put her child in a day care facility37
and go to work rather than to disrupt the family's financial independence" by
direct government grants specifically for child care, as is common in some
European nations.3 9
There is arguably also a recognition of parental duty to provide physical
nurturing in the Supreme Court's constitutional revision of the legal relation-
ship between the fetus and its mother which began in Roe v. Wade. 40 By
recognizing the power of the state to prohibit abortions after the point of fetal
similar to that of Iflinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd 1977), in which a child has a
cause of action against sellers of intoxicants for loss of parental support resulting from injuries
sustained because of intoxication.
There is some question of how vigorously state mandatory support provisions are enforced. See
S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
8133, 8146-47 (failure of effective enforcement is "not an area of jurisprudence about which this
country can be proud." Id. at 8146).
35. See, e.g., Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa
293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966).
36. The Senate, in its report on the 1974 Social Services Amendments, P.L. 93-647, listed the
five goals towards which the states would be expected to work in providing Aid to Families with
Dependent'Children. See S. Rep. No. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 8133, 8142. The first goal listed is "achieving or maintaining economic
self-support to prevent, reduce, or eliminate dependency .... ." Id. The legislative interest in
"preventing or remedying neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults, unable to protect
their own interests, or preserving, rehabilitating, or reuniting families" is not listed until goal
number three. Id.
37. Provision of child care services to the single parent in America is one necessary evil
occasioned- by the State's emphasis upon economic independence of the family unit. Child care is
generally administered through welfare channels, incorporated into welfare reform to encourage
the poor to work, and is only coincidentally concerned with the child. M. Steinfels, Who's
Minding the Children? 16-17, 219 (1973).
38. See generally S. Katz, When Parents Fail 9-10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
39. Most European countries provide regular family allowances for each child, payable
directly to the mother. Unlike the American system of Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
which limits its payments to families that are not self-supporting, child care allowances in Europe
are paid regardless of family income level. They are intended to counteract the depressing of
family income by the increased burden of child care costs. While it is not contended that such
allowances, in fact, cover these costs entirely, the burden is at least somewhat relieved thereby.
Maternity and housing allowances are also available. See generally Part III: Cross-National
Perspectives on Child Care, in Child Care: Who Cares? 133-213 (P. Roby ed. 1973); Reinhold, In
Europe, More Than the Poor Get WeUare, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1977, § 4, at 2, col. 3. It should
be noted that, from a child's point of view, the European approach is preferable. Personal
physical and emotional nurturing by a parent is central to a child's development, while the source
of economic means is clearly irrelevant to him.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
viability,41 Roe permits the inference that at that point in her pregnancy, a
mother's responsibility to provide continued physical nurturing to the fetus
outweighs whatever conflicting interests she may have, short of her own
physical health.4 2 The Court designated viability as the point at which the
interests of the fetus become the proper subject of protective state legislation
to prevent the mother from aborting the child. 43 A fiduciary as well as a
physical relationship can be said to exist-the mother is like a trustee who,
under the duty of loyalty, 44 must allow no self-interest to interfere or conflict
with the interests of the beneficiary.
Moreover, this duty of loyalty can be extended backwards from viability to
the earlier stages of pregnancy. It would not interfere with a woman's
recognized privacy in childbearing decisions to require that until such decision
is reached, she do nothing of her own volition which might jeopardize the
normal growth process of the fetus.4 5 In fact, the definition of nurturing as the
provision of every reasonable opportunity for normal development 46 cannot
logically exclude the first five months of human growth. The woman's
decision to continue the pregnancy to term is therefore nothing more than a
decision to continue the duties of nurturing which antedate the decision
itself.4
7
The legal recognition of the parent's duty to provide physical nurturing
which will be the main focus of this section is chiefly a legislative recognition,
given expression in the neglect statutes. Such statutes provide both a rationale
for an extended definition of parental duties to nurture and a mechanism for
enforcement of such duties. First, some form of neglect statute exists in every
state, 48 representing a universal recognition of the role of the state in ensuring
41. The opinion in Roe v. Wade addresses the question primarily in terms of balancing the
interest of the State against a woman's privacy in childbearing decisions. See id. at 164-65.
42. Id. at 163-64.
43. Id.
44. A. Loring, A Trustee's Handbook 6, 67 (Farr Revision, 6th Od. 1962); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959).
45. See notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text.
46. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
47. There are parallels between the choices made in childbearing and in taking on duties as a
trustee. The following quotation is taken from a discussion of the seriousness of a trustee's duties,
but it might well be applied to the decision to bear and raise children: "[A potential trustee] had
best examine the trust property, his own property and his walk of life to make certain In advance
that his personal interests will not conflict with his duties as trustee, for it well may be that the
relationship is not compatible with the continuation of what he needs to do in order to take care
of his own interests properly." Loring, supra note 44, at 7.
48. Ala. Code tit. 26, §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.010(1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 8-201 (1974); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-401 to -403 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code § 300 (West 1977), §§ 16500-16511 (,Vest 1972 & Cum- Supp. 1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
19-1-101 to -103 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 17-32 to -47a (1975 &
Supp. 1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 31, § 301 (1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 39.001(2), 39.01(10) (1974),
as amended by Act of June 8, 1977, ch. 77-149, § 39.01(10)(g), 1977 Fla. Laws 494; Ga. Code
Ann. § 24A-401 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-11 (1976); Idaho Code §§ 16-1601 to
-1603 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 702-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Cum.
Supp. 1978); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-5-7-1 to -6 (Burns 1973 & Burns Cum. Supp. 1976); Iowa
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that children receive proper care when their parents have manifestly failed in
their responsibilities. Second, the neglect statutes provide a means of finding
children who are not properly cared for and intervening in their behalf. Child
abuse and neglect reporting systems4 9 have been mandated legislatively to
Code §§ 232.1-.3 (West Supp. 1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-802 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky.
Rev. Stat §§ 208.010-.080 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1569-74 (West Supp.
1977); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 3792-3803 (Vest Supp. 1977); Md. Ann. Code art. 88A, §
45 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, §§ 1-39 (MichielLaw. Co-op 1975 &
Supp. 1977); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 722.621-.636 (Supp. 1977-1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
260.015 (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-3 to -S (Cur. Supp. 1977); Mo.
Ann. Stat. §§ 210.110-.130 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 10:.1300-1314 (Cum.
Supp. 1975 & Int. Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-209 (1974); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 62.010..040
(1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 169:1 to 169:2 (1964 & Supp. 1975); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 9:6-1 to
:6-3 (1976) & 30:4C-1 to :4C-2 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-14-1 to -3
(1976); N.Y. Famn. CL Act §§ 1011-1013 (McKinney 1975), as amended by Act of Aug. 1, 1977,
ch. 518, § 1012(e) 1977 N.Y. Laws 776; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-277 to -289 (1969 & Cum. Supp.
1975); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-20-01 to 27-20-03 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 2151.01-.05 (Page 1976); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101 (Vest Supp. 1977-1978); Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 419.472-.476 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -102 (Purdon 1977-1978);
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-1 to -52 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-10-10 to -40
(Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 26-8-1 to -6 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-101
(1977); Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-1 to -2
(1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 631-632 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-226 to -228
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.020(12) (Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code Ann. §
49-1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.13 (1957 & Vest Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 14-115.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
49. Reporting statutes now exist in every jurisdiction. A typical reporting statute is Ala. Code
tit. 26, §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1975), which provides for mandatory reporting by anyone called upon to
render aid or medical assistance to a child (id. § 26-14-3); permissive reporting by any other
person having "reasonable cause" to believe that a child is abused (id. § 26-14-4); a central
registry of all such reports and investigations of reports (id. § 26-14-8); and immunity from civil
or criminal liability for all persons making good faith reports of child abuse (id. § 26-14-9). In
addition, some reporting statutes specifically provide that no husband-wife or doctor-patient
privilege excuses the making of reports, see, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.17.060 (1975), although a
lawyer-client privilege may still be effective, see, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 42-815 (Supp. 1977).
State reporting statutes include: Ala. Code tit. 26, §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1975); Alaska Stat. §§
47.17.010-.070 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-546 to -546.04 (West
1977); Cal. Well. & Inst. Code §§ 16500-16509 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 19-10-101 to -115 (Cuam. Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-38(a)-(c) (West Supp.
1978); Del. Code tit. 16, §§ 901-909 (Cuam. Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 827.07 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1977); Ga. Code §§ 99-201 to -213 (1976); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 350-1 to -5 (1976); Idaho
Code §§ 16-1619 to -1620 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 23, §§ 2051-2061 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1977); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-5-7-8 (Burns 1973); Iowa Code §§ 235A.1-.24 (1969 & West
Supp. 1977); Kan. Stat. §§ 38-716 to -724 (Supp. 1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199:335 (Cum. Supp.
1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:403 (1974 & West Supp. 1977); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§
3853-3860 (Supp. 1975 & West Supp. 1977); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 35A (1971 & Cum. Supp.
1977); Ymss. Ann. Laws ch. 119, §§ 51A-51G (ichieLaw. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1977); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 722.622-.634 (West Supp. 1977); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.S56 (%Vest Supp.
1977); Mss. Code Ann. §§ 43-24-1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 210.110-.165
(Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 10:1304-:1305 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 28-1501 to -1508 (1975), as amended by Act of June 1, 1977, Pub. L. No. 40, § 28-1508,
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require that persons outside the family who have access to children report
apparent cases of neglect or abuse to public agencies. s ° Such statutes are
found in all jurisdictions and provide a means of identifying the problem and
providing protection and support for families and children on a case-by-case
basis.
Neglect statutes prohibit certain types of parental behavior.5 1 For example,
they prohibit "cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse" by a parent, 52 and
classify neglecting parents as those who are "unable to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization,
or other physical or mental incapacity."5 3 Neglect statutes have been de-
scribed as specifying what is undesirable, while leaving "to inference what is
desirable. '54 The negative cast of this type of legislation avoids setting up
exact positive guidelines for parental behavior. This lack of specificity has
been criticized, s s but an argument can be made that it is this very absence of
strict standard-setting by the legislature that preserves the constitutionally
1977 Neb. Laws 411; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.501-.508 (1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 169:38-45
(Supp. 1975); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 9:6-8.8-.15 (1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-14-14.1 to .2 (1976), as
amended by Act of April 8, 1977, ch. 379, § 13-14-14.1, 1977 N.M. Laws 2736; N.Y. Soc. Serv.
Law §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1976 & Cur. Supp. 1977-1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 110-115 to -122
(1975), as amended by Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 786, §§ 110-117, 119(1), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws
167; Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 625, §§ 110-118, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 165; N.D. Cent. Code §§
50-25.1-01 to -14 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.421 (Page 1976); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, §§ 845-848 (West Supp. 1977-1978); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 418.740-.775 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 11, §§ 2201-2215 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-9-5.1 to .2 (Supp. 1976);
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-10-50 to -100 (Cure. Supp. 1977); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 26-10-10
to -15 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 17, 1977, ch. 209, § 26-10-15, 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws
409; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1201 to -1212 (1977); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. tit. 2, §§ 34.01-.08
(Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978); Utah Code Ann. §§ 55-16-1 to -7 (Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
13, §§ 1351-1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Va. Code §§ 63.1-248.1 to .17 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.44.010-.080 (Supp. 1976), as amended by Act of May 24, 1977, 1st Ex.
Sess., ch. 80, §§ 26.44.010, -.020, -. 030, -.040, -.050, -. 070, 1977 Wash. Laws 328; W. Va. Code
§§ 49-6A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.981 (West Supp. 1977); Child Abuse and
Neglect Act of Feb. 26, 1977, ch. 10, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 328 (to be codified in Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §§ 14-28.7-.13).
50. Few reporting statutes are limited only to the reporting of actual physical injuries
sustained by a child. As of 1975, only nine states (California, Georgia, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin) had statutes which would exclude
the reporting of neglect. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 Fain.
L.Q. 1, 63 (1975).
51. See Katz, supra note 38, at 57-58.
52. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(d) (West Supp. 1977).
53. Idaho Code § 16-1602(nX2) (Supp. 1977).
54. Katz, supra note 38, at 57.
55. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1001 (1975) (vague neglect laws allow improper state intervention);
cf. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 18-19 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1976) (neglect statute held unconstitutionally vague as a basis for permanent termination of a
parent-hild relationship because the wording of the statute failed to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what parental behavior was prohibited).
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protected areas of family privacy. By reserving to the parents the discretion to
make basic decisions regarding the way a child is brought up,5 6 at least while
the child is incapable of reaching a rational decision of his own,"7 the state
respects the integrity of the family unit, and initially protects the child's right
to nurturing by enhancing the stability of the family as a source of protection,
continuity, and care.58
Constitutional recognition for and guarantee of parental autonomy is not
intended, however, to shield the parent who fails to provide his child with
adequate physical care. The autonomy accorded parents is premised upon the
use of parental power to benefit the child. Once the exercise of parental
autonomy can no longer be harmonized with the promotion of the child's
interests, as when parents violate the negative prohibitions of a neglect
statute, parents have abused their discretion.5 9 A court of proper jurisdic-
tion 60 then has the opportunity to begin to define in positive terms those
duties which parents owe their children under the neglect statutes. This
judicial task will be facilitated by language in some neglect statutes which
suggests that affirmative parental conduct may be required. The statute in
Idaho, for example, defines a neglected child as one who "is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, education, medical or other care or
control necessary for his well being because of the conduct . . . of his
parents. '6 1 The statutory definition of neglect in Montana closely parallels the
definition of nurturing, stating that neglect is the "commission or omission of
any act or acts which materially affect the normal physical or emotional
development of a youth. ' 62
Courts have construed neglect statutes to find an affirmative duty on the
part of parents which resembles that imposed on a trustee by the courts of
equity. One definition of neglect, for example, formulated by the Illinois
56. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents may send children to
private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents may require that a child have
the opportunity to study particular subjects). See also Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among
Infants, Their Parents and the State, Part I, 4 Farn. L.Q. 410 (1970).
57. See pt. I supra, notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
58. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, No. 76-7475, slip op. at 6120-21 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1977).
59. Parental discretion in the exercise of a child's rights is, in fact, analogous to the discretion
a trustee enjoys in administering the corpus of a trust. As long as the trustee does not abuse his
discretionary powers, he is free of judicial intervention. The court obtains jurisdiction upon a
breach of fiduciary duties in administration. See Loring, supra note 44, at 108-09.
60. Most neglect statutes provide for exclusive original jurisdiction of a family or juvenile
court in proceedings involving a neglected child living or found in the state. See, e.g., Idaho Code
§ 16-1603 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1013 (McKinney 1975).
61. Idaho Code § 16-1602(n)(1)(Supp. 1977). A similar, but more detailed, provision is N.Y.
Fain. Ct. Act § 1012()(i) (McKinney 1975), which states that a neglected child is one "whose
physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent.., to exercise a minimum degree of care (A) in
supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education ... or medical, dental,
optometrical or surgical care . . . . or (B) in providing the child with proper supervision or
guardianship . .. ."
62. Mont. Rev. Codes, Ann. § 10-1301(2Xa) (Int. Supp. 1977).
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Supreme Court and cited with approval by other courts, 63 states that neglect
is the "failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand .... It
is not a term of fixed and measured meaning. It takes its content always from
specific circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding
circumstances changes. '64 This flexible and affirmative obligation resembles
that of a trustee who must act with the "care and skill [of a person] of
prudence, discretion and intelligence .. . in the light of circumstances existing
at the time [of] the act. . . . "65 Courts have applied such a reasonably prudent
parent standard in determining if a parent with a low IQ has neglected her
children. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in In re McDonald,66 removed the
children from the custody of the mother not merely because of the mother's
marginal intelligence, 67 but because the court found clear and convincing
evidence that the mother's subnormal intelligence impaired her ability to
evaluate circumstances with the judgment of an ordinarily prudent person. 68
Her mental incapacity threatened the physical well-being of her children, and
there was no indication that training or assistance would alleviate the
problems arising from the mother's incapacity. 69 In short, no matter how
minimally one defined the affirmative duties of physical nurturing, the mother
in McDonald was not capable of making ordinary discriminations to act as a
reasonably prudent parent on a day-to-day basis.
Another application of the reasonably prudent parent standard to define the
limits of parental discretion arises in cases reviewing parental decisions about
medical care for a child. One court stated the general rule: parents are
allowed discretion in not seeking medical care for every trivial complaint
63. See In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, -, 363 N.E.2d 820, 822, 6 Ill. Dec. 873, - (1977); In re "H"
Children, 65 Misc. 2d 187, 188, 317 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (Fain. Ct. 1970).
64. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, b24, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952).
65. Loring, supra note 44, at 87.
66. 201 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1972).
67. The mother's IQ was 47. Id. at 449. The court heard testimony by a visiting nurse, a
social worker, and another member of the family who had helped care for the children while they
were in the mother's custody.
68. The witnesses heard by the court in McDonald expressed serious reservations about the
mother's ability to make decisions in subtle judgmental matters such as proper care during
childhood illnesses and the mother's capacity to give her apparently normal children adequate
stimulation to promote their intellectual development. Id. at 449-51.
69. The witnesses testified, for example, that the mother had required considerable training to
master such basic matters as bathing the babies and making their formula. Id. at 451.
A factually similar case came before the Iowa courts in In re Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa
1973). The mother in Wardle had an IQ of 60 and was described as being easily depressed by
parental duties, which bewildered and confused her. A psychologist described the mother as
having little ability to evaluate her surroundings accurately and a lack of impulse and emotional
control. The social worker in Wardle waited four years before suggesting termination of the
parent-child relationship "to give the child and parents every chance possible to see if there would
be improvement." Id. at 559. While it is possible to understand the social worker's sympathy for
the mother, it is difficult for this author to ignore the adverse developmental effects on the
children arising from the additional time spent in a less than adequate family situation. See In re
Sampson, discussed notes 79-85 infra and accompanying text.
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provided such discretion is exercised in such a manner and on such occasions
as "an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of his child and
anxious to promote its recovery, °70 would provide. In passing on parental
judgment concerning provision of health care for their children, the court
looks to specific treatment alternatives available, and the risks and benefits
which attach to each alternative.7 1 In cases in which the risks are such that a
reasonably prudent parent might choose not to pursue a hazardous course of
treatment, the court will not override parental refusal of consent." 2
There are, however, situations in which a court will intervene to order
medical treatment for a child where the parent has refused such treatment on
the child's behalf. In order to justify the court's intervention, there must be
some abuse of parental discretion. The cases are not always clear on what
rationale the court adopts, but a rationale may be developed from the
definition of nurturing used herein. If the duty to nurture requires that a
parent ensure every reasonable opportunity for normal physical development,
parents who ignore the medical and developmental consequences of refused
medical treatment are abusing their discretionary powers. A parent who, for
example, refuses a relatively safe blood transfusion for his newborn child
because of his own religious convictions, and ignores the fact that his refusal
will lead to the child's death or severe mental retardation, has abused his
discretion because he or she has denied the child an opportunity for normal
physical development.7 3 Just as a trustee will not be permitted to act in his
70. Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 113, 116 P. 345, 346 (1911).
71. Among the factors considered by the courts are: danger to the child's life from the existing
medical condition, the danger involved in the proposed treatment, the probable success of the
treatment, the degree of cooperation necessary from the child to ensure minimum success, and the
burden on the community if the condition goes untreated. Note, Judicial Power To Order
Medical Treatment for Minors over Objections of Their Guardians, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 84, 89-90
(1962). In medical care cases, the court reviews a single parental decision and does not call
into question the soundness of the entire parent-child relationship. See Santos v. Goldstein, 16
App. Div. 2d 755, 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (1962). In declaring a child neglected purely for
surgical consent purposes, the Santos court stated that its neglect determinhation "in no way
imports a finding that these parents failed in their duty to the child in any other respect." Id.
72. See In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). An eleven-year-old girl suffered
from a hypertrophic left arm, which was approximately ten times the extremity's normal size. An
older sibling had brought the child to the court's attention in order to compel the parents to
consent to amputation of the useless and disfiguring limb. Because the arm was not in any way
life-threatening in a medical sense, the court refused to overrule the parental decision. The girl
was essentially isolated at home, having been withdrawn from school because she was an object
of thoughtless curiosity to the other children. She was taught at home, but her older siblings were
convinced that her deformity would keep her "out of life, . . . out of everything eventually."
Id. at 715, 126 P.2d at 784 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (quoting the child's thirty-year-old
sister).
73. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 IMI. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952). The parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, refused a blood transfusion for their
eight-day-old child who would have died or suffered severe brain damage without it. Since time
was of the essence for the effectiveness of the proposed treatment, the court below had appointed
a guardian to consent to the transfusion, and permitted the parents to appeal without mootness.
The issue of surgical consent was felt to be of significant social impact to allow a ruling in the
context of a concluded episode.
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own self-interest when it conflicts with the interests of his beneficiary, 74 a
parent should not be allowed to reject medical treatment arbitrarily, for
reasons which are not relevant to the child's developmental well-being. 7" The
court's intervention and review of the prognosis with and without treatment is
nothing more than an act in the child's behalf, "uninfluenced by the whims or
arbitrary determination of parents. '"76
In cases in which the alternatives are less clearly defined than life or death,
the court should look again to the parent's duty to nurture the child in
deciding whether or not to honor the parent's decision to withhold medical
care. That duty requires the parent to take all reasonable steps to ensure that
the child will develop normally. The principle of decision in such cases should
be a choice of the course of action which forecloses the fewest possibilities for
the full development of the child. 77 If the child's right to make a decision to
receive medical care is thought of as held in trust, the parent-trustee has a
duty to preserve the options of the child until he develops the rational powers
of an adult and can choose for himself whether his physical health or devotion
to religious precepts is personally more important. 78 An example of such an
approach is In re Sampson,79 in which the court was asked to make a decision
concerning surgical treatment of a fifteen-year-old boy with an extensive facial
74. Loring, supra note 44, at 6.
75. While religious beliefs are clearly constitutionally protected, religious practices that are
contrary to law may be regulated. As the Supreme Court stated in a much quoted portion of Its
opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts, "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free... to make martyrs of their children ..... Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
76. In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 130, 263 N.Y.S. 552, 555 (1933) (mother refused
removal of a child's cancerous eye on the ground that "God gave her the baby and God can do
what He wants'); accord, In re Elwell, 55 Misc. 2d 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Fain. Ct. 1967)
(parents financially able to immunize their children refused to do so; children unable to attend
public school until immunized against polio).
77. See In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1974), in which the
court gave permission for surgical repair of a cleft palate and other congenital malformations for a
severely retarded twenty-two-year-old male, who had been institutionalized and was without
family contact. The court noted that "the court must decide what its ward would choose, If he
were in a position to make a sound judgment. Certainly, he would pick the chance for a fuller
participation in life rather than a rejection of his potential as a more fully endowed human
being." Id. at 757, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
See also Goldstein, supra note 21, at 53-64, where it was argued that the principle of decision In
child custody cases should be "the least detrimental alternative" to the child. Similarly, in child
neglect cases, use of such a standard would direct the court's attention to the degree of
obstruction to a child's development that various decisions about physical and medical care would
produce. The court would then be most likely to choose the alternative which foreclosed the
fewest possibilities for full development.
78. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955), in which a fourteen-year-old boy
refused corrective surgery for his cleft lip and palate because he, like his father, believed in the
healing power of "natural forces."
79. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), off'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d
253 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). In Sampson, the
boy suffered from neurofibromatosis which caused the bizarre overgrowth of facial tissue.
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deformity caused by an overgrowth of folds of facial tissue. His gross physical
condition was not life-threatening, but it was so disfiguring that his family
had withdrawn him from extra-family activities to protect him from public
curiosity and cruelty.80 The surgical remedy available could reduce the
disfiguring condition significantly, though a fully normal appearance was not
possible. The doctors were willing to undertake the considerable risks of
surgery only if the mother would give consent to intra- and post-operative
blood transfusions. The mother had consented to surgery but, for religious
reasons, had withheld consent for transfusion therapy, which effectively
barred the corrective surgical procedure. The mother, the child's law guar-
dian, and one of the testifying surgeons advocated waiting until the child
reached the age of consent to agree to the operation on his own behalf.8' Had
the case been decided purely on the basis of the propriety of the exercise of
parental discretion, the mother's decision would probably have withstood
judicial review as the refusal of consent for a hazardous operation when no
life-threatening condition existed.8
2
The court in Sampson, however, focused upon the effects of postponing the
surgical procedure upon the boy's personal development in the intervening
years, and found those potential effects less than benign. It was not simply a
matter of a static condition which would be equally amenable to surgical
correction after the passage of six or more years. The delay in treatment until
the boy's madjority would lengthen the time during which he would have to
restrict his activities and remain isolated at home. His entire development
would continue to be nothing more than adjustment to his deformity, which
the court characterized as "an overriding limiting factor militating against his
future [normal] development. . . . [U]nless some constructive steps [were]
taken to alleviate his condition, his chances for a normal, useful life [were]
virtually nil.''s3
By giving permission for the surgery, the court enforced the parent's duty to
provide affirmative care. The court expressly addressed the child's right to
have every reasonable opportunity for normal development when it noted that
delay in surgical correction would "totally [ignore] the developmental and
psychological factors stemming from [the boy's] deformity which the court
deems to be of the utmost importance in any consideration of the boy's future
welfare .... "84
The mother's refusal to give consent for a transfusion necessary for her
son's surgery in Sampson can be seen as an abuse of her discretion in the
performance of her duty to nurture since the refusal did not protect the future
80. The boy in Sampson had been withdrawn from school at the age of nine. Although
intellectually capable, he was functionally illiterate. He was described as shy and exceedingly
dependent for his age. Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
81. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
82. It has traditionally been felt that "the father knows far better as a rule what is good for
his children than a Court of Justice ..... In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D., 317, 338 (1878) (opinion of Lord
Justice Bowen), cited at length in In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 692, 126 P.2d 765, 774 (1942).
83. 65 Msc. 2d at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
84. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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developmental opportunities which correction of the deformity might provide.
By analogy to the trust model, the court has the power to scrutinize and even
revise a trustee's decision which does not adequately reflect the beneficiary's
interests.85
This same concern for preserving developmental opportunities can be
applied to define prenatal maternal responsibilities in the care of unborn
children. Presently, many pregnant women violate the fetus' developmental
interests by failing to take advantage of available prenatal and obstetric care.
If untreated, maternal malnutrition, complications of pregnancy, or excessive
use of drugs or alcohol are known to increase the risk of infant mortality and
morbidity.8 6 Thus New York courts have found neglect where an infant is
born with withdrawal symptoms from her mother's drug use during preg-
nancy.87 A recognition of a child's right to developmental opportunities
cannot logically exclude the critical early months after conception. A first step
towards such recognition could be the provision of a legal deterrent patterned
after the New York court's finding of prenatal neglect. If, upon the birth of
her child, a mother can be held responsible for injury caused by her voluntary
malfeasance during pregnancy, she may be less likely to act in such a manner
as to incur penalties.88 As noted earlier,8 9 imposing a duty of care upon a
woman to preserve the possibility of normal development for the fetus does
not impinge on the privacy of her childbearing decision. It merely defines a
protectable right of the fetus as a potential legal person, leaving the decision
of nurturing that potential life in the hands of the woman herself.
To summarize, the legislatively-defined standards of parental care will be
adequate protection for a child's right to physical nurturing only if the courts
are willing to find affirmative duties corresponding to the circumstances of
each child.
85. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts § 89, 322-23 (5th ed. 1973) (the court in reviewing
a trustee's discharge of discretionary duties may direct the trustee to reconsider his actions or may
even go so far as to instruct him as to how he should make a new decision).
86. "The prospective mother should have a well-balanced diet, with adequate minerals and
vitamins. Prenatal examinations should be regular and include screening for maternal disease and
blood group incompatibility. Drugs should be avoided, [as should contact] with individuals
suffering from infectious or contagious diseases . . . ." The Merck Manual 883 (12th ed. 1972).
Uncertainty of causation has been, until recently, a major factor precluding recovery for
prenatal injury. Because of research into the effects of maternal disease, malnutrition, and drug
use upon the unborn child, there is now probably no greater burden of medical proof in prenatal
cases than in other actions involving medical judgments. The intrafamily nature of the cause of
action appears to be the principal objection raised in articles on the subject of liability for
prenatal injury. See, e.g., Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 583-86 (1962).
87. In re "F," 76 Misc. 2d 617, 619, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
88. A biological approach seems to be the trend in theories for protecting the not-yet-viable
fetus: until birth the fetus is treated as a biologically separate entity whose legal personality is
recognized only after birth. Liability for injury is only conditional before birth. See Comment,
Negligence and the Unborn Child: A Time for Change, I& S.D.L. Rev. 204, 217-18 (1973).
89. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
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b. The Right to Emotional Nurturing
The law has created an artificial dichotomy by attempting to protect a
child's physical well-being without giving similar recognition and protection
to his emotional health. 90 It is clear from empirical research that the two are
closely related. 91 Emotional nurturing is essentially the provision of those
intangible aspects of parental care, such as affection, guidance, and disci-
pline, which distinguish the parent-child bond from other intimate social
relationships. A strong presumption exists in the law that a child receives
emotional as well as physical care from his biological parents.9 2 This pre-
sumption underlies the statutory provisions in wrongful death statutes 93 and
dram shop acts94 of some states in which the loss of parental society, comfort,
and protection due to the tortious interference of a third person is a discrete
item of recovery accruing to the child.95
Some neglect statutes have incorporated provisions relating to emotional
neglect. For example, the Michigan statute includes in the definition of a
neglected child one who "is deprived of emotional well-being." 96 New York
includes in its neglect definition impairment or potential impairment of a
child's emotional condition-including "a state of substantially diminished
psychological or intellectual functioning . . . provided, however, that such
impairment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of
the [parent] to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child." 97 While
such provisions are a step toward recognition of the emotional aspects of child
care, many courts still may be willing to find emotional neglect only in two
limited situations-where it causes adverse physical effects 98 or where it exists
90. "The artificial distinction between physical and psychological well.being is a relic of the
past in which adults viewed children more as chattel than as persons in their own right."
Goldstein, supra note 21, at 4 (footnote omitted).
91. See notes 15-31 supra and accompanying text.
92. "Biological parents are credited with an invariable, instinctively based positive tie to the
child ... ." Goldstein, supra note 21, at 17. "The nature of parenthood is such that in most
instances the parents of the child will be most likely to best provide for its welfare.... [Plarental
affection is an element of priceless advantage to the child." In re Palmer, 81 Wash. 2d 604, 607,
503 P.2d 464, 466 (1972).
93. See, e.g., Williams v. McDowell, 32 Cal. App. 2d 49, 89 P.2d 155 (1939) (construing the
California statute, now codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377 (West Supp. 1977)).
94. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
95. "While recovery [under California's Wrongful Death statute] is limited to pecuniary loss
this may [mclude] ... a loss of benefits which under the circumstances could reasonably be
expected to have accrued to the heir even though the obligation resting upon the deceased to
bestow such benefits may have been a moral obligation only." Williams v. McDowell, 32 Cal.
App. 2d 49, 53, 89 P.2d 155, 157 (1939).
96. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.2(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
97. N.Y. Far. Ct. Act § 1012(h) (McKinney 1975).
98. The New York statute, for example, specifically mentions failure to thrive, see N.Y.
Far. Ct. Act § 1012(h) (McKinney 1975), which is the syndrome of physical growth failure
described by Patton and Gardner and discussed above, see notes 23-30 supra and accompanying
text.
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in conjunction with demonstrated physical neglect. 99
A child's right to emotional nurturing by a parent has been given indepen-
dent recognition by the courts of three jurisdictions in suits based upon
alienation of parental affections. 10 0 Where a third party had enticed a parent
away from the home and thereby deprived the child of anticipated parental
care and guidance, the third party has been held liable to the child for that
deprivation. 10 1 These courts have therefore recognized that the child has a
legally protectable right to the maintenance of the emotional support of the
family relationship.102 The judges who favored adoption of parental affection
actions viewed parental love as a major factor in the development of a child's
99. The Michigan Court of Appeals, before the 1972 statutory amendment which produced
the provision referred to above in note 96 and accompanying text, found neglect in "[t]he repeated
failure to care for the physical needs of the child, together with a marked lack of affection and
marked preference for another child." In re Franzel, 24 Mich. App. 371, 375, 180 N.W.2d 375,
377 (1970) (emphasis added).
100. The jurisdictions are: (1) Illinois: Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (decision
by federal court in the acknowledged absence of applicable Illinois law); Johnson v. Luhman, 330
Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); (2) Michigan: Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D.
Mich. 1949); and (3) Minnesota: Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949). For a
general discussion of these four cases, in which a suit for alienation of parental affections was
allowed, see Note: The Child's Right To Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship
Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 722 (1976).
101. Recognition of a child's cause of action for alienation of parental affections was, no
doubt, impeded by the courts' conceptual difficulties with the cause of action between spouses for
alienation of affections upon which the child's suit was modeled. Actions for alienation of
affections are no longer available to adult litigants in states which adopted Heart Balm statutes.
These statutes abolished the common law liability for breach of a promise to marry and for
alienation of affections, seduction, and criminal conversation. States enacting such legislation have
effectively foreclosed infant litigants from bringing similar suits. Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412,
413, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 163, 56 A.2d 768,
771 (1947) (denied child's suit for alienation of maternal affection, noting that alienation of
affections as a cause of action had been eliminated by statute in twelve states since 1935).
Jurisdictions which have abolished suits based upon a breach of a promise to marry include:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. See Annot., 73
A.L.R.2d 557, § I n.1 (1960). But see Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 286 (W.D. Mich. 1949)
(distinguished suit by infants for wrongful invasion of family relationships from the specific
husband-wife relationship covered by the heart balm statute in Michigan). Other courts have
noted that alienation of affections is rooted in the right of consortium, which is peculiar to the
marital relationship and not capable of expansion to parent-child relationships. See Pleasant v.
Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (denying a child recovery for loss
of care because of a third person's negligent injury of plaintiff's mother); Nelson v. Rlchwagen,
326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950) (infant plaintiff denied recovery for loss of maternal care
because of defendant's enticement of the mother to leave home; while desertion is a marital
wrong, a minor child has no legal right to the personal care of his parent).
102. As one dissenter in a case refusing recognition noted: "The fact is that, unless interfered
with, service, care and affection flow as a matter of course from the relationship of parent and
child." Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 7, 30 Ohio Ops. 2d 1, 4, 203 N.E.2d 338, 342 (1964)
(Gibson, J., dissenting).
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character, disposition, and abilities, which therefore has a major impact upon
society. 10 3 As one opinion noted, "it is of the highest importance to the child
and society that its right to receive the benefits derived from its mother be
protected.1 04
While a court that might recognize a child's right to emotional nurturing
today could do so under the authority of the lbgislative mandates contained in
the neglect statutes,10 5 the courts which recognized a cause of action for loss
of parental affections found arguments sufficiently compelling to reach such a
result without statutory authority. Since cases seeking relief for alienation of
parental affections were cases of first impression, and there was no strictly
applicable legislative statement on the subject, courts which accepted the
cause of action, beginning with Daily v. Parker,10 6 justified their unpre-
cedented holdings by embracing the philosophy of judicial empiricism. 07
This jurisprudential theory holds that the common law is sufficiently elastic to
respond to changed circumstances10 8 rather than adhere to precedents which
are no longer relevant. The courts which accepted the cause of action
proposed by these infant litigants rejected the archaic model of the family in
which the rights of all family members were vested in the husbandlfather.10 9
In such changes as the statutory emancipation of women, these courts saw a
trend toward recognition of the distinct rights of other family members."10
Although the cases lack any reference to sociological data which might
support the existence of this trend, the courts were satisfied that changes in
society provided an adequate basis for recognition of the child as an individ-
ual whose rights to the tangible and intangible benefits of family life are
entitled to protection."'
The parental affection cases are the closest judicial analogue to the right of
emotional nurturing proposed in this section. The discrete interest of a child
in adequate emotional care from his parent is common to both. The cases
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 605, 71 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1947); fller
v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 402, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949).
104. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 403, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949).
105. See notes 48-85 supra and accompanying text.
106. 152 F.2d 174, 176 (7th Cir. 1945); accord, Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 285 (W.D.
Mch. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 602, 71 N.E.2d 810, 812 (1947); Miller v.
Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 410, 37 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1949).
107. See cases cited note 106 supra. While Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543
(1949), does not specifically use the term "judicial empiricism," the decision does state that the
"common law does not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexible rules, but rather ... [ilts
principles have been determined by the social needs of the community and have changed with
changes in such needs." Id. at 406, 37 N.W.2d at 547 (dictum).
108. R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 166-92 (1921).
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 408, 37 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1949).
110. Id.
111. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 176 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp.
281, 284 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 111. App. 598, 605, 71 N.E.2d 810, 813
(1947). Among the intangible rights to be protected is a child's right to a parent's comfort, society,
and protection. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d at 176.
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
accepting the cause of action against third party interference with the parent-
child relationship were in an admitted minority when they arose thirty years
ago. But the flexibility of the common law which those courts espoused should
probably be reconsidered in evaluating suits protecting the child's interests in
the intangible benefits of family life. Courts which initially rejected such suits
raised a number of objections to the parental affection action. However, these
arguments against recognition of a child's right to recover from a third person
for loss of parental affection are less compelling when directed against
recognition of a child's right of action against a non-caring parent for
emotional nurturing. Arguments raised against actions for loss of parental
love fall into three basic categories: (1) the lack of power to enforce what is
essentially a moral right, (2) the lack of common law or legislative precedent,
and (3) potential practical problems arising from recognition of such a cause
of action.
The provision of parental love has been characterized as merely a moral or
social obligation, incapable of legal enforcement. As one New York court put
it, "[t]he law cannot require a parent to love or train a child. It forbids abuse
and abandonment but it does not compel devotion."' 1 2 But since the parent is
the only person in a position to provide critical early emotional care, to deny
relief to the child is to leave the child without an alternative emotional
relationship as a remedy. Unlike the remedy of money damages sought as
compensation for loss of parental care in actions for alienation of parental
affections, remedies more appropriate to the character of the right could be
fashioned in emotional nurturing actions,1 13 such as psychological care and
follow-up to overcome an inadequate capacity for emotional parenting. While
the state cannot enforce love, it can reinforce it by providing social services
which encourage formation or maintenance of parent-child ties.
While no court considering a cause of action for alienation for parental
affections has admitted that the mere novelty of the claim effectively barred a
child's recovery," 14 some courts have felt that recognition of a new right in a
child was a policy decision affecting a major portion of the population, and
therefore required legislative action to define the right.' 5 In fact, however,
most legislatures have already recognized a series of duties running from
parent to child under neglect, support, and wrongful death statutes. 1 6 By
finding an obligation to provide for the child's emotional well-being as part of
112. Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 160, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (action for
medical malpractice in which, inter alia, siblings of a child born after the father had been
vasectomized claimed deprivation of a portion of parental care, affection, and training each
would have received if the unplanned brother had not been born).
113. See remedies discussion, notes 136-59 infra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 135, 273 N.Y.S. 912, 913 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (early New York case rejecting a child's cause of action for alienation of affections of his
mother by a third person).
115. Whitcomb v. Huffington, 180 Kan. 340, 344, 304 P.2d 465, 467-68 (1956); Scholberg v.
Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 213-14, 58 N.W.2d 698, 699-700 (1953).
116. See notes 34-39 & 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
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those duties, courts will be carrying out the legislatures' intent to protect the
child.
The loss of parental affection action was also thought to be contrary to the
policy of family repose' 1 7 which bars intrafamily tort litigation. In fact,
intrafamily immunities have been in increasing disfavor in the decades since
many of the parental affection actions were decided,"" and therefore consti-
tute a less persuasive basis for refusing recovery. While family repose may be
a justifiable policy to discourage legal actions which might disrupt an intact
family, it offers no reasonable protection in a situation in which a child has
experienced such a deprivation of parental affection that he seeks legal
redress. The family life of such a child has deteriorated significantly before
legal action is even initiated.
Courts have also expressed uncertainty about practical problems in deter-
mining an adequate remedy for loss of parental affections, most especially the
problems of assessing monetary damages' 9 and of defining the extent and
duration of the right' 20 to parental affection in light of the changing status of
the child vis-4-vis his parents as he matures. The first problem is minimized
in action for emotional nurturing by confining the award of monetary dam-
ages to very limited circumstances and upon conditions that would militate
against family collusion for fraudulent gain. 2 1 The second problem could be
solved by adjusting the remedy to the child's age at the time of injury and to
the type and extent of damage which has resulted. For example, if the child
were an infant, the most appropriate remedy might be psychological counsel-
ing for the parent to improve nurturing skills, while a more appropriate
remedy for an adolescent might be to allow him to choose a supplemental
guardian.
Courts which have denied actions for loss of parental affection have also
117. "The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent." Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 579, 118 S.E. 12, 13
(1923) (quoting Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891)).
118. Intrafamily negligence actions in tort have been increasingly allowed under the theory
that family members should have the same access to remedies as other persons injured by a
parent's negligence. See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529 (1969); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 970-80 (1972) (setting forth the rationale from cases limiting
or abrogating the parental immunity doctrine).
119. In Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 176, 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949), the court
expressed fear that actions among family members for monetary damages would "convert the
home into a commercial enterprise." It is ironic that the very courts which express this fear
usually emphasize financial support when discussing responsibilities enforceable against parents.
"Although the common law recognized the right of a child to support and maintenance from his
parents by virtue of the family relationship, it recognized no enforceable right to damages for loss
of personal care .... ." Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 472-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (denying recovery for loss of parental care because of injury to parent by negligent
third person).
120. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947).
121. See remedies discussion, notes 136-59 infra and accompanying text.
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expressed fear of a flood of litigation. 122 The fact is, however, that if the
recognition of a new cause of action should result in large numbers of suits,
provided that the possibility of fraudulent suits is minimized, that would
simply go to show a genuine need for a remedy. Moreover, it will be proposed
below that the existing machinery of the social service bureaucracy should
deal with cases of emotional neglect. 123 This would insulate the courts from
having to bear the entire burden of increased litigation. It is estimated that
the social service mechanism presently deals with 80% of neglect cases
without recourse to the courts in a state like New York.124
Recognition of a right to emotional nurturing would focus on providing a
child with a stable parent-child relationship that satisfies the child's need for
early emotional security.' 25 Whereas infant litigants usually sue through a
"next friend" who is customarily one of the infant's parents, 26 the child
himself with a legal guardian of his own interests would be a necessary party
in a suit in which the quality of his emotional care is at issue. Independent
suit could be brought by a minor of sufficient maturity to determine that his
parents are presently contributing to his emotional maladjustment.' 27 The
child protective system, which requires reports of child neglect by those who
are in a position to acquire knowledge of neglect, could be used to raise the
claims of younger emotionally neglected children.' 28 Grandparents and adult
siblings are already frequently the parties who raise the question of the quality
of a child's care.
1 29
In actions brought by or on behalf of emotionally neglected children, the
court would bear the burden of making a thorough and expeditious investiga-
tion of the child's existing affectional ties to determine where an emotionally
122. See, e.g., Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 161, 56 A.2d 768, 770 (1947); Morrow v.
Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 135, 273 N.Y.S. 912, 914 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
123. See remedies discussion, notes 136-59 infra and accompanying text.
124. Besharov, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § l011 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
This author does not mean to suggest that the already heavily burdened social service bureau-
cracy or family court judicial personnel can be expected to assume still greater responsibilities
without increased manpower and funding. Only "[wihen we, as a society, are prepared to commit
as much money to children as we do to alcohol (approximately $34 billion a year), (will] we then
stand to assure our children a much safer environment in which to grow than we provide now."
Letter from Allen R. Walker, Univ. of Rochester School of Medicine to the New York Times
(N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1977, at A24, col. 4).
125. See notes 15-31 supra and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
127. Under some state laws, a child of fourteen years of age has the controlling voice In
custody disputes between his parents or potential guardians. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 30-127,
74-104 (1977); pt. IV(B) infra, notes 131-217 and accompanying text.
128. All jurisdictions have statutorily established child neglect and abuse reporting systems.
See note 49 supra.
129. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallinger, 55 App. Div. 2d 1036, 391 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1977)
(custody of child awarded to paternal grandparents who had devoted time and care to raising
her); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (question of neglect raised by child's
adult sister).
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nurturing relationship exists or would be most likely to arise.130 The court's
methods would be analogous to those already used by some courts in deciding
custody questions in connection with dissolution of marriages.' 31 The court
would consider, for example, the expressed preference of the child132 if the
child is of sufficient age and intelligence to communicate it free of pressures
from other family members. If the child is an infant or otherwise unable to
communicate his preferences directly, the court might rely upon observa-
tion 133 of the child's interactions with the adults concerned, to determine
where the most positive interactions take place. Time would be of the essence
in such proceedings. The usually protracted course of judicial proceedings
could itself be damaging to the child's emotional health since a child is not
able to tolerate delay in matters which he feels strongly about. 134 Younger
children in particular are least able to tolerate conflict among adults to whom
they are attached, and are least capable of dealing with emotional insecurity
in their relationships. 135
2. Remedies for Failure to Nurture
Once the court has jurisdiction over a neglected child, it must exercise its
own discretionary 136 powers and determine the child's future disposition.
While it is customary for courts to state that they exercise their powers in the
child's "best interests,"' 3 7 it has been suggested that "the least detrimental
alternative" 38 should be used as the proper guideline in determining the
needs of the child in deciding disposition. The use of the latter test would
serve as a reminder to courts of a fact underlying all solutions to family
130. A full discussion of court investigation of affectional ties during custody proceedings may
be found in the Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Intoling Third
Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151 (1963). See also Goldstein, supra note 21, at 17-20, where a
psychological parent is defined as an adult who, "on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction ... and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the
child's physical needs." Id. at 98. It is the psychological parent whom the court is attempting to
identify in addressing custody or emotional nurturing problems from this point of view.
131. The child's rights in custody matters is a separate subject addressed in this Comment.
See pt. IV(B) infra. It should be noted at this point, however, that emotional nurturing appears to
be one of the relevant factors in awarding custody under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
§ 402 (1971 version), which states: "The court shall consider all relevant factors including:... 3.
the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest .... "
132. See Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Invok'ing Third
Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151, 162 (1963).
133. Id.
134. Goldstein, supra note 21, at 40.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Loring, supra note 44, at 108-09.
137. "The rationale of parens patriae is that the State must intervene in order to protect an
individual who is not able to make decisions in his own best interest." In re Weberlist, 79 Misc.
2d 753, 756, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
138. See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 53-64; pt. IV(B)(2)Xb) infra, notes 116-30 and accom-
panying text.
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disruptions involving a child-namely, that none of the available alternatives
are free from potential emotional harm for the child. 139 It is a matter of
determining which remedy is most likely to have the least harmful effects.
"The least detrimental alternative" approach will generally focus on providing
a secure emotional attachment between the child and some adult who is
committed to caring for him.' 40 A primary consideration is the need to
minimize "the possibility of [future] frequent and perhaps continuous judicial
intervention into the life of the child.' 1 4
1
The court may go so far as to dissolve the family relationship by removing
the child from the home and placing him in foster or institutional care.
Although removal of the child is not the only remedy for neglect, it may seem
so drastic that the court is deterred even from finding neglect lest it be obliged
to invoke the removal remedy. Thus, in practice, the remedy may determine
the extent of both the parent's duty and the child's right. The court may, for
example, avoid finding neglect by minimizing the parental duty so that
present levels of parental performance may be deemed adequate. 142
Whenever the court lowers the standard of parental conduct, however, it also
diminishes the child's right to nurturing, namely, the provision of every
reasonable opportunity for normal physical and emotional development.
Where the child's physical safety or health is seriously threatened by the
parent's inadvertent or willful neglect, 143 the court can readily harmonize the
protective aspects of removal from the family with the least detrimental
alternative standard by weighing the adverse effects of removal against the
probabilities of continued deterioration in the child's physical welfare. Where
the child is suffering deprivation of intangibles, such as stimulation, disci-
pline, 44 or affection,145 the immediate adverse effects are less readily observ-
139. Goldstein, supra note 21, at 54. Any child who has been neglected to the degree that his
custody has been made the subject of litigation has already suffered some emotional, and
therefore developmental, damage.
140. Id. at 99.
141. Katz, supra note 38, at 146.
142. See, e.g., In re Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 1973), discussed note 144 infra and
accompanying text.
143. Examples of willful or inadvertent neglect include In re Robbins, 230 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa
1975), where a mother's behavior was characterized by the court as a series of deliberate choices
destructive of the welfare of her children, and In re Price, 13 Wash. App. 437, 535 P.2d 475
(1975), in which the failure of parents to cooperate with welfare agencies in providing proper
medical and physical care for their children constituted neglect. The court attributed the parents'
lack of response to "a combination of low intellect, stubborn distrust of dedicated public
employees, bad judgment, and poverty." Id. at 441, 535 P.2d at 478 (footnote omitted).
144. In In re Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa 1973), the court terminated Miss Wardle's
custody over her two-year-old son because she h'as unable to meet his physical needs. In contrast,
the court returned custody of her five-year-old daughter to Miss Warde because it had found no
evidence that the daughter's physical well-being was in danger. But the girl did have a history of
behavior problems, which the social worker attributed to lack of consistent discipline, and an
inadequate vocabulary for her age, which a nursery school teacher predicted would cause
difficulty when the child entered the first grade. Yet the court felt that the school system would
remedy the problems, whether the child was living with her mother or with foster parents. The
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able, and the court may feel constrained to avoid invocation of a seemingly
excessive remedy. 14 6
But a mechanism for providing remedies other than removal for inadequate
physical and emotional nurturing already exists in many states, where broad
child protective services 147 have been made available to deal with physical
neglect and abuse. With the intent of reducing the resort to courts and law
enforcement agencies, many state legislatures have mandated provision of
social and financial assistance to children who are neglected or whose general
welfare is threatened by parental conduct.' 48 A typical broad child protective
program will receive any referral or complaint "from a public or private
agency or from any person having reasonable cause to know that the welfare
of a child is endangered."'1 49 This reporting system and the services offered
through it could be expanded to encompass emotional protection of children
as well.
Direct assistance to the family unit is clearly preferable to the harsh step of
removal of the child from the home for placement in foster or institutional
care. In the initial stages of a neglect procedure, for example, it should be
customary to allow the parent to retain custody upon the condition that he
cooperate in state intervention15 0 to ensure that the neglect does not continue
court even went so far as to admit that the daughter had shown considerable improvement in
behavior and speech during a temporary stay with foster parents. Nevertheless the court failed to
find adequate grounds for terminating custody in the presence of clear evidence that the child's
subtler social needs were not being met. It is difficult to resolve the discrepancy in the court's
results: that a mother who could not adequately care for one child's physical needs could be
entrusted with custody of a child whose social, emotional, and intellectual needs were obviously
unfulfilled. See id. at 563-64.
145. See notes 90-135 supra and accompanying text.
146. It may be contended, for example, that removal of a child from a mother because of the
mother's subnormal intelligence amounts to punishment for a lack of judgment which it is not
within the mother's capacity to exercise. This is a necessary conclusion only if one equates
custody with ownership, and the loss of custody with punitive deprivation of property. Under a
trust model, breach of the fiduciary duty to meet the best interests of the child, whether willful or
innocent, requires judicial consideration of the question of the continuation of the trust, if its
purposes cannot be served. See Loring, supra note 44, at 293.
147. One example is California, which set up a broad program of children's protective
services in 1968. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 16501 (West Supp. 1977) reads, in part: "[Clhild
protective services shall include casework and related services designed to forestall or reduce the
need for action by law enforcement agencies, probation departments and courts, and to render
these services in behalf of children who are without parents, proper guardianship, or custody, or
who are being neglected or whose general welfare is being damaged by the conduct of parents,
guardians, or custodians, whether willfully or otherwise."
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., In re Welcher, 243 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1976), in which a woman whose two
previous illegitimate children had been permanently removed from her care appealed the removal
of her four-year-old son. The court allowed resumption of custody on condition that the mother
continue to undergo psychiatric treatment, that she cooperate with the Department of Social
Services in attending child care and vocational training classes, and that she allow the Depart-
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unabated. Parents may be required to undergo psychological counseling,
attend classes on home and child care, accept homemakers' services to
supplement their own efforts, and agree to social service department visits to
monitor their progress. 15 1
If with support and guidance the parent does not improve his level of care
and concern for the children,' 1 2 or if support and guidance measures are
refused unreasonably,- 3 the court may consider permanent severance
5 4 of
the parent-child relationship in order to place the child in a more appropriate
home setting, with some security. Similarly, in the trust model, removal of a
trustee is one alternative remedy, where the trust's purpose is not being
met. 15 5 It should be emphasized that where emotional ties exist between the
parent and the child, every attempt must be made to correct other shortcom-
ings in the provision of child care, since emotional attachment is the most
difficult aspect of child care to preserve through transplanting of a child.1
5 6
There are additional remedies which might be made available for failure of
physical or emotional nurturing. The possibility of early or partial emancipa-
tion may be extended to adolescents who are capable of making rational
choices about their relationships with adults. It has been suggested that a
system of secondary guardianships be permitted whereby a child of adequate
discretion and an adult can reach an express voluntary agreement to enter
into a guardianship relationship. 157 This would provide a continuing adult
role in an adolescent's life while giving the adolescent himself a choice as to
which adult will exercise discretionary powers over him. In some jurisdictions
this is already in practice-the expressed preference of a child fourteen years
or older is controlling in custody disputes. 158
ment of Social Welfare to make periodic observations of the quality of care she was giving the
child. Id. at 845.
The question of the constitutional propriety of caseworker's visits was addressed in Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in which the Supreme Court noted: "The focus is on the child and,
further, it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's
concern. The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate
those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims
as her rights." Id. at 318.
151. In re Welcher, 243 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 1976).
152. In re Robbins, 230 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1975).
153. In re Price, 13 Wash. App. 437, 535 P.2d 475 (1975); see note 143 supra.
154. Adjudication of permanent neglect sufficient to justify termination of the parent-child
relationship usually requires that, for a period of one year, a parent fail to maintain contact with
the child "notwithstanding the (placement] agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen
the parental relationship." N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 611 (McKinney 1975).
155. It is possible to conceive of parental behavior which parallels grounds for termination of
a trust, i.e., improper use of power (child abuse), improper self-interest (refusal of medical care
for personal religious reasons), failure to maintain the beneficiary according to the terms of the
trust (statutory physical neglect), and even bad habits which jeopardize the trust (prostitution or
drug abuse to which children are exposed). See Loring, supra note 44, at 29-30. See also pt.
IV(C)(2) infra.
156. Goldstein, supra note 21, at 20.
157. J. Holt, Escape from Childhood 156-57 (1974).
158. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 30-127, 74-107 (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 46
1978] RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 739
The possibility of a monetary recovery for lack of nurturing should be
limited to adult plaintiffs. Adults who have physical or emotional dysfunc-
tions traceable to parental failures should not be denied some compensation.
Here again an analogy may be found in the trust model, where liability for
misdoings under a trust remains enforceable indefinitely. 15 9 Monetary awards
would be insulated from fraudulent use by stipulating that money so recov-
ered be put to use specifically to remedy the alleged damage, to pay for
psychiatric care for personality disorders, or medical care for complications
arising from untreated physical conditions.
B. The Child's Rights in Custody Disputes
Childhood, like slavery in the ante bellum South, is a "peculiar institution"'
because the child's status as property is incompatible with his status as a
person. Despite the recent agitation for the recognition of children's rights, 2
the law continues to view children as human property which benevolent,
well-intentioned adults have the right to possess and control.3 The child's
paradoxical status as human property is evident in the area of child custody
adjudication, which is essentially a determination of ownership rights to the
child.4 This section will first analyze the predominance of the ownership
concept in current practice and then develop the rights the child must have in
order for custody adjudication to become an adjustment of personal rights
rather than a determination of ownership rights.
1. The Child's Status as Property in Custody Adjudication
The issue that courts have traditionally grappled with in a custody dispute
is essentially the same issue they confront in a dispute over the ownership of a
chattel, that is, whose expectations with regard to this thing should the law
protect?5 Under what might be called the law's ownership model of parent-
age, two branches of custody law emerged: disputes in which the claimants
are the mother and father, and disputes in which the claimants are the
biological parent and an interested party. 6 Each branch developed its own set
159. Loring, supra note 44, at 7.
1. Kenneth Stampp has characterized slavery in the ante bellum South as "the peculiar
institution." K. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution (1956). One of the aspects of slavery which
caused Stampp to so characterize it was the dual character of the slave as property and as person.
Id. at 192-93. It is only in this respect that the analogy between childhood and slavery has been
drawn.
2. See, e.g., 3. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973);
B. Gross & R. Gross, The Children's Rights Movement: Overcoming the Oppression of Young
People (1977); 3. Holt, Escape from Childhood (1974).
3. See pt. IV(A), (C).
4. See notes 9-95 infra and accompanying text.
5. The author is indebted to John Humbach, Professor of Law, Pace University School of
Law, who advanced this theory of property law when he was an associate professor of law at
Fordhan Law School.
6. Cf. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indetermi.
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of preferences. While courts were certain that the law should protect the
biological parents' expectations over those of outside parties, because of the
biological parents' natural right in the child, 7 they had difficulty deciding
which biological parent's expectations to protect since both had a natural right
in the child.8
a. Disputes Between Mother and Father
The law has consistently treated the relationship between parents and child
as one that exists for the benefit of the parents. 9 Viewing the relationship from
this perspective necessitated the development of preferences between the two
biological parents because the benefits of parenthood which were shared
during the marriage could not be shared when the marriage disintegrated.
In early-nineteenth-century England, as well as in a few jurisdictions in the
United States during the mid-nineteenth century, adjudication of a custody
dispute between the father and the mother was governed by a single prefer-
ence: the superior right of the father.10 The father's right was superior
because he had the natural and legal obligation of supporting and protecting
the child. 1 Jeremy Bentham's definition of "father" is useful in clarifying the
rationale underlying the paternal preference. Bentham described the father as
both master and guardian of the child. 1 2 When the parent-child relationship is
seen from the perspective of the father as master, the advantages to the father
are considered, whereas when the relationship is seen from the perspective of
the father as guardian, the advantages to the child are considered.1 3 Custody
was regularly awarded to the father even when the child was very young and
the separation was compelled by the father's abuse of the mother, 14 the father
was incarcerated,' 5 or the child had been in the exclusive custody of the
mother for four years.' 6 It is evident that the courts were looking at the
custody decision from the perspective of the father as master who is entitled to
nancy, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 226, 229 (No. 3 1975) (courts perform two functions In the
resolution of custody disputes: "private-dispute-settlement" and "child-protection").
7. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 16-17; Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," B.Y.L. Rev.
605, 615-19 (1976); notes 65-77, 82-89 infra and accompanying text.
8. See Mnookin, supra note 6, at 232-37; Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current
Criteria, 26 DePaul L. Rev. 241, 241-43 (1977); notes 9-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 10-60 infra and accompanying text.
10. See People v. Humphreys, 24 Barb. 521, 523 (N.Y. 1857); People ex rel. Barry v.
Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 422 (N.Y. 1842); King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1054 (K.B.
1804).
11. 2 Kent's Commentaries 205 (6th ed. New York 1848) (1st ed. New York 1826); Inker &
Peretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 Mass. L.Q. 229, 231 (1970); Comment,
Custody and Control of Children, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 460, 462 (1936).
12. 1 J. Bentham, Theory of Legislation 252-53 (Boston 1840).
13. Id.
14. King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
15. Ex parte Skinner, 27 Rev. R. 710 (C.P. 1824).
16. People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N. V. 1842).
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the child's services and earnings as compensation for his duty of support and
maintenance. 
17
Spousal fault, the standard used in those American jurisdictions in which
the paternal preference rule was not followed, 18 also did not focus on the
child's needs; instead, it looked to which spouse was guilty of bringing about
the dissolution of the marriage. Here the courts operated under the presump-
tion that the child would "be best taken care of [and instructed] by the innocent
party."1 9 The rationale underlying the fault rule appears to be a variation on
the legal maxim that a wrongdoer may not profit from his own wrong. 20 The
courts refused to protect one of the parent's expectations, not because of any
demonstration of parental unfitness, but because that parent, being the party
responsible for the dissolution of the marriage, had brought about the custody
dispute, and therefore was not entitled to receive custody. 2 1 More often than
not, the fault standard became one of maternal preference since social mores
demanded that the wife institute the suit for divorce, and in so doing she had
to establish fault on the part of her husband.
22
In the twentieth century, the "tender years" approach emerged. 23 The
courts protected the mother's expectations with regard to the child because it
was assumed that the mother naturally has a greater inclination and ability to
nurture the young child than did the father. As one court put it, "[tihe child at
tender age is entitled to have such care, love and discipline as only a good and
devoted mother can usually give."'24 This approach, like the spousal fault rule
which preceded it, appeared to represent a shift in focus from the parents' to
the child's interests, as it was premised on the assumption that one class of
parents was better suited to care for the child than another class of parents.
Whereas the spousal fault rule assumed innocent spouses were better parents
than guilty spouses, 2S the "tender years" approach assumed females were
better parents than males. 26 In actuality, the "tender years" approach was
only a rebalancing of interests between the parents themselves, focusing this
17. Inker & Peretta, supra note 11, at 231; see 2 Kent's Commentaries 205 (6th ed. New York
1848) (1st ed. New York 1826).
18. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 234.
19. J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 554 (2d ed. Boston 1856)
(lst ed. Boston 1852).
20. See id. at 561 ("[WVlhen the court pronounces for a divorce on the prayer of the wife, and
gives her the custody of the children; then, in respect to their support, the rule would apply to the
husband, that no man shall profit by his own wrong, and to the wife, the corresponding rule,
recognized by good-sense, if not so formally received among the maxims of the legal family, that
no one shall suffer for doing right; in pursuance of which, the husband should be charged with
the full burden of maintaining the children committed to the wife's care.").
21. Becker v. Becker, 79 Ill. 532, 534 (1875); Welch v. Welch, 33 Wis. 534, 542 (1873).
22. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 234-35.
23. Id. at 235; Schiller, supra note 8, at 243.
24. Ullman v. Ullman, 151 App. Div. 419, 424-25, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1033 (1912).
25. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Minerv. Miner, 11 l. 43, 49-50(1849); Ullman v. Uliman, 151 App. Div. 419,
424-25, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1083 (1912).
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time on the sex of the custodial parent. The "tender years" approach only
expressly confirmed what had been tacitly recognized under the spousal fault
rule: the mother had the superior ownership right37
The "tender years" approach has recently come into disfavor as founded
upon "outdated social stereotypes rather than on current theory of what is in
the best interests of the child."'28 As one family court judge observed, "[t]he
simple fact of being a mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or
willingness to render a quality of care different from that which the father can
provide. '29 The women's liberation movement and economic necessity has
prompted an increasing number of mothers to enter the employment ranks.
30
As a result, the daily responsibility of caring for children has been delegated
to relatives, day care centers, or housekeepers. 3 1 Recognizing this change in
the role of women and its effect on family life, some courts and legislatures
have established the "best interests of the child" standard as the method by
which custody disputes between the mother and the father are to be re-
solved. 32 The standard is nonsexist in that no preference is given either
parent.33 Instead, a court is supposed to assess the relationship between the
child and each of his parents and then decide which of the two relationships
better serves the child's physical and emotional needs.
34
Although the standard appears child-oriented, the "best interests" test has
not served its intended purpose of protecting the child's rights.3" The courts
are unable to give full expression to the child's "best interests" because they
generally conflict with the property notions that have traditionally been used
27. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 235; Schiller, supra note 8, at 243.
28. Solomon, The Fathers' Revolution in Custody Cases, Trial, Oct. 1977, at 33, 34; see State
ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
29. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 1, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Fam. Ct.
1973) (opinion of Kooper, J.).
30. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 236; Schiller, supra note 8, at 243; Molinoff, Life with Father,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 13.
31. Schiller, supra note 8, at 243-44; Molinoff, supra note 30, at 13.
32. See, e.g., Moudy v. Moudy, 211 Kan. 213, 505 P.2d 764 (1973); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 518.17 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
33. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-364(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 70, 240 (McKinney 1977).
34. The Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act § 402 provides: "The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the- best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including: (1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) The wishes of the
child as to his custodian; (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5) The mental and physical
health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child."
35. 2 H. Foster & D. Freed, Law & the Family in New York 29:6 (1967); Goldstein, supra note
2, at 54; see Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. Fam. L. 1, 7 (1966);
Inker & Perretta, supra note 11, at 231-32; Note, A Case for Independent Counsel To Represent
Children in Custody Proceedings, 7 New Eng. L. Rev. 351, 351 (1972) (hereinafter cited as A Case for
Independent Counsel].
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to define the parent-child relationship, and when such a conflict occurs, the
firmly established, administratively convenient property notions will usually
prevail. 36
Operating within the framework of the ownership model of parentage, the
"best interests" test only succeeds in equalizing the competing parents' expec-
tations. In effect, the ascendancy of the "best interests" test in custody
adjudication involving a mother and father is no more than legal recognition
that men, as well as women, have a need and a right to nurture their
children. 3
7
In seeking the "best interests of the child," courts embark upon a quixotic
search for the benevolent owner. The hallmark of benevolence is "fitness," or
the ability to provide adequate care and affection for the child. 38 An examina-
tion of fitness does not serve the "best interests of the child" because both
parents usually pass the fitness test, and therefore the courts generally must
resort to the maternal preference, "tender years" approach, to resolve the
dispute. 39 The father must establish that the mother is unfit. If he fails to
carry his burden of proof, the mother is awarded custody, and the father's
fitness is irrelevant.40 Irrespective of the outcome, it is difficult to see how the
36. See 2 H. Foster & D. Freed, Law & the Family in New York 29:6 (1967); Goldstein, supra
note 2, at 54-64.
37. See Stite ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Farn. CL 1973);
Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145,138 N.W.2d 185 (1965); PodeUl, Peck & First, Custody-To
Which Parent?, 56 Marq. U.L. Rev. 51, 56 n.23 (1972) (citing cases in which the parents were treated
equally and the father was awarded custody); Molinoff, supra note 30, at 13.
38. See Inker& Perretta, supra note 11, at 232; Solomonsupra note 28, at33-34; Molinoff,supra
note 30, at 14.
39. Solomon,supra note 28, at33-34; Molinoff, supra note30, at 14;see, e.g., Spada v. Spada, 47
App. Div. 2d 586, 363 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1975) (lower court's finding that awarding custody to the
mother was in the "best interests" of the children upheld, even though that court had ignored the
statutory provision excluding any prima fade right to custody in either parent, when the record
indicated that mother was fit and not neglectful, afforded the children good home surroundings, and
minimized the effects of trauma associated with divorce on the children). But see, e.g., Salk v. Salk,
89 Misc. 2d 883, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. CL 1975), aft'd, 53 App. Div. 2d 558, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1015
(1976) (sustained lower court's finding that although both parents exhibited love and affection for
their children, the father was the fitter parent and therefore should be given custody).
40. Solomon, supra note 28, at 33-34; Molinoff, supra note 30, at 14. The problem with
establishing the "best interests" of the child by demonstrating the mother's unfitness is that the court's
decision is reached by a process of elimination; it decides that it would not be in the "best interests" of
the child to award custody to the mother. See Inker & Perretta, supra note 11, at 232.
See T. v. U., 36 App. Div. 2d 665, 318 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1971) (custody awarded to father where
mother had been frequenting bars, admitted committing adultery, and was pregnant by another
man); In re Horgan, 20 App. Div. 2d 859, 248 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1964) (custody returned to, and
permanently vested in, mother when it subsequently appeared she was mentally fit to take care of
children); Borges v. Borges, 77 Misc. 2d 985, 354 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Faro. CL 1974) (custody retained by
father when he presented evidence showing that mother had continually failed to change the child's
diapers and thatthe child hadbien well cared for while in his exclusive custody). But see Salk v. Salk,
89 Misc. 2d 883, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 53 App. Div. 2d 558, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1015
(1976) (although both parents exhibited love and affection for their children, the father was the fitter
parent and therefore should be given custody).
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child benefits from having one of his parent's declared unfit. 4 1 Thus, while the
courts pay lip service to the "best interests of the child," they continue to
protect the mother's expectations with regard to the child.
Further, the courts' determination of custody, a decision purportedly turn-
ing on benefit to the child, is in fact based on evidence offered from the
perspective of the feuding parent-claimants rather than from that of the child
himself.4 2 Each parent's attorney attempts to establish that it is in the "best
interests of the child" that his client receive custody.43 In most jurisdictions,
no one is charged with the duty of advocating the child's position in the
determination of who will be responsible for his mental and physical devel-
opment.4 4 Although it is often mandated that courts consult the child's
wishes, the weight these wishes are accorded in the resolution of a custody
dispute is discretionary. 45 As a result, a court often recognizes the child's
preferences when they coincide with what the court has already concluded are
the child's "best interests,' 4 6 and ignores them when they conflict by claiming
that the child does not have sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent
choice. 47
Although some recognition is given to the child's interests in contested
custody cases, the child's interests are virtually ignored when custody is
uncontested. 48 The courts generally rubberstamp their approval of uncon-
41. Solomon, supra note 28, at 33.
42. Inker & Perretta, supra note 11, at 231-32, 235-36; A Case for Independent Counsel, supra
note 35, at 351-52.
43. Each parent's attorney is obligated to represent his client's interests. ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics No. 7.
44. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 65-67; Hansen, supra note 35, at 7; Inker & Perretta, supra note
11, at 235-36; Juvenile Rights Litigation Project, Children's Rights in Domestic Disputes, Youth
Law Center, 10 Clearinghouse Rev. 956, 956 (1977);A Casefor Independent Counsel, supra note 35,
at 351-52.
However, in some jurisdictions, guardians ad litem and attorneys are appointed to protect the
child's interests during the adjudication of a custody dispute. See notes 204-05 infra and accompany-
ing text.
45. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.55.205(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 1277.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 1977).
46. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974).
47. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 355 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1960). In Davis the court stated: "[Both
parents] have catered to her whims and wants, although the mother has exercised a greater degree of
discipline. The child is bright and inquisitive and no doubt recognized that she might have more
latitude with her father than with her mother which appears to be the basis for her wanting her father
to have custody of her. However, the whims, wants and desires of a minor child are not the criteria for
determining which parent should be granted custody of a minor child, although the court or judge
may consider the preference of a child who is of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference. In
determining the custody of a minor child in a divorce case, this Court has consistently held the best
interests of the child should be the paramount consideration, and where it does not appear that the
trial court has abused its discretion, this Court will not reverse the order of the trial court." Id. at
574-75.
48. Hansen, supra note 35, at 2; see A Case for Indepenlent Counsel, supra note 35, at 351-52.
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tested custody agreements49-the manner in which approximately ninety
percent of all custody disputes between mothers and fathers are resolved. s5
By bestowing judicial approval on a custody arrangement without first
determining if it is in the "best interests of the child," the court confirms the
child's status as the chattel of his parents. s5
The law generally prefers the private resolution of disputes in the belief that
the parties are better able to achieve a mutually satisfactory resolution than
are the courts.5 2 Additionally, in this particular kind of out-of-court settle-
ment, judicial noninterference is often seen as an act of benevolence toward
the child.5 3 The policy of noninterference is based on two assumptions: (1) the
parents have considered the child's needs in reaching the agreement, 54 and (2)
the child should be spared the agony of being directly involved in his parents'
legal battle to win custody. 55
This justification falls to recognize, however, that uncontested custody
agreements frequently begin as custody battles in which the child's "best
interests" are only one of many factors considered by the parties to a broken
marriage. 56 The agreement is hammered out between the parents' attorneys.5 7
During the negotiations, each attorney is primarily concerned with achieving
his client's desires; he is not concerned with the child's needs or preferences.58
Furthermore, while the child may be spared the painful experience of a
courtroom appearance, it is only in the unique case that he is protected from
being intimately involved in his parents' often bitter attempts to win the
custody battle.5 9 As one family court judge has written, "[t]he distinction
between being a chattel or possession of the parties and being a proper subject
49. Hansen, supra note 35, at 1.
50. Id. at 2; Molinoff, supra note 30, at 13.
51. Hansen, supra note 35, at 1.
52. See generally Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, in 43 F.R.D. 211, 220 (1967); W.
Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System 9-12 (1968) (out-of-courtsettlement is one of the
purposes of discovery).
53. See J. Despert, Children of Divorce 219-20 (1962).
54. See id.
55. See Parker v. Parker, 467 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Ky. 1971) (court should have wide latitude in
protecting the child from the trauma that would be suffered if the child is called as a witness);
Marshallv. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364,369,302 A.2d 682,685 (1973)(in-chambersinterview of the
child minimizes as much as possible the psychological impact of participation in the custody dispute).
56. "Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of custody, so vital to a child's
happiness and well-being, frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is particularly
true where, as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with emotion
and prejudice." Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
57. Freed & Foster, The Shuffled Child and Divorce Court, Trial, May/June 1974, at 26, 41;
Molinoff, supra note 30, at 13.
58. Despert,supra note 53, at 200-01; Inker& Perretta, supra note 11, at 235-36; Juvenile Rights
Litigation Project, Children's Rights in Domestic Disputes, Youth Law Center, 10 Clearinghouse
Rev. 956, 956-57 (1977); see Hansen, supra note 35, at 7-8.
59. See Molinoff, supra note 30, at 13.
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of court concern becomes a matter of words, not deeds,"60 when the courts
routinely accept uncontested custody agreements.
b. Disputes Between Biological Parent and Interested Party
In the early nineteenth century, the parens patriae power of the state was
believed to be great enough to permit equity courts to terminate the parents'
possessory right to the child and to give that right to another. 61 Today, the
parens patriae power is embodied in statutory neglect 62 and abandonment
laws.63 These statutes are the primary source of limitations on the biological
parents' ownership rights. 64 However, the state's interest in protecting chil-
dren from parental neglect represented by these statutes has not been a
significant counterbalance to the primacy of the biological parents' rights to
the child. 65 This is still true despite such recent encroachments as the
introduction of the "best interests" test into neglect statutes 66 and a trend
toward giving less weight to the claims of biological parents in abandonment
proceedings,6 7 because of the state's strong interests in family autonomy. 68
60. Hansen, supra note 35, at 2.
61. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 240.
62. For a comprehensive compilation and analysis of neglect statutes, see Katz, Howe &
McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 Farn. L.Q. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. For a
summary of typical provisions in neglect statutes, see S. Katz, When Parents Fall: The Law's
Response to Family Breakdown 57-58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as When Parents Fail]. See pt. IV(A)
supra.
63. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-43a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 260.221 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(S) (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1976-1977). For a comprehensive compilation of statutes authorizing the termination of parental
rights (including those authorizing termination on grounds of abandonment), see Katz, supra note
62.
64. Hafen, supra note 7, at 629. Abuse statutes are another primary source of limitations on the
biological parents' rights. Id.; see pt. IV(C) infra.
65. See notes 74-95 infra and accompanying text.
66. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 243; see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-2301(a) (1976) ("best suited to
the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child'); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 10-1310(10)(f) (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("best interest of the youth'); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-230(a) (1977)
("bestsuited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child"). When used in the
resolution of a neglect proceeding, the "best interests" test has been criticized as an indeterminate
standard which results in officious intermeddling in the privacy of the family. Mnookin, supra note 6.
The "best interests" test has also been praised as a necessarily vague standard which permits the court
to consider each situation on its facts. When Parents Fail, supra note 62, at 64.
67. Chambers, Adoption Without Consent, Trial, Oct. 1977, at 29; Mnookin, supra note 6, at
244-46;see, e.g., In re Sanjivini K., 40 N.Y.2d 1025, 359 N.E.2d 1330, 391 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1976); In
re Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1976); In re Patricia A. W., 89
Misc. 2d368, 392 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Faro. Ct. 1977);Inre Roy, 90 Misc. 2d35, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fain.
Ct. 1977). These New York cases deal with what is referred to as "permanent neglect" in New York;
the difference between "permanent neglect" and "abandonment" is discussed infra note 83.
68. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887, 893 (1975); Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 186 (1916); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 989 (1975).
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Neglect is an elusive concept.69 The draftsmen of neglect statutes have not
specifically defined the term, 70 and, as a result, the task of definition has
fallen on child welfare agencies and courts. 71 The usual situations which
warrant a state-initiated challenge to the biological parents' right to the child
on grounds of neglect are: "inadequate supervision or housekeeping, emo-
tional neglect, inadequate parenting, . . . failure to provide medical care,
immoral or unconventional parental behavior, and parental conduct that
constitutes contributing to the delinquency of a minor.17 2 The neglect statutes
authorize a court, usually a juvenile court, to determine whether it is in the
"best interests" of the child who has been neglected to remove him from
parental custody or to appoint a child welfare agency to supervise that
custody.7 3 Despite the use of the "best interests" test, the child continues to be
treated as human property in neglect proceedings for two reasons-first,
because the courts see the preservation of the biological parents' ownership
rights as being in the child's "best interests," 74 and second, because the courts
are concerned with protecting the state's interest in nurturing its citizens.75
69. MAnookin, supra note 6, at 242-44; Wald, supra note 68, at 1000-04.
70. For typically vague statutory definitions of neglect, see, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f) (McKinney 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2151.03 (Page 1976). The California definition of a neglected child is one: "(a) Who is in need of
proper and effective parental care or control and has -no parent or guardian, or has no parent or
guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or
guardian actually exercising such care or control. (b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided
with the necessities of life, or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode. (c) Who
is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or
abnormality. (d) Whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity, or
physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in whose custody or care
he is." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
71. Mnookin,supra note 6, at 241; Wald,supra note 68, at 1001-02;see L. Young, Wednesday's
Children 141-42 (1964).
72. Wald,supra note 68, at 1007-08. The primary inadequacy of the currentstatutory definitions
of "neglect" is that, to the extent "neglect" is defined, it is defined in terms of parental behavior and
not in terms of the detrimental effects parental behavior has on the child. Consequently, children are
removed from the custody of their parents when the neglectful behavior does not have damaging
effects on the child. See Wald, supra note 68, at 1002-04.
73. Mnookin, supra note 6, at 240-41; Wald, supra note 68, at 993-1000.
74. See Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431,324 N.Y.S.2d
937 (1971); In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959);
State ex rel. Wallace v. Lhotan, 51 App. Div. 2d 252, 380 N.Y.S. 250, appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d
743, 349 N.E.2d893, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1976); Katz, Who LooksAfterLaura?, in Gross, supra note
2, at 53.
75. See Areen, supra note 68, at 893-94; Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
"Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rev. 147 (1970); Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical
Overview, Legal Matrix, and SocialPerspectives, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 293, 313-22 (1972). Legislatures
also see the preservation of biological parents' ownership rights as being in the child's interests. Many
state statutes that authorize state intervention for the protection of the child express a preference for
the biological parents. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 902(a) (1975); IIl. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); RI. Gen. Laws Ann. § 14-1-2 (1970).
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The biological parents' expectations with regard to the child are protected
in neglect proceedings because it is assumed that the child is better reared by
the individuals who have the natural obligation to support and protect him
than by strangers appointed by the state. 76 This assumption is unjustified in
the context of neglect proceedings which arise because there is some doubt
that the biological parents' natural instincts to care for the child are function-
ing properly. 7"
The court, exercising the parens patriae power in a neglect proceeding,
must also consider the state's interest in having the child become a well-
balanced citizen by proper nurturing. 78 Thus it frequently orders supervision
by a child welfare agency. In ordering parental possession supervised by a
child welfare agency, the court simultaneously protects the biological parents'
ownership rights by permitting retention of possession, and fulfills the state's
need to nurture its citizens by insuring that the child is nurtured by the
parents under the guidance of, or with the assistance of, a professional.
However, the limited availability of services such as homemakers, tutors, and
psychologists usually requires that the court suspend parental possession in
order to protect the state's interest in the child's nurturing.7 9 As a result, the
child is placed under foster care, where, however, the biological parents' right
to repossession is protected by the child welfare agency's policy of regularly
changing such placements to prevent the development of emotional bonds
between the child and the foster parent.80 Thus the needs of the child are
subordinated to the interests of the biological parents and the state. Although
the relationship between the child and the biological parent has been effec-
tively severed by such foster care, the child is nevertheless denied the
opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship with any other adult.8 '
Again, it seems clear that when the "best interests of the child" are deter-
mined in the ownership model context, the possessory rights of the parents
will generally prevail.
Although the "best interests" test is frequently used in neglect cases to
suspend or supervise parental possession, it is not applied in abandonment
cases to terminate biological parents' rights over their child.8 2 In deciding to
76. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 17; Hafen, supra note 7, at 649; note 75 supra and statutes
cited therein.
77. This assumption of an instinctive positive tie between the biological parent and the child,
however, ignores the evidence of "infant-battering, child neglect, abuse, and abandonment."
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 17; see note 72 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 75 supra.
79. See Glasser, Legal Rights for the Powerless and the Vulnerable, Children's Rights Report 12,
12-13 (Mar. 1977); Wald, supra note 68, at 997-99. For a good description of social work policies and
programs, see F. Feldman & F. Sherz, Family Social Welfare 267-373 (1967).
80. Glasser, supra note 79, at 13; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 39; Katz, Foster Parents Versus
Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application of 'The Best Interests of the Child"Doctrine, 65
Mich. L. Rev. 145 (1966) [hereinafter cited asFosterParents Versus Agencies]; Wald, supra note 68,
at 994 n.52.
81. See Glasser, supra note 79, at 13; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 39.
82. Abandonment is the usual basis for the involuntary, permanent termination of parental
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terminate these rights because of abandonment, adult-centered standards are
applied-the focus is on the parents' intent to abandon the child. Intent to
abandon is measured in terms of frequency of visitation and communication
with the child.8 3 In addition, not less than one year of neglect is usually
required to establish intent to abandon.8 4 Since the abandonment process has
been viewed as a continuing one that can be reversed by the estranged
parents' express declaration of intent not to abandon, 5 the child can be left in
the uncertainty of foster care for years.8 6 Another possible consideration is
whether the child welfare agency has been diligent in encouraging and
strengthening the relationship between the child and the estranged parents.8 7
rights. Chambers, supra note 67, at 29; Alnookin, supra note 6, at 245. A finding of abandonment
frees the child for adoption without the usual prerequisite of parental consenL See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Code § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-43(a) (West Supp. 1977); Minn.
Stat Ann. § 260.221(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977); Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and
Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 St.
Johns L. Rev. 215 (1971); MInookin, supra note 6, at 244.
83. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 128.012 (1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:6-1, :2-19 (Vest 1976). In
New York, § 384-b of the Social Services Law delineates two major methods for freeing a child for
adoption without the biological parents' consent. These are abandonment and permanent neglect:
"5. (a) For the purposes of this section, a child is 'abandoned' by his parent if such parent evinces
an intent to forego his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure to visit
the child and communicate with the child or agency, although able to do so and not prevented or
discouraged from doing so by the agency. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, such ability to
visit and communicate shall be presumed.
(b) The subjective intent of the parent, whether expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence
of the foregoing parental acts manifesting such intent, shall not preclude a determination that such
parent has abandoned his or her child. In making such determination, the court shall not require a
showing of diligent efforts, if any, by an authorized agency to encourage the parent to perform the
acts specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision.
"7. (a) Forthepurposesofthissection, 'permanently neglected child'shall mean a childwho isin
the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period of more than
one year following the date such child came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and
continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to encourage
and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests
of the child." N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(s), (7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
The textual discussion of "abandonment" applies to "permanent neglect" in the context of New
York law. The confusion the distinction between "permanent neglect" and "abandonment" has
created is discussed in Carrieri, The Foster Child-Major Case Revisited, 127 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1,
1977, at 1, col. 2; Carrieri, The Foster Child and Rights of Parents, 127 N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1977, at 1,
col. 2.
84. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(7)(a)
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. Stat. § 14-53 (1965).
85. E.g., In re Graham, 239 Mo. App. 1036, 199 S.W.2d 68 (1946).
86. See E. Weinstein, The Self-Image of the Foster Child 22-23 (1960); Foster Parents Versus
Agencies, supra note 80; Mnookin, Foster Care--In Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 599,
622-26 (1973).
87. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(7) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. Gen. Laws
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The agency's dereliction of its duty can prevent a court from finding aban-
donment even though the child "has been abandoned psychologically for
many years."88 In short, a finding of abandonment is not based upon the
effect parental absence has on the child's perception of his relationship to his
biological parents, but instead upon the parents' intention to reassume
parental duties and the child welfare agency's ability to encourage the parents
to communicate and visit with the child.8 9
The relative insignificance of the child's interests in neglect and abandon-
ment proceedings is also evidenced by the absence of representation on behalf
of the child. 90 The courts are presumed capable of protecting the child's
interests despite the glaring deficiency in the evidence upon which their
custody decision is made-no evidence is offered exclusively from the child's
perspective. 9 1 The courts have the mammoth task of discerning where each
party's interests end and the child's interests begin. All parties necessarily
claim that they are acting in the child's "best interests," but that does not alter
the reality that each is pursuing his own interest as well: the biological parents
are interested in retaining their ownership rights, 92 the state is interested in
molding future citizens, 93 the child welfare agency is interested in keeping
children under its supervision, 94 and the foster parent is interested in retain-
ing possession.95
2. Elevating the Child's Status from That of Property to Person
Some of the inadequacies of the present system of determining custodial
arrangements can be eliminated by introducing a new perspective into the
determination-that of the child. 96 For the custodial decision to reflect the
Ann. § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1976). As indicated in note 83 supra, the New York provision concerns
"permanent neglect." Rhode Island's provision also concerns "permanent neglect."
88. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 47-48.
89. Id. at 48-49.
90. See id. at 65.
91. The biological parents, the state, and the foster parents share the responsibility for the
guardianship of the child. In juvenile court proceedings, all three maintain that the positions they
advocate are identical to the position which best protects the rights and interests of the child. The
court reaches its decision without the benefit of having the case presented by an independent
representative of the child. See id. at 65-67.
92. See id. at 65-66; notes 76, 77, 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Katz, Who Looks AfterLaura?, in Gross, supra note 2, at 48; Lansner, The Civil Liberties Union Has
Become an Active Part of This Oppressive System, 1 Children's Rights Report 9, 10 (Mar. 1977);
Goldin Audit Scores Foster-Care System, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1977, § B, at 10, col. 1.
95. See, e.g., Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality& Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
("Plaintiffs [foster parents] further assert that the statistical evidence as to the length of the average
child's stay in foster care creates an 'informal tenure' system raising legitimate expectations that their
role as foster parents will not be abruptly terminated.').
96. See Goldstein, supra note 2; When Parents Fail, supra note 62; Foster & Freed, A Bill of
Rights for Children, 6 Fam. L.Q. 343 (1972).
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interests of the child, as well as those of the parents and the state, the
ownership model of parentage should be abandoned and replaced by the trust
model.9
7
The state assumes that the child is an incomplete being who is not fully
capable of determining and protecting his interests. Therefore the state
recognizes the child's need for intimate care "by the adults who are personally
committed to assume such responsibility." 98 The recognition of the child's
need for adult care and supervision has given rise to the erroneous assumption
that there is always an identity of interests between the parent and the
child.9 9 Ironically, a divergence of interests between the parent and the child
can result in the child's interests being sacrificed in the name of protection. 10 0
Viewing the parent-child relationship as one of trust would simultaneously
preserve the parents' wide discretion in rearing the child and protect the
child's individual interests because the parents would have a fiduciary duty to
exercise their discretion solely for the child's benefit. 10'
a. The Trust Model
The full development of the child is a well-recognized aim of child
rearing.10 2 This right to develop would constitute the corpus of the trust, and
97. See genera//y G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts (5th ed. 1973)
[hereinafaer cited as Law of Trusts].
98. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 3; see Hafen, supra note 7, at 605, 610-19; Hafen, Puberty,
Privacy, and Protection: The Risks of Children's "Rights," 63 A.B.A.J. 1383, 1383-84 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Puberty, Privacy, and Protection]; Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of
Youth, 4 Human Rights 13, 17 (1974).
99. See, e.g., Inre Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 305, 123 So. 2d 218, 220 (1960) ("The
kind and extent of education, moral and intellectual, to be given to a child and the mode of furnishing
it are left largely to the discretion of the parents. Certainly judicial machinery is inadequate to the
task of educating children, and should not interfere with a parent's right in this regard except to
correct abuses or protect the minor. Unless shown to the contrary, the presumption is that natural
parents will make the best decisions for their offspring." (citations omitted)); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 132-33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925) ("Anything that brings the child into conflict with the
father or diminishes the father's authority or hampers him in its exercise is repugnant to the family
establishment, and is not to be countenanced save upon positive provisions of statute law.").
100. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 54 (although cloaked in terms of the "best interests" of the
child, many custody decisions are made to fulfill the needs and desires of the adult claimants); Holt,
supra note 2, at 27 (many of those who champion the family "do not see it as an instrument of growth
and freedom but of dominance and slavery, a miniature dictatorship (sometimes justified by 'love') in
which the child learns to live under and submit to absolute and unquestionable power"); Inker &
Perretta, supra note 11, at 231-32 (child's welfare sacrificed when divorce custody proceeding
becomes a "last-ditch" effort to preserve the family).
101. See generaUy Law of Trusts, supra note 97, § 95 (trustee's duty of loyalty).
102. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 5-6; Foster & Freed, supra note 96, at 347; Joint Comm'n on
Mental Health of Children: Crisis in Child Mental Health: Challenge for the 1970's, at 3-4 (1969); see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 726 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-2
(1970); Katz, supra note 62, ch. 1.
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the parents, as co-trustees, would be jointly responsible for nurturing the
child to independence. 10 3 As long as they are fulfilling their responsibilities,
the parents would continue to act as co-trustees' 0 4 until the purpose of the
trust has been achieved-the child becomes fully mature.' 05 The state as
settlor of the trust could challenge the trusteeship whenever it appeared the
trust was not being administered according to its terms, that is, when the
child appeared to be neglected or abandoned.10 6
In contrast to the ownership model in which the child is viewed as the
chattel of parents whose ownership rights are protected by the state, 10 7 the
trust model would elevate the child's status from that of chattel to person by
recognizing that, as the beneficiary of a trust, he has interests which are
separate and distinct from his parents' interests as trustees and the state's
interests as settlor. 1°0 Thus, under the trust model, the need for protection, as
well as the need for limitations on that protection, is fulfilled.
b. The Child's Rights as Beneficiary of the Trust
The child has an enormous stake in who acts as his trustees because
achievement of the desired state of full development depends almost exclu-
sively on the care and nurturing he receives during the trust period. 10 9
Recognition of the child's interest in who serves as his trustee requires a
definition of the rights that the child should have in the removal and
appointment of trustees.
Two important considerations in determining what those rights should be
are the level of ability and the need of the child to determine his own
interests. Although the state presumes that children as a group are not fully
capable of determining their interests, 1 0 it is obvious that wide gradations of
incapacity exist, not only between individual children, but more importantly
103. "A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one person is the holder of the title to property
subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another." Law of
Trusts, supra note 97, § 1.
104. Id. § 91.
105. See note 102 supra.
106. Cf. Law of Trusts, supra note 97, § 95 (trustee has a duty of loyalty-to administer the
trust in beneficiary's interest alone; if the trustee breaches this duty equity will grant relief). The trust
model recognizes that the state has a legitimate interest in seeing that children become well-balanced
citizens and permits it to protect that interest by creating a trust for "minor" citizens. Cf. Law of
Trusts, supra note 97, §§ 25-33 (creation of the trust).
107. See notes 5-95 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 103 supra.
109. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 6; N. Polansky, R. Borgman & C. DeSain, Roots of
Futility 121-77; S. White, Federal Programs for Young Children: Review and Recommendations
80-129; MacFarlane, Clausen & Yahares, Childhood Influences upon Intelligence, Personality and
Mental Health, The Mental Health of the Child: Project Reports 131 (1971).
110. "The [common] law did not distinguish between the infant and the mature teenager,
treating them both as the property of their parents, who could make all decisions affecting them." Poe
v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901
(1976); see notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
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between different age levels-particularly between pre-adolescents and ado-
lescents."1 ' Furthermore, it is more important for some age groups to deter-
mine who their guardian will be than for other age groups. For example, the
more dependent younger child is more likely to be satisfied with having his
parents determine his interests. 1 2 The adolescent, on the verge of adulthood,
has a greater need to make his own choices.1 13 The adolescent's capability
and strong desire to determine his interests arise from his increased cognitive
and intellectual powers." 4 He is in the process of developing the ability for
abstract and theoretical thinking, and, as a result, begins to experience the
need for, and to seek, a sense of personal autonomy; he begins to develop
attitudes and goals independent of his parents. 115
Because of the pre-adolescent's relative inability to determine his own
interests and his need for supervision and direction, 116 he should have the
right to have the trust decision, that is, the removal and appointment of
trustees, made on the basis of the "least detrimental alternative"'"17 standard
whenever the trusteeship is brought into the issue by his parents because of
divorce or by the state because of neglect or abandonment.
The "least detrimental alternative" is:
that specific placement and procedure for placement which maximizes, in accord with
the child's sense of time and on the basis of short term predictions given the limitations
of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a
continuous basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become his
psychological parent." 8
The first criterion that must be fulfilled under this standard is that the child's
trustee should be the adult who is, or will become, his psychological par-
ent." 9 Normally, begetting a child has deep psychological significance for the
parents, 120 and thus the biological parents are presumed to have an instinc-
ill. D. Elkind, Children and Adolescents 75-80 (1970); A. Gesell, F. Ig & L. Ames, Youth: The
Years from Ten to Sixteen 175-82 (1956); J. Horrocks, The Psychology of Adolescence 241-3S1 (4th
ed. 1976); A. Kay, Moral Development 172-83 (1968); Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A
Developmental View, in Adolescent Behavior and Society 193, 199-200 (RL Muuss ed. 1971).
112. See Epstein & Komorita, Childhood Prejudice as a Function of Parental Ethnocentrism,
Punitiveness, and Outgroup Characteristics, 3 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 259, 262-63 (1966);
Hetherington, A Developmental Study of the Effects of Sex of the Dominant Parent on Sex Role
Preference, Identification and Imitation in Children, 2 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 188, 188, 193
(1965).
113. See Hollender, Development ofVocationalDecisions During Adolescence, 18J. Counseling
Psych. 244-48 (1971); Klineberg, Changes in Outlook on the Future Between Childhood and Adoles-
cence, 7 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 185-93 (1967); note 111 supra.
114. See note 111 supra.
115. See note 113 supra.
116. See note 112 supra.
117. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 53-64.
118. Id. at 53.
119. Id. at 17-20.
120. Id. at 12, 16-17.
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tive positive tie to the child. 12' In contrast to adults, children have no
psychological conception of a blood relationship until late in their develop-
ment.' 22 What is important to the child is the daily interaction with the adult
who takes care of him. 123 An adult who could fulfill this need would qualify
as trustee; an adult who was absent and inactive would not. 124
The second criterion is that the child's trustee should be the adult by whom
the child is "wanted.' 1 25 Whereas the psychological parent criterion assesses
the child's emotional attachment to the adult, the "wanted" child criterion
assesses the adult's emotional attachment to the child. The child is "wanted"
when the trustee's attachment to the child is based upon respect for the child
as an individual.
1 26
The final criterion used to make a trust decision under the "least detrimen-
tal alternative" standard is the child's sense of time. 127 Because the child's
perception of time largely determines his ability to deal with parental absence,
it is a key consideration in cases of neglect and abandonment and in
determining with what expediency the law should act in those cases and in
divorce cases.128
As the law now stands, in theory but not necessarily in practice, the child
has the right to have a custody dispute arising from divorce or neglect
determined in his "best interests."'129 Therefore, in such cases the use of the
12 1. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845-47 (1977); In re Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 305, 123 So. 2d 218, 220(1960); People ex
rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952).
122. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 12, 16-17.
123. Id. at 12-13, 17-20; J. Bowlby, Separation, Attachment and Loss 322-62 (1973).
124. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 19.
125. Id. at 20-21.
126. Id. at 21. An adult's emotional attachment can be measured along a scale of "wanting." At
one end of the scale, the adult's "wanting" is founded upon a self-centered motive, as, for example,
when the parent "wants" the child for the purpose of retaliation against a divorcing spouse. The child
is viewed as a means to an end and not as an individual. As a result there is a good possibility that he
will experience doubts about his worth. At the opposite end of the scale, the adult's "wanting" is
based on an overvaluation of the child. Since the child is viewed as a central figure in the adult's life,
he will frequently have a well-developed self-esteem, but may also be overly secure and egotistical.
Id.
127. Id. at 40-49.
128. Id. at 42. The time it takes a child to sever an old psychological attachment and to form a
new one depends upon the child's stage of development. For the very young child, time is measured
by the "egocentric part" of the mind. This part of the mind is determined to achieve gratification and
therefore a relatively short parental absence is perceived by the child as a permanent loss. For the
adolescent child, time is measured by the "reasoning part" of the mind; therefore he is able to cope
with considerably longer parental absence. Id. at 41.
A closely related factor is continuity of relationships. Continuity of relationships is well recognized
as essdntial to the child's growth because it is a source of stability during a time when the child's
internal, mental and emotional, processes are in flux. Id. at 31-39; J. Bowlby, Child Care and the
Growth of Love 13-20 (2d ed. 1965). This continuity seems to be one of the primary indicia of the
existence of a psychological parent-child relationship.
129. See notes 32-41, 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
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"least detrimental alternative" standard is not the recognition of a new right,
but the clarification of what an existing right should mean through the use of
a standard that clearly defines criteria for safeguarding the child's interests in
the trust decision. In cases of abandonment, on the other hand, the use of the
"least detrimental alternative" standard would recognize a new right of the
child.130
Since, as noted earlier, 13 1 the adolescent has a significantly greater need
and ability to determine his own interests than the pre-adolescent, he should
have the right to choose his trustee whenever the trust is brought into issue by
his parents because of divorce. Such a right in the adolescent to choose his
custodial parent is well established in Georgia, 132 which for over one hundred
years has permitted an adolescent to make this decision upon reaching the age
of fourteen. The statute presently reads in part:
In all such cases [of divorce granted] and in cases where a change in custody is sought,
where the child has reached the age of fourteen years, such child shall have the right to
select the parent with whom such child desires to live and such selection shall be
controlling unless the parent so selected is determined not to be a fit and proper person
to have the custody of said child. 133
Neglect is difficult to detect in an adolescent and as a result, neglected
adolescents are more likely to be deemed "incorrigible."' 34 In the case of a
pre-adolescent, neglect is frequently discovered by means of indicators such as
malnutrition and unkempt appearance.11s These indicators generally are not
useful in detecting neglect when the child is older because, at that stage of
development, the child has learned to care for himself and therefore usually
does not suffer physical neglect.' 36 Instead, he is usually the victim of
emotional neglect which generally goes undetected until the adolescent man-
ifests its damaging effects in the form of incorrigible behavior. 13
Recognizing that such behavior is often only a manifestation of emotional
neglect, the court ought to be required to determine whether the adolescent's
incorrigibility arises from parental neglect.' 38 If the court so finds, then the
130. See notes 82-89 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 111, 113 supra.
132. Texas is the only other state that gives controlling force to the preference of a child who is
fourteen or older, with nothing else considered but the basic fitness of the parent chosen. Tex. Farn.
Code Ann. tit. 2, § 14.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1976).
133. Ga. Code Ann. § 30-127 (Cur. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
134. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 Mich. L. Rev.
1097, 1113 (1976); see E. Wakin, Children Without Justice 12-13, 69 (1975); M. Wald, Protection
Services and Emotional Neglect 6 (1961).
The term "incorrigible" is used here to refer to cases concerning noncriminal behavior. See
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra at 1100-01.
135. See pt. IV(A)(1) supra.
136. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 413, 464 P.2d 395, 399 (1970).
137. See note 134 supra.
138. New York permits the substitution of a neglect petition at any stage of a PINS ("person in
need of supervision') proceeding. See N.Y. Fain. CL Act § 716(b) (McKinney 1975).
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adolescent's ability and desire to determine his own interests'3 9 also should
entitle him to resolve the trusteeship issue which arises because of neglect.
The adolescent ought to have the right to choose between having the
biological parents' trusteeship supervised by a child welfare agency and
having a foster parent appointed as a co-trustee who assumes the responsibil-
ity of nurturing. 140 Permitting the adolescent to exert control over the course
of his life at this juncture avoids compelling him either to live with adults who
cannot fulfill his emotional and physical needs or to revolt against those adults
by becoming a run-away, truant, or some other sort of status offender.
If he chooses placement with a foster parent, such foster care would be a
temporary arrangement,' 4 1 which the adolescent should have the right to
terminate on request and either return to his biological parent or be freed for
adoption on the basis of being abandoned by them. In this way, a finding of
abandonment would center upon the effect parental absence has on the
adolescent, and not upon either the intent of the estranged biological parents,
or the diligence of a child care agency in encouraging the re-development of
the parent-child relationship.1 42 Recognizing this right reflects the shift in
emphasis under the trust model from the parents' rights to the child's rights by
focusing on the effect of the biological parents' conduct on the child and not
on the motives underlying that conduct.
The period of time during which the adolescent could exercise his right to
terminate foster care should be statutorily prescribed in order to maximize the
adolescent's opportunity to establish a psychological parent-child relationship
with at least one adult.' 43 Accordingly, if the adolescent should not exercise
his right within the allotted time, he would become available for adoption as
soon as appointing an adoptive parent as the trustee became the "least
detrimental alternative"'144 for the adolescent. In this way the abandoned
adolescent does not remain in foster care indeterminately, 45 and of equal
139. See notes 111-15 supra and accompanying text.
140. If, for example, an adolescent were adjudicated neglected because his parents failed to assist
and support him in his schoolwork and thereby contributed to his truancy, he would be able to remain
at home with the supportive service of a tutor or live with a foster parent.
These are the same two alternatives available under the present system. See note 73 supra and
accompanying text. Under the trust model, effective protection of the existing parent-child relation-
ship, as well as protection of the child, is achieved by supervision. See Glasser, supra note 79, at
12-15.
141. Foster care has been defined as "[a] child welfare service which provides substitute family
care for a child when his own family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period and when
adoption is neither desirable nor possible." Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster
Family Care 5 (1959). However, children frequently remain in foster care for much longer than they
should under the theory that foster care is a temporary arrangement. Mnookin, Foster Care-in
Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 599, 610-13 (19731; Wald,State Intervention onBehafof
"Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Children from TheirHomes, Monitoring the Status
of Children in FosterCare, and Termination of ParentalRights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 662-63 (1976).
142. See notes 83-89 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
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importance, the adolescent who remains psychologically attached to his
biological parents after the expiration of the statutory period is not prema-
turely, permanently separated from them.146
The adolescent who cannot or does not want to decide his custodial
arrangement in cases of divorce, neglect, or abandonment should have the
right to have it chosen by others on the basis of the "least detrimental
alternative" standard. 147 Such an option should be available in order to avoid
burdening the adolescent who has severe loyalty conflicts with guilt feelings
about choosing his trustee arrangement. 148
The child's presently recognized right to develop fully 14 9 can be expanded
under the trust model to encompass not only the right to freedom from neglect
and abandonment, but also the right to develop independent judgment
because the trust model requires that the trust be administered exclusively in
the child's interests.15 0 Growth from childhood to adulthood is a gradual
evolution from dependence upon adult authority to autonomy.' Adolescence
has traditionally been viewed by psychologists as a kind of bridge between
childhood and adulthood because the achievement of autonomy is a goal of
adolescence. S2 One of the most significant obligations of the parents is
preparing the child to assume the responsibilities of adult life.' 5 3 In the case of
the adolescent, this obligation has two dimensions which tend to conflict. On
the one hand, the parents must continue to instill values as they have done
throughout the adolescent's childhood because the adolescent does not always
use his newly acquired reasoning ability and often resorts to earlier forms of
thinking.1 54 On the other hand, the parents must begin to permit the
adolescent to choose his own values and make his own decisions. 'ss Fulfilling
this dual obligation is not a simple task; however, parents who continue to
impose their values and standards on the unwilling adolescent, without
permitting him to develop reasoning ability, encourage blind reliance on
authority and do not prepare their child for the responsibilities that come with
adulthood. 156
When the adolescent is not permitted to develop his own values and
146. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 118-28supra and accompanying text (discussing the pre-adolescent's right to have
the trust decision made on the basis of the "least detrimental alternative" standard).
148. See Despert, supra note 53, at 196.
149. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
152. See Horrocks, upra note 111, at 8-25.
153. See Stanley v. Ilinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); When Parents Fail,
supra note 62, ch. 1.
154. See Higgins-Trenk & Gaite, The Elusiveness of Formal Operational Thought in Adoles-
cents, 6 Proc. Ann. Cony. Am. Psych. A. 201-02 (1971).
155. See notes 111, 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
156. Douvan & Gold, Modal Patterns in American Adolescence, in 2 L. Hoffman & M.
Hoffman, Review of Child Development Research (1966).
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attitudes, but is forced to conform to those of his parents, the parents are not
fulfilling their obligation to help the child achieve independence, that is
become a self-sufficient individual capable of thinking for himself and making
intelligent decisions. Because the ultimate purpose of the trust is for the child
to achieve independence,1 5 7 parents who consistently compel their unwilling
adolescent to conform to their values and attitudes would be in breach of the
trust; the adolescent would be entitled to initiate a challenge to his parents'
trusteeship.1 58 The adolescent who could establish this failure to encourage
his development would be entitled to have a foster parent appointed as
co-trustee. '
5 9
The Supreme Court of Washington appears to be the first court to recognize
the right to institute a challenge to parental custody. In the case of In re
Snyder, 160 a sixteen-year-old asked the court to declare her incorrigible in
order to remove her from the custody of parents who had imposed strict
limitations on her activities, such as "restricting her choice of friends, and
refusing to let her smoke, date, or participate in certain extracurricular
activities within the school." '16 1 The court's finding of incorrigibility was
based primarily on the adolescent's refusal to live with her parents and the
possibility that she might run away if compelled to remain with them. 162 As a
result, the adolescent was permitted to remain in foster care where she had
been placed by the juvenile court. 163
The trust model is characterized by its recognition of the child's need for
protection and for the limitations it places on that protection.' 64 Therefore
instead of requiring the adolescent to ask the court to declare him incorrigible,
the adolescent should be permitted to challenge parental custody directly
when he believes his parents' efforts to protect him are jeopardizing his
development.165 Although the law's overwhelming interest has been to fulfill
157. See notes 102, 103 supra and accompanying text.
158. See In re Synder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975), discussed notes 160-63 itfra and
accompanying text; Holt, supra note 2, at 160 (the child should have the right to choose his
guardian).
159. Once the foster parent is appointed co-trustee, the adolescent would have the same rights
as a neglected adolescent who chooses to have a foster parent appointed as co-trustee. See notes
140-45 supra and accompanying text.
160. 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975).
161. Id. at 183, 532 P.2d at 279. Having decided that he needed assistance in controlling his
daughter, Cynthia Snyder's father brought her to the Youth Service Center, which In turn placed
her in a receiving home. To avoid returning to her parents, Cynthia filed a petition alleging she
was a dependent child. As a result, she was placed in the custody of the Department of Social and
Health Services. The juvenile court found that Cynthia was not a dependent child and returned
her to the custody of her parents. After she experienced further difficulties at home, Cynthia went
to the Youth Service Center and the director of the intake program at the center filed the petition
alleging Cynthia was incorrigible as defined in Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.010(7). Id. at 184-85,
532 P.2d at 279-80.
162. Id. at 185-87, 532 P.2d at 281.
163. Id. at 185, 187, 532 P.2d at 280, 281.
164. See notes 97-108 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 111, 113, 149-59 supra and accompanying text.
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the child's need for protection, a concern evinced by the ascendancy of the
"best interests" test in divorce and neglect law,' 66 there are promising
indications in other areas of the law that the need for limitations on protection
is beginning to be perceived.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,167 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, struck down a Missouri statute requiring parental consent to an
abortion for an unmarried minor except when the abortion was necessary to
preserve the life of the pregnant minor. The majority opinion, delivered by
Justice Blackmun, suggests that competent minors may have a constitutional
right of privacy that would serve to limit parental intervention into the
abortion decision. 168
A suggestion that there should be limitations on the parents' right to protect
their child also appears in Justice Douglas' partial dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 169 In that case the Court held that a state compulsory attendance
statute as applied to require Amish children to attend school in contravention
of their parents' religious beliefs infringed on the parents' freedom of reli-
gion.170 Justice Douglas was compelled to dissent in part because of the
failure to determine whether the high school-aged children of two of the
defendants shared their parents' religious beliefs and desire that the children
not attend high school. 17 I The opinion indicated that a mature child may
have a first amendment right to freedom of religion that would prevent his
religiously-motivated parents from prohibiting him from attending high
school.172
The movement toward placing limitations on parental prerogatives has
aroused concern that the recognition of children's rights heralds the end of the
166. See notes 32-34, 73 supra and accompanying text.
167. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
168. "One suggested interest [of the state in imposing a parental consent provision as a
prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy] is the safeguarding of the family unit and
of parental authority. It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate the
patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto
power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor
daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant." Id. at 75 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
169. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
170. Id. at 230-31.
171. Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
172. "[N]o analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a vacuum. If the parents in
this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions
of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express potentially
conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition
without canvassing his views .... As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation
that his rights should be considered. And, if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is
mature enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents'
religiously motivated objections." Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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family.' 73 The increasing concern with the rights of children has been
described as "a conflict between two of our most fundamental cultural
traditions-family life and individual liberty."' 7 4 The Snyder and Da~iforth
decisions and the Yoder dissent have been criticized because they treated
children as if they were adults and thereby abandoned children to their
rights.' 75 Such a characterization, however, tends to overlook the significance
of the ages of the children who were the subjects of the decisions. 17 6 The
child's status as an adolescent was a significant common factor in these
cases' 77 because it accounted for the limitations to be placed on parental
protection. These cases did not treat children as adults in resolving the
issues,178 but as children, who, because they were on the verge of adulthood,
were entitled to exercise some control over the course of their lives.' 7 9 Nor did
these cases forecast the destruction of the family tradition. 8 0 On the contrary,
the family's role of preparing the child for independence was reaffirmed, 18 1
but subordinated to the adolescent's critical need to be protected from his
parents' well-intentioned attempts to protect him.' 8 2
The application of an "egalitarian"'18 3 theory to children has been said to
173. Chambers, supra note 67, at 29; Hafen, supra note 7, at 607; Puberty, Privacy, and
Protection, supra note 98, at 1386; Wald, supra note 68, at 987; Comment, The State vs. The
Family. Does Intervention Really Spare the Child?, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 547, 547 (1977).
174. Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 93, at 1383.
175. See Hafen, supra note 7, at 644-56; Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 98, at
1387.
176. See Hafen, supra note 7, at 644-50, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 98, at
1387-88.
177. The adolescent in Snyder was sixteen. 85 Wash. 2d at 183, 532 P.2d at 279. Dat[forth
concerned the rights of pregnant women under the age of eighteen. 428 U.S. at 72-75. The
adolescents in Yoder were fourteen and fifteen. 406 U.S. at 207.
178. But see note 175 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 164-72 supra and accompanying text.
180. But see note 175 supra and accompanying text.
181. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75, quoted note 168 supra; Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244-45 ("On this important and vital matter of education, I think the
children should be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the
entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided
views. He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will have to
break from Amish tradition.") (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d at
188-89, 532 P.2d at 282 (juvenile court did not disregard parents' rights in declaring child
incorrigible and did fulfill its responsibility to assist in achieving a reconciliation between parents
and child).
182. See notes 149-72 supra and accompanying text.
183. Hafen coined the term "egalitarian" for the theory that all individuals should be treated
equally by the law. He argues that the Snyder and Danforth decisions and the Yoder dissent
applied this "egalitarian" theory to children because in those cases they were treated as adults.
See note 175 supra and accompanying text. The textual use of the term "egalitarian" theory
should not be interpreted as an acceptance of Hafen's position that these cases treated children as
adults. The term is only used as a convenient method of referring to the way in which courts arc
beginning to recognize that children sometimes need to be protected from well-intentioned
parental efforts to protect their children.
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raise "basic new questions about the nature of parental responsibility."'8 4 An
argument has been made that under an "egalitarian" theory the state would
stand in the same relationship to children as to adults, and therefore it could
assume responsibility for nurturing children.' 8 5 This would mean that the
state could revoke or limit its delegation of responsibility for child nurturing
to adults. 186 The possibility of the state assuming full control over the
nurturing of children would not ripen into actuality under the trust model
because the trust must be administered exclusively in the child's interest.' 8 7
Since the child's primary interest is the development of a parent-child
relationship,18 8 in order for the trust to be administered exclusively in the
child's interest, the trustee must be that adult with whom the child has, or can
establish, a parent-child relationship. 8 9 Furthermore, the state's role is
limited to that of the settlor of the trust who may challenge the trusteeship
only when the child is not being nurtured because of parental neglect or
abandonment. 90 In the case of an adolescent who challenges the trusteeship
by claiming that his parents are unduly restricting his development, it would
be for the child as beneficiary to institute the challenge. 191 This would not be
the obligation of the state, because only the adolescent would be aware of this
particular deficiency in the parent-child relationship.
A related objection to limiting parental protection is that it %ill result in
parental ambivalence toward the child either because "parents [will] believe
they have no right to give direction to their children, or . . . they fear that in
giving them direction they might meet [some] kind of state-supported resis-
tance." 192 Under the trust model, not only do parents, as the trustees, have
the right to give direction to their children, they also have an obligation to do
so.' 93 But there is a limitation placed on this right when the child is an
adolescent because of his need to develop his own attitudes and goals . 94 This
limitation is that parental direction must not inhibit the adolescent's develop-
ment of independent reasoning ability. 195 Parents who exercise this right, and
thereby fulfill their obligation as trustees, need not be concerned that the
adolescent will institute a challenge, and they have no basis for fearing that
the state, whose only involvement in the child-initiated challenge would be
limited to the impartiality of judicial adjudication, will uphold unsupported
claims. The trust model of parentage would encourage parental responsibility
184. Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 98, at 1386. See also Hafen, supra note 7,
at 654-55.
185. Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 98, at 1386; Hafen supra note 7, at 654-55.
186. Puberty, Privacy, and Protection, supra note 98, at 1386.
187. See notes 101-06 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 109, 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 159-72 supra and accompanying text.
192. Hafen, supra note 7, at 655.
193. See notes 101-06 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 111, 113 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 159-72 supra and accompanying text.
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and uphold the child's right to be reared to independence by permitting the
child, for whose benefit the trust exists, to seek relief when his development of
independent reasoning ability is impeded.
c. Implementation of the Child's Rights as Beneficiary
A basic requirement in implementing the rights discussed in the preceding
subsection is the child's right to be a party and to be represented in any
proceeding affecting his trust interest.' 96
Under the trust model, the child is an indispensable party to any proceeding
concerning the removal and appointment of trustees because any judgment
rendered in his absence would severely prejudice his rights. 197 In the case of
the adolescent beneficiary, his right to choose his custodial arrangement
whenever it comes into issue because of divorce, neglect, or abandonment
would be denied. In the case of the pre-adolescent beneficiary, his right to
have the trust decision made on the basis of the "least detrimental alterna-
tive" 198 standard would be prejudiced because no other party to the proceed-
ing, trustee or settlor, has interests identical to the beneficiary's, 199 and
therefore the court has no way of determining what the "least detrimental
alternative" would be.
The child is entitled to a representative who protects the child's rights and
advocates his interests. 20 0 Parents are inappropriate representatives of the
child because of the conflict of interest that arises when their obligations as
trustees are at issue. 20 1 The state cannot adequately safeguard the child's right
because in exercising its parens patriae power, its concern is the molding of
good citizens, 20 2 and this objective is not always identical to the child's
interests in establishing a parent-child relationship with at least one adult.
20 3
Representation and protection of the child's interests by an adult not
otherwise interested in the proceedings is not a new idea. New York's
legislature has recognized the need for independent legal representation of the
196. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 65-67.
197. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); cf. Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp.
704 (D. Colo. 1966) (court refused to dismiss action brought by contingent beneficiaries under
testatmentary trusts against trustee where other beneficiarie- could not be joined but should have
been parties under the requirements of Rule 19(c), because the corpus of the trust would increase
for the benefit of all the beneficiaries if the plaintiff/beneficiaries succeeded); Law of Trusts, supra
note 97, § 31, at 104 (beneficiary is a necessary party to a proceeding brought by the trustee to be
relieved of the trust).
198. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 42-60, 90-95 supra and accompanying text.
200. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 65-67; Hansen, supra note 35; Inker & Perretta, supra
note- 11, at 236-40; Juvenile Rights Litigation Project, Children's Rights in Domestic Disputes,
Youth Law Center, 10 Clearinghouse Rev. 956 (1977).
201. See notes 42-60, 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
202. See Areen, supra note 68, at 893-94; Cogan, supra note 75; Thomas, supra note 75, at
313-22.
203. See Inker & Perretta, supra note 11, at 230-32; notes 75, 78-81 supra and accompanying
text.
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child in neglect and abandonment proceedings by providing for the appoint-
ment of a law guardian at the discretion of the family court judge.2 4
Similarly, the Family Court of Milwaukee appoints a guardian ad litem in
contested custody disputes arising out of divorce. 20 5 Commentators have even
suggested that this practice ought to be extended to include uncontested
custody agreements to insure that courts actually conduct an inquiry into
whether the arrangements worked out by the parents protect the children's
interests. 2 06
The rights described in the preceding subsection 20 7 indicate that the func-
tion of the child's representative will differ markedly depending on whether
the child is an adolescent or pre-adolescent. When the child is an adolescent
beneficiary, the representative should inform him of his right to choose his
trust arrangement or to have the decision made on the basis of the "least
detrimental alternative.1 20 8 If an action for neglect is brought against the
parent-trustees, the child must be apprised of the legal ramifications of
choosing to have a foster parent appointed co-trustee. The adolescent must
know that although he may later terminate the co-trusteeship (to have the
parents re-assume the exclusive administration of the trust or to have an
adoptive parent appointed as trustee), if that right is not exercised within a
statutorily defined period of time, the co-trusteeship will end and an adoptive
parent will be appointed as soon as appointrhent becomes the "least detrimen-
tal alternative." 20 9 Furthermore, before removal of the trustees is sought, the
representative should inform the adolescent of the possible legal consequences
of removal: loss of the child's right to inherit from his parents2 10 or receive
support from them. 211 When the child is a pre-adolescent who chooses to have
the trust decision made on the basis of the "least detrimental alternative,212
the representative will have the responsibility of determining what the "least
detrimental alternative" is for the child; he must then advocate that alterna-
204. N.Y. Farn. Ct. Act § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). See also N.Y.S. Judicial
Conference, 1976 Annual Report 42, 162 (table 77 shows the frequency with which law guardians
appear on behalf of children and the costs of their services). Other states also provide the child
with attorneys in juvenile court proceedings. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 17-66c (West
Supp. 1978).
205. Hansen, supra note 35; A Case for Independent Counsel, supra note 35. Other jurisdic-
tions have also provided the child with a representative in custody proceedings that arise out of
divorce. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-116 (1973) (court can appoint an attorney to represent
the child); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 215, § 56A (MichiefLaw. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977) (court can
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.165 (West Supp. 1977)
(court can appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child).
206. See Hansen, supra note 35; A Case for Independent Counsel, supra note 35.
207. See notes 109-95 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-3203 (1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.60 (Supp.
1977-1978).
211. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 229 (West 1954); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.172 (West Supp. 1975).
212. See notes 118-28 supra and accompanying text.
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tive in court.2 13 Here the representative should seek the assistance of
everyone, including the child, who can give him insight into the child's
relationship with his trustees. 2 14
The primary inadequacy of the present system of custody adjudication is
that, in an effort to protect the child's interests, the law presupposes an
identity of interest between child and parents or child and state. 2 15 This
presupposition results in a custody resolution that often does not reflect the
child's interests because the parents and the state usually are so intent on
securing their own rights and fulfilling their own needs that the child's
interests do not receive adequate representation. 21 6 The trust model of
parentage will help to cure this inadequacy because it clearly defines the
child's, the parents', and the state's respective rights and interests in the
parent-child relationship.
21 7
C. The Child's Right to Freedom from Abuse
"Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes;
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases."'
That parents may, on occasion, beat their children for annoying behavior,
or for more serious transgressions, is not news. A parent's right to use
corporal punishment for the discipline and control 2 of his offspring is part of
the body of family rights recognized and protected by the Constitution 3 as
well as by long-established social tradition. 4 But when parents beat to the
213. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 7.
214. See Fain, The Role and Responsibility of the Lawyer in Custody Cases, I Fam. L.Q.,
No. 3 1967, at 36; Isaaes, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501 (1963).
215. See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 99-100, 109-95 supra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 102-08 supra and accompanyirg text.
1. L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
2. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 27 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Parental control over the rearing of children has found constitutional support in, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (barring unreasonable interference with
the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control'), and in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (defining the right of an
individual to "establish a home and bring up children" as a "liberty guaranteed . . . by tile
Fourteenth Amendment").
4. The unquestioned acceptance of the use of physical force as a disciplinary measure in the
socialization of children is indicated by the existence of a common term in our vocabulary for the
practice, i.e., "spanking"; by the existence of the proverb "spare the rod and spoil the child" to
connote a perfectly valid school of thought on child rearing, Model Penal Code § 3.08, Comment,
at 72 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); D. Gil, Violence Against Children 8 (1973); Paulsen, The Legal
Framework for Child Protection, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 679, 686 (1966); and by the casual
acceptance of corporal punishment in public schools by the Supreme Court in Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977).
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point of brutality, or otherwise deliberately inflict the serious physical injuries
described in the literature of child abuse,- this disciplinary privilege is
challenged by the child's interest in personal security6 and by society's interest
in protecting its weakest and most vulnerable members.
Because of the child's dependent position in the family, and because, in
child abuse cases, his natural protector is the one from whom he needs
protection, 7 it is usually necessary that protection of the child's interest come
from outside the family. However, this runs counter to a fundamental bias, of
constitutional dimensions,8 against such intrusion into the "private realm of
family life." 9 This bias is so deeply imbedded in the national psyche that
when a choice must be made between protecting a child by interfering in
a threatening home situation' ° or protecting his parents' right to family
5. Clinical studies of child abuse report a range of injuries from minor, superficial cuts and
bruises to burns, scaldings, fractures, internal injuries, intentional starvation, dismemberment,
and severe injuries to the brain and nervous system. Gil, supra note 4, at 2. Although sexual
abuse is sometimes considered with other forms of abuse, see, e.g., Summary of N.Y. Child
Protective Services Act of 1973, at Intro. 1 (issued by the Dep't of N.Y.C. Special Serv. for
Children on Sept. 1, 1973), it is usually classified as child abuse only when it involves the use of
force, Gil, supra note 4, at 6.
6. The right to be free from "unjustified intrusions on personal security" is one of the "historic
liberties" recognized at common law and incorporated into the Constitution in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). The child enjoys this
right, although it is limited by the requirements of reasonable discipline. People v. Curtiss, 116
Cal. App. 771, 782, 300 P. 801, 805 (Super. Ct. 1931); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va.
851, 862, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1947); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 27 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Child abuse is, by definition, the abuse of a child by someone standing in the position of
parent to that child, and does not include injury inflicted by strangers or those with a minimal
supervisory role, such as teachers. The definition used in ap influential nationwide study
conducted under the aegis of the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare was: "Physical abuse of children is the intentional, nonaccidental use of
force, or intentional, nonaccidental acts of omission, on the part of a parent or other caretaker
interacting with a child in his care, aimed at hurting, injuring, or destroying that child." Gil,
supra note 4, at 6.
8. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.... And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); accord, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
9. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
10. Reluctance of medical personnel to intrude on the privacy of family affairs by investigat-
ing the circumstances behind the injuries to young patients inhibited early attempts to gather
statistics on child abuse. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Leqislation, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1-4 (1967). See also D. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy 126 (1974). The
persistence of this attitude is reflected in the comment of a professional homemaker, assigned by
court order to a couple later accused in the child-abuse death of their 105-day-old infant. The boy
suffered from broken ribs, fractured skull, and severely burned buttocks and feet. Although the
homemaker actually witnessed rough handling by the father, and was in the home almost daily
up to three days before the child's death, she failed to see injuries inflicted during the period she
was in daily contact with the child. She told an interviewer, in explanation, that she "tries not to
be overly intrusive to the parents she serves." N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 75, col. S.
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privacy, 1 the parental right will frequently prevail. One explanation may be
that in weighing the interests involved, many analysts consider the child's
right to personal security-particularly, to be free of abuse from a parent or
parent-substitute-as outside of, and subordinate to, the body of protected
family rights. 12 As a result, while deploring the sacrifice of the child's
interests, they reluctantly permit it if necessary to preserve the integrity of the
family. For example, even where it is fairly certain that a particular parent
will engage in dangerously abusive behavior, courts have not prevented him
from gaining or keeping custody of his child, but have preferred to wait for
conclusive evidence of abuse before interfering in the parent's natural right to
custody. 13 This frequently means a child must undergo serious injury before
his right to protection is recognized. One need not be unsympathetic to the
sound reasons 14 for guarding the family from officious meddling by outside
agencies to question the results in these circumstances.
This section will be concerned with the ultimate remedy currently provided
11. In the case referred to in note 10 supra, the infant was returned to the custody of a
handicapped mother who had been diagnosed as "severely distrubed, irrational and angry ...
[and] extremely self-destructive" and whose "severely impaired judgment pose(d] a grave threat to her
baby's safety and life," and to a father with a history of violence. The baby's death, fewer than
three months later, from injuries inflicted by the father, raised a storm of protest. However, tile
court's decision on custody was defended as necessary to preserve parents' rights to the care and
custody of their children. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 41, col. 1, 75, col. 1; Letter of R. Uviller,
Director, Juvenile Rights Project, ACLU, to the New York Times (N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1977,
at 40, col. 4) [hereinafter cited as Uviller].
12. The child's right to freedom from abuse is generally treated as an aspect of the common
law right to freedom from the "corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding,"
rather than as a right of the child in the family. Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407 (1977)
(quoting Blackstone's Commentaries).
13. E.g., The Short, Unhappy Life ofRubin Almeyda, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1977, at 41, col.
1, 75, col. 1. The court ruled that the Bureau of Child Welfare had not proved conclusively that
the infant was in "imminent danger." Id. at 75, col. 3. The validity of predictors of abusive
behavior has been challenged as a basis for denying custody by one child advocate who expressed
the view that protection of the rights of parents justifies the risk of injury to children. Uviller,
supra note 11, cols. 5-6 ("If 50 percent of the parents about whom future violence is predicted do
not fulfill the prophecy, should they too lose their children in order to protect the other 50
percent?"). Whether society is, in fact, willing to risk subjecting some of its children to the
treatment described in the Almeyda case as the price of preserving the rights of some parents may
soon have to be decided. Researchers have reported development of a set of 17 indicators of
abusive traits which, in a limited study, was able to classify correctly 77% of the parents studied.
Predicting and Preventing Child Abuse, Psych. Today, Jan. 1978, at 99.
14. While the necessity for discretion, flexibility, and immediacy in meeting the needs of a
child's everyday life argue persuasively for keeping control in the hands of the party closest to the
situation, a more compelling argument for parental autonomy is that outside regulation would
permit the moral, social, and economic values of the dominant class to be imposed on the rest of
the society. For example, zoning regulations defining "family" according to the "nuclear family"
model familiar to white, middle-class society, to the exclusion of the "extended family" tradition
of black Americans, could be seen as a preference for one class' standard of normal family life and
an attempt to make that standard universal. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-13
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring.)
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for th protection of abused children-removal from the home and placement
in in! titutional or foster care.' 5 Despite the well-documented dangers of
removal, 16 when it appears that other techniques for protecting the child-
supervision of the family, court-ordered counseling for the parent-will not be
effective, the abused child is removed from his home and family. The abusing
parent remains at home in full enjoyment of his family rights. This section
will discuss the child's interest in personal security as an integral part of the
constitutionally-protected body of family rights and will suggest that under
such an analysis, it is proper, in some circumstances, to remove the abusing
parent before resorting to removal of the abused child.
1. The Child's Interest in the Family Relationship
The existence of a body of rights centering on the family has been
established in a long line of Supreme Court decisions,' 7 which have deemed
the family relationship to be as "old and as fundamental as our entire
civilization,"8 and the preservation of the integrity of that relationship, to be
a function of the ninth 19 and the fourteenth amendments.2 0
While enumerating certain particular rights-the right to marry, 2' to
bear,2 2 or not to bear,2 3 children, to educate them according to one's own
beliefs24 :-the Court has made clear that these are but examples of a broader
15. Typical language in abuse and neglect statutes directs that all other possible remedies
should be tried before resort is made to removal of the child. See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 10, § 902
(1974) ("the home will, if possible, remain unbroken"); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § I (Michie!
Law. Co-op 1975) ("to provide substitute care of children only when the family... [is] unable to
provide the necessary care and protection'); M nn. Stat. Ann. § 260.011 (West 1971) ("removing
[the child] from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection of the
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal"); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 10-1300
(Cum. Supp. 1975) ("preserve the unity . .. of the family whenever possible"); N.,M. Stat.
§ 13-14-2(C) (1976) ("separating the child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in
the interests of public safety"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-201 (1977) ("separating the child from his
parents only when necessary for his welfare . . .); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.01(2)(c) (West 1957)
("Protection of children from unnecessary separation, either temporary or permanent, from their
parents').
16. See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
17. From Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), through Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
to Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized the vital role played by the family in our culture and the importance of family
autonomy to that role.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
19. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
21. Loving v. Virgini, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (192S);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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concept of rights that each individual has in the family relationship; 25 and
that the source of these rights lies in the function of the family in providing
the "custody, care and nurture of the child."'26 Because it has so often been
the case that the parent is the party whose rights are vindicated, 27 it is easy to
overlook the mutual nature of the family rights involved, and to conclude that
the parent has exclusive claim to those rights. It should be noted, however,
that the cases upholding the integrity of a family against intrusion involved
not the parent's right alone but the family members' rights against outside
interference. 28 For example, the education cases explicitly upheld the parent's
right to educate and the child's right to learn in religious schools, 29 or in a
foreign tongue. 30 The child's inclusion among those having a protected
interest in the family is explicit in Levy v. Louisiana,31 which declared
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that denied to illegitimate children a
wrongful death action for the death of their mother, and in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland3 2 where the concept of the "extended family," including
children, grandchildren, and other relatives, was held to be protected from
state interference. 33
Since the cases establishing the primacy of these family rights involved the
family against the state, they should not be used to establish the primacy of
the rights of individual family members against each other, as seems to be
happening when the family right to privacy is used to close off or limit efforts
to protect a child from his parent.34 Rather, when the rights of parent and
25. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213-15 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
26. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
27. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents' right topreserve religious values
by terminating the "formal education" of their children after the eighth grade); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' right to educate their children in parochial schools).
28. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty
... excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.').
30. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (barring interference by the state with, inter
alia, the "opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge" in German).
31. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
32. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
33. A housing ordinance of the City of East Cleveland limited occupancy of "dwelling units"
to single families and defined "family" as, in effect, the "nuclear family"-i.e., essentially a
couple and its dependent children. A grandmother who lived with her son and two grandsons,
who were cousins rather than brothers, was convicted of criminal violation of the ordinance. In
overturning her conviction and finding that the ordinance deprived her of her liberty in violation
of the fourteenth amendment, the majority stated: "Ours is by no means a tradition limited to
respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has
roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." Id. at 504.
34. In the few cases where the issues have been framed as parent against child, the Court has
not come down on the side of the parent, even where the parent couched his argument in terms of
protection of the family. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where
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child in the family relationship conflict, the interests of each should be
weighed and analyzed as in any nonfamilial conflict, and the resolution
reached should be that which is least restrictive of the rights of all parties.
Certain rights in the family relationship have been explicitly recognized as
belonging to the child, 35 but they should be seen as examples of the broader
interest in the family relationship based upon the nurturing function of the
family. 36 Just as the parent's authority over his child is predicated upon his
right and duty to rear the helpless infant to responsible adulthood, 37 the
submission of the child to parental authority is predicated upon the latter's
need for care, training, discipline, and guidance from his parent in order to
achieve the goal of responsible adulthood. 38 That the child has a right to a
certain level of care from his parents can be deduced from the neglect and
abandonment statutes which set minimum standards for parental conduct,39
and there is increasing evidence of the recognition of more positive rights in
the child to a level of nurturing that will promote his maximum develop-
ment.4
0
The importance to that development of a safe, stable home environment
has been well established. It is recognized in the neglect and abandonment
statutes which provide that removal of a child from his home should be the
remedy of last resort.4 1 It is recognized in the sociological literature detailing
the importance of continuity in a parent-child relationship4 2 and the trauma
arising out of disturbance of that continuity.4 3 It is recognized in the reluc-
tance of courts to disrupt a family relationship, even an "unconventional"
one.44 Where the parent's abusive behavior is the cause of the problem, the
child should not have to choose between his physical safety and his family
ties. He should, wherever possible, be able to preserve both, even at the cost
of some restriction of his parent's interest in those same family ties. Accord-
the right of a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent was upheld, despite
strong objections that this interfered with the parent's right to control his family.
35. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
36. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977). ("[Tlhe importance of familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children.")
37. "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
38. See generally, W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 122, at 867-68 (4th ed. 1971).
39. S. Katz, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 Farn. L.Q. 1, 73 (1975); Note, The Legal
Response to Child Abuse, 11 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 960, 968-81 (1970).
40. See pt. IV(A) supra.
41. See note 15 supra.
42. E.g., J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 31-35
(1973).
43. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 994 (1975).
44. See, e.g., People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896
(1952).
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ingly, where abuse by a parent has created a situation threatening to the
child's safety and development, the child's interest in his family rights-his
interest in remaining in a safe, stable family situation-should require that
whenever the family unit can be maintained without the presence of the
abusing adult, the right to stay at home should be preserved to the child and
the abusing parent should be removed instead.
2. The Proposed Alternative: Removal of the Parent
Where there is the possibility of another adult maintaining the family
unit-for example, a nonabusing parent, grandparent, older sibling, other
relative or close family friend, or even court-appointed guardian or foster-
parent-leaving the child at home under the supervision of such an adult
would result in several beneficial effects while diminishing greatly the harmful
effects of uprooting the child from his familiar environment.
The child would continue to reside in familiar surroundings without
interruption of school or friendships. The supervising adult would often be a
relative or friend known to the child and familiar with his daily routine. This
would promote the child's sense of security with minimal disruption of his
lifestyle. Continuation of the child in his own home would reduce the stigma
attached to abused or neglected children and would thus relieve much of the
child's embarrassment, in particular the embarrassment caused by being
"foster."45
In addition to the beneficial effects mentioned above, removal of the
abusing parent rather than the abused child would focus the remedy on the
wrongdoer rather than on the victim. This should relieve the child of much of
the guilt felt by children who are removed from their homes. 46 It would also
emphasize to the abusing parent the wrongful nature of his conduct, and
would prevent future abuse of the abused child's siblings without removing all
children, whether abused or not, from the home. 4 7
If the proposed remedy were adopted, social work and psychiatric services
could be provided to the abusing parent. Since the parent would be relieved
45. Children cared for by child care systems are often placed in foster homes. As these
children become more aware of their status as "foster children," they often become increasingly
embarrassed by this status. Their embarrassment is shown in their reluctance to disclose their
status, in adoption of the foster parents' surname, and in their conversations with each other
(e.g., "Are you foster?"). See, e.g., Wald, supra note 43, at 994-95 (1975); Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights,
28 Stan. L. Rev. 625, 644-46, 667-72 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wald, Standards for Removal.]
46. Abused children cared for by child care systems often feel at fault for their own abuse.
They may feel that they are bad, unlovable, or in some way responsible for their removal.
Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part 1: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and Social
Perspective, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 293, 347-48 (1972). See also J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 11-12 (1973).
47. An additional benefit to the family would result from the continued support services
provided when the court leaves a child in the home, service!. which would cease when the abused
child is removed. Wald, Standards for Removal, supra note 45, at 630-31.
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of the task of caring for the children, treatment could focus more directly on
the parent's problems and frustrations with minimal interference from the
anxiety-provoking home situation. Additionally, visitation to the child could
be provided for, either within or without the home. Since there would be a
resident supervising adult in the home, all visits could be supervised and, if
the resident adult were a relative or friend, visits would be less threatening for
the parent,4 8 and therefore more enjoyable and reassuring for both parent and
child.
a. Bases for Removal of the Parent
The remedy of physical removal of a wrongdoer is not new to the law.
Indeed, removal is central to the notions of retribution and rehabilitation in
the criminal law. More specifically, by statute in a number of states, a person
found guilty of abusing a child is guilty of a crime49 and may be incarcerated
for the offense. 50 The goals of retribution and rehabilitation focus on punish-
ing the wrongdoer and on conforming his behavior.
An equally important goal of the criminal law is deterrence, or the
protection of society against the wrongdoer's harmful acts. This goal focuses
on the innocent and recognizes a right to be free from the harmful acts of
others.5 1 It is particularly appropriate to recognize this goal of protecting the
innocent in a discussion of children's rights since children are inherently
vulnerable and unable to protect themselves.
There is also precedent in the family law area for removal of wrongdoers.
This precedent is found in statutes empowering the court to issue orders of
protection against "family offenders." s 2 These orders of protection typically
set forth certain reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a
48. Parents who visit their children in foster homes often feel inadequate and threatened.
Additionally, foster parents are often wary of parental visits, especially if they have grown
attached to the child and view such visits as a preliminary to the child's return to the care of his
parents. Wald, Standards for Removal, supra note, 45 at 674-75. These underlying fears and
anxieties often make visiting traumatic and unpleasant, and thus parental visiting may actually
work against the return of the child to his parents' care. Id. at 644-46, 667-72, 672 n.197.
49. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977), which provides that a
person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when "[b]eing a parent, guardian or other
person legally charged with the care or custody of a child less than eighteen years old, he fails or
refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming
an 'abused child' [or] a 'neglected child,' "and further provides that "[elndangering the welfare of
a child is a class A misdemeanor." (The statute had been amended in 1970 to delete a
differentiation in parental duty with regard to the child's age and sex: "male child less than
sixteen years old or . . . female child less than eighteen years old.').
S0. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1975), which provides: "A sentence of
imprisonment for a class A misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence ... ,fixed by the court, and
shall not exceed one year."
51. See note 6 supra.
52. E.g., N.Y. Far. Ct. Act § 842 (McKinney 1975). Article 8 of the Family Court Act deals
with "family offenses." Section 842 provides for the issuance of an order of protection where the
safety of a family member is threatened. See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55 (%Vest 1976), whose
protective order is almost identical to New York's.
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specified time by a person before the court. Such conditions may include an
order to stay away from the home, spouse, or children. Statutes providing for
orders of protection in matrimonial actions are also common.5 3
However, these orders are not issued lightly To deny a person access to the
home, spouse, or children, it must appear that such access represents a danger
to the safety of the other persons in the home. A single incident of aggression
occurring during an altercation is not enough for the court to issue an order of
protection, 54 nor is conduct which is merely alarming, annoying, or disturb-
ing.5 5 The conduct must be such that it would constitute disorderly conduct,
harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, assault or attempted assault
as these crimes are defined in the penal law.5 6
Some states have enacted statutes empowering the court to issue orders of
protection in child protective proceedings.5 7 These orders typically set forth
reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed by a parent or other person
legally responsible for the care of the child who is before the court. They may
require the parent or custodian to stay away from the home or the child;5 8 to
permit a parent to visit the child at stated periods;5 9 to abstain from offensive
conduct against the child, his parent, or any person to whom custody of the
child is awarded; 60 to give proper attention to the care of the home; 61 to
cooperate in good faith with a child caring agency having custody of a child; 62
or to refrain from acts of commission or omission which tend to make the
home an improper place for a child. 63 Such orders of protection may be issued
during the pendency of child protective proceedings 64 for the purpose of
53. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 446 (McKinney 1975), which provides for orders of
protection in support proceedings.
54. Downing v. Downing, 31 App. Div. 2d 913, 293 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1969). Downing was
decided under § 842 of the New York Family Court Act. The wife claimed that her husband had
slapped her once during an altercation which she had instigated. The court found no order of
protection was warranted.
55. DiDonna v. DiDonna, 72 Misc. 2d 231, 339 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fain. Ct. 1972).
56. Id. at 236, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
57. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4359, 5102 (West Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5
(Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55 (West 1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056
(McKinney 1975).
58. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55 (West
1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056(a) (McKinney 1975).
59. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55(b) (West
1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056(b) (McKinney 1975).
60. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(c) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55(c) (West
1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056(c) (McKinney 1975).
61. II. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(d) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55(d) (West
1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056(d) (McKinney 1975).
62. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(e) (Smith-Hurd 1972).
63. Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 705-5(0 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.55(e) (West
1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1056(e) (McKinney 1975).
64. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1029 (McKinney 1975).
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protecting the child until final disposition of the action or as a part of the final
judgment.65
b. Removal of the Parent-Expansion of an Existing Remedy
Adoption of the proposed alternative of removing the abusing parent from
the home would actually require no more than recognition and effectuation of
the order of protection remedy now in existence in those states which have
empowered their courts to issue such orders in child protective proceedings.
At the present time such orders of protection are rarely issued against an
abusing parent unless there are also grounds to justify a legal separation
between the parents. 6 6 This is because exclusion of an abusing parent from
the home enforces a separation between the spouses, and there must be legal
grounds under matrimonial law to justify such action. 67 If both parents are,
or a "single parent" is, the abusers, the usual procedure is to remove the child
and place him in a child care facility.
Under the proposed alternative, one or both parents could be excluded from
the home during the pendency of an abuse action and at final judgment.
Throughout the proceedings, the child would remain in the home, thus
protecting the child against the harmful physical effects of abuse and also
minimizing the harmful emotional effects of removal and placement.
c. Removal of the Parent and the Trust Model
The trust model can provide an effective means of implementing the
proposed alternative-removing the abusing parent or parents from the home
rather than removing the abused child. Courts have long recognized the
similarity between the parent-child and the trustee-beneficiary relationships:
"In dealing with the custody and control of infants, their welfare and
happiness . . . is the primary consideration. The natural right of the [parent]
to the custody of [the] child is not an absolute property right, but rather a
trust reposed in the [parent] by the state." 68 The trust relationship between
parent and child arises from the "trust and confidence ... reposed on the one
side, and influence and control . . . exercised on the other .... "69
The inherent nature of the parent-child relationship is that of an active
trust imposing upon the parent the power and duty to guide the child's growth
and development. The parent as trustee must, as must all trustees, exercise
65. Carol E. v. Guy E., 82 Misc.2d 969, 371 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Farn. Ct. 1975; Unda F. v.
Gerald F., 67 Misc.2d 43, 323 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Fain. Ct. 1971); In re Blaine, 54 Misc.2d 248, 282
N.Y.S.2d 359 (Fain. Ct. 1967). See In re Desiree T., 64 Misc.2d 28, 37, 314 N.Y.S.2d 480, 489
(Faro. Ct. 1970), in which an order of protection was used to prevent "bitter acrimony ...
harassments and threats ...."
66. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
67. In re Blaine, 54 MIisc.2d 248, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Fain. Ct. 1967).
68. Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 81, 26 A.2d 799, 809 (Ch. 1942) (quoting IUppincott v.
Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 519, 128 A. 254, 255 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925)).
69. Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 338, 352 (1863); accord, Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 93,
112, 44 N.E. 9, 11 (1896).
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sound discretion in the carrying out of his duties, and the trustee's duty of
loyalty prohibits him from doing anything harmful to the interests of the child
as beneficiary. Generally, abuses of trust relationships may be found by
viewing the good faith, arbitrariness, capriciousness, maliciousness, or im-
proper motive in light of all the circumstances. 70 In the context of a parent-
child relationship, it would be desirable to impose particularly strict standards
on the conduct of the parent trustee because of the vulnerability of the child.
The courts have utilized the trust analogy before in granting relief where a
parent-child relationship is abused. Thus they have noted that the parent-
child trust relationship "requires the [parent] to refrain from all selfish
projects. 'The general principle is, if a confidence is reposed, and that
confidence is abused, Courts of Equity will grant relief.' "71 Relief for abuse
of the parent-child relationship is often granted through invocation of the
doctrine of "parens patriae."72 This doctrine roots the authority of the State to
regulate the custody of infants found within its jurisdiction in the protection
that is due to the incompetent or helpless. 73- However, while the parens
patriae doctrine supplies the justification for the State's right to intervene in
the parent-child relationship if that relationship is abused, the remedy em-
ployed by the courts has typically been removal of the child from the home of
the abusing parents.
Removal of the child for abuse of the parent-child trust relationship is a
remedy at odds with the remedy usually employed in abuse of trust cases. In a
typical trust relationship, if a trustee abuses his position of trust, the court has
the power to remove him and to appoint a successor trustee. 74 The rights and
70. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Tierney, 116 Conn. 588, 591-92, 165 A. 807, 808 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Err. 1933) ("They [courts] will not, however, interfere with the exercise of the discretionary
powers of trustees in the absence of a showing of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. So long
as the discretion is fairly and honestly exercised, the court will not deprive a trustee of [his] power
... . The court may, however, review the exercise of judgment and determine whether the
trustee has exceeded the liberty given him.'). Williams v. Hund, 302 Mo. 451, 258 S.W. 703
(1924); In re Vohland's Estate, 135 Neb. 77, 280 N.W. 241 (1938). See also Marburg v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 165, 167, 9 A.2d 222, 223 (1939) ("Unless there has been a clear
abuse of power or neglect of duty by the trustee ... or a violation of the trust, courts should not
and will not interfere . . . "); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith, 263 N.Y. 292, 295, 189
N.E. 222, 223 (1934) ("The manner in which a trustee shall exercise his function rests ordinarily
within his discretion. If he exceeds his powers, acts negligently or abuses his discretion, a
beneficiary injured thereby may have redress.").
71. Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 338, 352-53 (1863) ("Whenever a fiduciary relationship
exists, legal or actual, . . . trust and confidence are reposed on the one side, and influence and
control are exercised on the other .... One of the most familiar examples is that of parent and
child .... "). See also cases cited note 68 supra.
72. Parens patriae authority stems from the English case of Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms.
103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722); accord, In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
73. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
74. May v. May, 167 U.S. 310, 320-21 (1897) ("The power of a court of equity to remove a
trustee, and to substitute another in his place, is incidental to its paramount duty to see that trusts
are properly executed; and may properly be exercised whenever such a state of mutual ill-feeling,
growing out of his behavior, exists between [him and his cotrustee or the beneficiaries] that his
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circumstances of the innocent beneficiary remain untouched.7 5 Similarly, it
can be argued that, if a parent abuses his position as guardian of a child, the
court should be empowered to remove the abusing parent and to appoint a
substitute. Under this analogy, the rights and physical circumstances of the
innocent child would remain untouched and only the guilty parent's rights
would be affected. Since courts have long recognized their power to remove a
wrongful trustee, the time is past due for them to recognize their power to
remove a wrongful parent.
It should be recognized that there may be due process problems in exclud-
ing a parent from access to his home. 76 Aside from the arguable position that
removal of a parent deprives him of a property interest in his child (i.e., in
actual physical custody of his child), there is the argument that exclusion of a
parent from his home deprives him of his property interest in his house.77 It
would be essential, therefore, that due process requirements be met before
excluding a parent from access to his home.
Assuming due process requirements are met, there is some precedent in the
law for depriving a party of possession of his home as a result of his wrongful
conduct. Under New York law,7 8 in an action for divorce, separation,
continuance in office would be detrimental to the execution of the trust."); Haswell v. Wedding,
277 Ky. 729, 127 S.W.2d 152 (1939); In re Creedmore State Hosp., 62 Mrisc.2d 830, 832, 310
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
75. The motive propelling the court to order removal is not the punishment of the abusive
trustee, but the protection of the injured beneficiary. See Moore v. Bowes, 8 Cal. 2d 162, 165, 64
P.2d 423, 424 (1937); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 107-08 (1959).
76. There can be no serious argument that the state may never interfere in the parent-child
relationship. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the right to direct the
upbringing of one's children is within the concept of liberty set forth in the Bill of Rights, see
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
related to the right of privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it is clear that
this right is not absolute, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). The state has an
interest in protecting the safety of its citizens, Gitiow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and it
may be argued that in the area of child abuse, where the victim is often helpless, its interest is
compelling. In these circumstances, the state may legislate to provide for orders of protection if
such orders are necessary to protect its compelling interest in the safety of its citizens.
77. See Lernerv. Lerner, 21 App. Div. 2d 861, 862, 251 N.Y.S.2d 400,402 (1964), where the
court stated: "The argument on unconstitutionality ignores the fact that the order merely directs
temporary possession pending the outcome of the separation action."
78. N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 234 (McKinney 1977) provides: "In any action for divorce, for a
separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1)
determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such
direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion
justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such
direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before
or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment." See also
Mumma v. Mumma, 280 A.2d 73 (D.C. App. 1971); Klebba v. Klebba, 108 111. App. 2d 32, 246
N.E.2d 681 (1969); Jetter v. Jetter, 66 Misc.2d 879, 323 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup. Ct. 1971); D.C.
Code Encycl. § 16-910 (West 1966) ("[T]he court may award the property to the one lawfully
entitled thereto or alportion it in such manner as seems equitable, just, and reasonable."); Ill.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may make a
direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, includ-
ing the marital home. While ordinarily it is the owner of the premises who has
the right to remain in possession, 79 the sole owner in fee can be excluded if
there is some reason why he should be deprived of his property.8 0 Thus, the
New York courts have granted exclusive possession of the marital home
where the conduct of the excluded party created the danger of violence from
continued cohabitation. 8' Exclusive possession of the home has also been
granted where it was needed as a home for the children and where it was
located in a neighborhood in which the children had resided all their lives.8 2
Thus it appears that exclusion of a dangerous parent from the home and
maintenance of continuity of environment for the children has found some
support in the law. Assuming due process requirements are met, removing the
parent from the home would seem to be the least harmful remedy for child
abuse. It would minimize the harm to the child and to his emotional growth
and development and would infringe least on the body of rights enjoyed by
parent and child. Exclusion of the abusing parent would recognize the child's
right to be free from physical and emotional abuse and is also consistent with
recognition of the parent's right to regain custody of the child when the parent
no longer poses a danger to the child.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment is premised on the assumption that children have, or should
have, rights. Considerable attention has been given to defining those interests
unique to the child that require protection as legally recognized rights. The
trust model has been introduced to reconcile the assertion that children have
rights with the fact that in many instances children are incapable of prudently
exercising those rights. Certain basic elements of trust law have been used as
an analogy to conceptualize the proper relationship between the child and his
parents or the state. The trust model would allow a court to recognize that
children have rights and to still permit parents or the state to exercise those
Ann. Stat. ch. 52, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1967) ("In case of a divorce, the court granting the divorce
may dispose of the homestead estate according to the equities of the case."); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
125.150(1) (1973) ("disposition of the community property of the parties, as appears just and
equitable').
79. Weltz v. Weltz, 35 App. Div. 2d 208, 209, 315 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (1970); accord, Lerner
v. Lerner, 21 App. Div. 2d 861, 862, 251 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1964); Rosentiel v. Rosentiel, 20
App. Div. 2d 71, 76-77, 245 N.Y.S.2d 395, 401-02 (1963).
80. Dubno v. Dubno, 51 App. Div. 2d 693, 379 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1976). See also Smith v.
Smith, 49 Cal. App. 2d 716, 122 P.2d 346 (1942) (temporary order excluding a husband from the
marital home was justified because he had discharged a gun in the home).
81. Binet v. Binet, 53 App. Div. 2d 836, 385 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); accord, Broadhurst v.
Broadhurst, 50 App. Div. 2d 569, 374 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1975); Scampoli v. Scampoli, 37 App. Dlv.
2d 614, 323 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1971); Mayeri v. Mayeri, 26 Misc. 2d 6, 208 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
82. Bonardi v. Bonardi, 55 App. Div. 2d 613, 389 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1976).
[Vol. 46
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
rights on the child's behalf until such time as the child is capable of exercising
them for himself.1
The interests which should be recognized as legally enforceable rights
constitute the corpus of the trust which is held by an adult party, either
parents or state, as trustee for the benefit of the child.2 The trust model places
two significant limitations on the trustee's power by virtue of the fact that the
rights exercised by the trustee are not his own but belong to the beneficial
owner-the child.3 The first limitation is that in exercising the rights on
behalf of the child, the trustee must meet a high standard of care and
loyalty-a standard which might be developed by analogy with the duty
imposed upon fiduciaries. 4 The second limitation is that the duration of the
trust is determined by the child's ability to exercise, protect, and enforce his
own rights. 5 As the child develops the capacity to exercise each right on his
own behalf there is no longer any need to protect him from the imprudent
exercise of the right. The trustee then relinquishes to the child his control of
the right, and the trust terminates in much the same way that a property trust
automatically terminates when the purpose of the trust is achieved. Ulti-
mately, the trust is completely terminated when the child is able to exercise all
of his rights.6
The corpus of the trust is composed of rights which have been organized
into three general areas: rights in the juvenile justice system,7 rights in the
compulsory educational system,8 and rights within the family. 9
The child's rights in the juvenile justice system, particularly with regard to
the rights of the status offender, should include the right to personal liberty' 0
and the right to civil liberty.11 The right to personal liberty, defined in its
broadest terms, is the right to make decisions concerning one's own life. 12 The
right to civil liberty is the right to fair treatment when personal liberty is
limited in order to protect the rights of others. 13 While the State's justifiable
concern with the quality of the citizenry can require restricting the personal
liberty of a child in order to protect him from a wanton life, the child has a
right to expect unimpaired civil liberty.14 The child is entitled to be protected
from the arbitrary restraint of his personal liberty-restraint that has tradi-
tionally passed for state paternalism. 15
1. See pt. I supra, notes 15-40 and acgompanying text.
2. See pt. I supra, notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
3. See pt. I supra, notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
4. See pt. I supra, notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
5. See pt. I supra, notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
6. See id.
7. See pt. IH supra.
8. See pt. I supra.
9. See pt. IV supra.
10. See pt. 11(A), (B) supra.
11. See pt. II(D) supra.
12. See pt. I(B) supra.
13. See pt. I(A), (D) supra.
14. See pt. 11(B), (D) supra, notes 47-51, 102-10 and accompanying text.
15. See pt. I(D)(1), (2) supra, notes 111-15, 149-65 and accompanying text.
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Within the compulsory education system the child should have a right to
intellectual development and a right to dignity and self-respect. 16 Recognition
of these rights requires a shift in emphasis from the interests of parents and
the State in education toward the interests of the individuals for whose benefit
the institution of compulsory education was created-children. 17 The recog-
nition of these rights would impose a duty on the State to design an
educational system which would advance rather than stifle a child's rights. 18
Traditionally the courts have refrained from imposing duties on state educa-
tors, who have been allowed wide discretion to use their expertise to design
educational programs. 19 But just as a trustee's broad discretion to manage a
trust is terminated when the court finds he has breached his fiduciary duty,
the judiciary should no longer defer to the discretion of an educator once he
has breached his duty to the child.20 A child's right to due process should
protect him from arbitrary confinement. 21 If it were shown that compulsory
education statutes result in confinement without education-as might well be
the case in some urban schools-the courts would be justified in granting a
remedy. 22
The child's interests within the family which deserve legal recognition are
parental nurturing, 23 affirmative participation in custody decisions,2 4 and
physical security. 25 A right to nurturing would guarantee the child every
reasonable opportunity for normal physical and emotional development.
26
Recognition of this right would require the courts to expand the affirmative
duties of parents in providing physical care,27 and to acknowledge the
parental role in safeguarding the emotional health of the developing child.28
The parent's duty to nurture, which is conceptually analogous to the trustee's
affirmative duty to develop the corpus of the trust, may be found in its
incipiency in the state neglect statutes. 29 The courts should be capable of
protecting the child's right to both physical and emotional care in neglect
cases by choosing supportive remedies such as family counseling rather than
disruptive remedies such as revoking custody.30 In this way, the legal view of
16. See pt. M11(A) supra.
17. See generally In re New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111,
122, 347 N.E.2d 568, 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 215 (1976) (the student should be the primary
concern).
18. See pt. HI(B)(1) supra.
19. See pt. I11(B)(3) supra.
20. See pt. 111(C) supra, notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
21. See pt. IfI(B)(1), (3) supra, notes 60-101, 128-35 and accompanying text.
22. See pt. 1II(C) supra.
23. See pt. IV(A) supra.
24. See pt. IV(B) supra.
25. See pt. IV(C) supra.
26. See pt. IV(A) supra, note 8 and accompanying text.
27. See pt. IV(A)(1)(a) supra.
28. See pt. IV(A)(1)(b) supra.
29. See pt. IV(A)(1)(a) supra.
30. See pt. IV(A)(2) supra.
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a child's development would be more closely aligned with the view held by
other disciplines which stress the crucial importance of early parental care. 31
The child should also have a right to have his interests in the parent-child
relationship respected in custody proceedings. 32 Although the interests of the
child are generally deemed to be the paramount consideration in custody
decisions, 33 the interests of the parents usually prdvail because it has been
assumed that an identity of interests exists between parents and child. 34 The
trust analogy can help to make the child's interests the paramount considera-
tion in practice and still preserve the wide parental discretion necessary for
child rearing. By viewing the parent-child relationship as one of trust, the
child's individual interests and the parent's discretion are both protected
because the parent would have an obligation, akin to a trustee's duty of
loyalty, to exercise his discretion solely for the child's benefit. 35 The institution
of a divorce, neglect, or abandonment proceeding would cast doubt on the
parent's ability to fulfill this obligation. 36 In these difficult situations the court
should place the child in the care of the adult who has the ability to exercise
discretion for the child's benefit. 37 The child should be guaranteed affirmative
participation in the custody decision to insure that his interests are the
touchstone of that decision. 38 The nature of the child's involvement in the
resolution of the custody issue depends on the extent to which the purpose of
the trust has been achieved-that is, the extent to which the child is capable
of determining his own interests.39 The blanket presumption of incapacity
that presently applies to all children should be replaced by a system that
draws a distinction between pre-adolescents and adolescents, taking into
account the pre-adolescents' need for supervision and direction and the
adolescents' ability to determine their own interests. 40 Recognition of the
child's right to have his interest in the parent-child relationship respected
could be accomplished by giving the pre-adolescent the right to have the
custody decision made on the basis of the "least detrimental alternative" 4' and
the adolescent the right to choose his custodial arrangement. 42 In addition,
the adolescent should also have the right to initiate a challenge to his parents'
custody when he can establish that they have breached their obligation to
exercise their discretion for his benefit by actively preventing him from
developing his own attitudes and goals. 43
31. See pt. IV(A)(1) supra, notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
32. See pt. IV(B) supra.
33. See pt. IV(B)(1) supra, notes 32-34, 73 and accompanying text.
34. See pt. IV(B)(1)(b), (2) supra, notes 81, 98-100 and accompanying text.
35. See pt. IV(B)(2) supra, notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
36. See pt. IV(B)(1) supra.
37. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra, note 109 and accompanying text.
38. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra.
39. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra, notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
40. See id.
41. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra, notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
42. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra, notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
43. See pt. IV(B)(2)(b) supra, notes 149-95 and accompanying text.
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The third right the child deserves in the family relationship is the right to a
safe, secure home environment, free of abuse by parent or guardian. 4 4 When
a parent exceeds the limits of reasonable discipline and abuses his child, the
child's right to physical security is infringed. When, as a result of such abuse,
the state removes the child from his home, his interest in a stable home
environment is infringed and the parents' right in the family is protected. 45 If
the child is to share equally in the rights of the family, 46 his interests in
remaining in his home, free from abuse, is as important as his parent's right to
family autonomy, and should prevail when a conflict between the two is
caused by the parent's abusive behavior. By analogy with trust law, there
should be a mechanism for removing the trustee who has abused his position.
Therefore, if necessary to preserve the child's physical security, the abused
child should remain in his familiar home environment and the abusing parent
should be removed. 47
Connie K. Beck
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Susan A. Glover
Mary Barnes Jenkins
Richard A. Nardi48
44. See pt. IV(C) supra, notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
45. See pt. IV(C) supra, text accompanying note 16.
46. See pt. IV(C)(1) supra, notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
47. See pt. IV(C)(2) supra.
48. Pts. I & IV(A) prepared by Mary Barnes Jenkins; pt. II by Connie K. Beck; pt. III by
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